Thursday 12 October 2006
We had been discussing whether the actus reus of a crime could be committed by an omission.
That is the case where there is a voluntary assumption of responsibility by the defendant. In Stone and Dobinson [1977] a 67 year old deaf, partially blind man of low intelligence, and the defendant, a 43 year old partner, described as ineffectual and inadequate, allowed the victim, the man’s 61 year old sister, to live with them. the victim suffered from anorexia nervosa and kept to herself. Eventually, however, the defendant and a neighbour intervened to clean both her and her bedroom. S and the defendant then made ineffectual efforts to contact a doctor but gave up, though they could easily have informed a social worker who regularly visited S’s son. the victim became bedridden and died from infected bedsores. Both were convicted of manslaughter and their convictions were upheld on appeal. S was a blood relation and had involved himself by trying to find a doctor. the defendant had involved herself by cleaning the victim and also by trying to find a doctor. Neither could then simply ignore the victim’s plight;
Where a dangerous situation is created, the defendant is under a duty to rectify it: Miller [1983].
The actus reus of a crime must be voluntary, barring the issue of state of affairs crimes discussed previously.
This needs to be thought of when discussing defences, e.g. automatism and duress.
We then turned to the issue of causation, which although of general importance, must always be discussed in homicide matters. In all crimes where a consequence (result) must be proved, the defendant’s conduct must be shown to have caused that result. Traditionally, this is said to require proof that the defendant’s conduct was both a cause in fact and a cause in law.
To be a cause in fact the defendant’s conduct must satisfy the “BUT-FOR” test. This means that the consequence would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct. See Pagett [1983] where although police bullets had killed the defendant’s hostage, the victim, this would never have happened if P had not taken the victim hostage, fired at the policemen pursuing him and held the victim in front of himself as a shield. Contrast with White [1910], though the defendant sought to kill his mother by poisoning her and she did in fact die during the night, the death resulted from a heart attack unaffected in any way by the poison. The poison was not a “but for” cause.
However, there will be very many “causes” in this sense and a further test is required to distinguish the cause or causes which will be sufficient for the purposes of criminal liability. This is known as causation in law. Many different forms of expression have been used, e.g.:
# substantial
# operating and substantial
# proximate
# imputable
None provides a test which will unerringly lead to the correct answer, for it is just changing one set of words for another.
“Significant contribution was used in Pagett and emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Cheshire [1991] (see below). What we can say is:
# whether the phrase is “substantial and operating”, “significant contribution” or some other, what is required is that it must he more than de minimus (the law takes no account of trifling matters);
# the conduct need not be the sole cause. So two or more people may be liable for the consequence.
# the enquiry often becomes one about whether the chain of causation has been broken by intervening events. The areas most commonly discussed are:
REFUSAL OF TREATMENT BY THE VICTIM. The courts have insisted that the defendant remains responsible for any consequence which flows from his conduct even if that consequence could have been avoided if the victim had sought medical treatment. Thus, the defendant was held to have caused the victim’s death when, having been injured in an attack by the defendant and advised to have his thumb amputated to prevent lockjaw, the victim initially refused and contracted the fatal infection: Holland [1841]. See also Blaue [1975].
THE ESPECIALLY SUSCEPTIBLE VICTIM (THE “THIN SKULL” VICTIM). The general rule is that the defendant must “take his victim as he finds him’’. This means that if because of some special weakness in the victim the defendant causes greater injury to the victim than would have been expected the defendant will nevertheless be held to have caused the greater injuries. Thus, attacks which bring on death through heart failure on account of some pre-existing condition in an apparently healthy victim will be held to cause the death: Hayward [1908]. This rule was utilised and further explained in Blaue.
INJURIES RESULTING FROM AN ATTEMPTED ESCAPE. The rule here is that the defendant will be held to cause any injuries which result from the reasonably foreseeable attempt by the victim to escape the danger being created by the defendant. The rule acknowledges that, in such circumstances of fear and danger, a victim’s response may still be reasonably foreseeable even though more reasoned reflection might have suggested a different response. In Roberts [1971] the defendant was held to have caused the injuries sustained by the victim in jumping out of a car moving at about 25 mph on a quiet road. the victim had jumped out in order to avoid the defendant’s unwelcome sexual attentions (he had begun to unbutton her coat); See also Pitts [1842] where the victim jumped into a river and drowned.
NEGLIGENT, POOR OR INAPPROPRIATE MEDICAL TREATMENT. A favourite examination topic. The courts are notoriously reluctant to accept that poor medical treatment breaks the chain of causation between the defendant’s conduct and the ultimate consequence (which, in the cases decided, is almost invariably death). See cases of Smith [1959] and Cheshire [1991] for examples of where the chain wasn’t broken. The only success can be found in Jordan [1956], where the victim’s original injuries had healed and death was said to have been brought about by the administering of an antibiotic which the victim could not tolerate, in with the intravenous administration of a large amount of fluid.
It is safe to say, therefore, that if the original injury is still a part of the ultimate consequence the chain will not be broken, otherwise it is broken.
Having looked at the actus reus we then began on the mens rea element of a crime.
The mens rea is the mental element, and includes (i) intention (ii) recklessness and (iii) negligence. There is a fourth category of blameless inadvertence, but it is of no importance to us.
Defining intention has been notoriously difficult for the courts over the years. Everyone claims to know when a person intends to do something, but has difficulty in explaining why.
Briefly, there are two types of intention:
(1) DIRECT – the consequence is desired
(2) OBLIQUE – the consequence is not desired for its own sake, but is virtually certain to occur barring some unforeseen intervention.
There is a file on the website explaining this in more detail.
I used an example whereby I wanted to kill the driver of a motor vehicle, by cutting the brake pipes. However, I didn’t want to kill the passenger. I have DIRECT intention towards the driver, but whether I have OBLIQUE intention towards the passenger will depend upon how many days a week he/she travels in the car. It must be virtually certain that death will occur before a jury can even begin to think about whether I intended the consequence. I suggested only 4 days a week would be enough, anything less would fall below the necessary standard required.
Because of all the uncertainty Parliament stepped in with s8 Criminal Justice Act 1967:
“… shall not be bound in law to infer that the defendant intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of it being a natural and probable consequence of those actions, but … shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.”.
The current law must be deduced from analysis of a series of House of Lords Court of Appeal decisions which began with Moloney [1985]. I went on to explain the details of the case, where on the face of it it was ‘obvious’ that the defendant intended to kill or seriously injure, yet having heard his story it wasn’t what it seemed. The later cases of Nedrick [1986] (Court of Appeal) and Woollin [1998] (House of Lords) the issue may appear to be settled.
In Nedrick [1986] a misdirection by the trial judge led to the Court of Appeal substituting a conviction for manslaughter. They stated that foresight of virtual certainty was evidence on which a jury could infer that the person intended that consequence (although they were not obliged to do so). With one minor exception the House of Lords approved of the statement in Woollin [1998]. Woollin had again been convicted because of a misdirection by the trial judge, and the House of Lords were asked (in effect) to approve of the decision in Nedrick. They did so, albeit changing the word ‘infer’ to ‘find’. Strange, given that Criminal Justice Act 2003 1967 (above) uses the word ‘infer’! Oh well. So the modified direction with regard to intention is now:
“Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where a simple direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) a as result of the defendant’s action and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.”
We will look at this in the light of later cases next week.

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