Thursday 2 November 2006
We continued with a talk on offences of strict liability. In Gammon v A-G of Hong Kong [1985], Lord Scarman set out a framework for determining whether the presumption in favour of mens rea is displaced in any particular crime. Some of them seem to make more sense than others, as inconsistency creeps in.
(1) The presumption is particularly strong where the offence is “truly criminal”. What does that mean? Serious, perhaps all, offences against the person would be so regarded. Which others would? No problem with rape, murder and theft. But some violations involving strict liability offences can be very serious, e.g. a victim may be killed as a result of speeding.
(2) It applies to statutory crimes and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute. Clearly, the words of the statute will be very important and the following may be factors:
(a) some words import mens rea, e.g. “knowingly” does, “permits” may do, as may “wilfully”, but “causes” does not. See: Alphacell v Woodward [1972].
(b) comparison of different sections of the same statute; absence of mens rea words in the section in question but their presence in others suggests strict liability, for example MEDICINES ACT 1968 ss58(2) and 63-65: Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Storkwain).
(3) The statute must deal with an issue of social concern, including:
drugs - Warner v MPC [1969] (discussed previously).
pollution - Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] the House of Lords held that a company was guilty of polluting a river. They had installed a device in an effort to prevent pollution, but the pumps became blocked by vegetation and polluted water overflowed into the river. There was no evidence that the company was negligent or that it knew of the pollution.
public safety - Gammon (above) concerned deviation from approved building plans in consequence of which part of a building collapsed.
owning or being in charge of a dog dangerously out of control in a public place contrary to the DANGEROUS DOGS ACT 1991 s3(1).
To these we can add two much later decisions:
Harrow LBC v Shah [1999]: selling a lottery ticket to a person under 16 years is a strict liability offence, even though the offence carries imprisonment of up to three months.
B v DPP [2000]: the House of Lords held that gross indecency with a child under the age of 14 years is so serious that mens rea as to age is required.
(4) Even so, strict liability must be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance not to commit the prohibited act. The arguments in favour are:
if a person runs a business properly, the law should not be broken. If the actus reus is committed, the business is improperly run.
that it is easier to obtain convictions; guilty people will not escape through lack of evidence, especially companies (Alphacell v Woodward).
strict liability raises standards all round, certain activities must be prohibited for the public good (regulatory offences).
it is easier to enforce the law when mens rea is irrelevant (Storkwain).
strict liability deters others from committing the same offence.
a person who creates a risk & takes a profit from it ought to be liable if the creation of the risk causes problems.
it avoids the increased length of trials. Courts are not overburdened with prosecutions seeking to prove petty violations
Some arguments against:
there is no evidence that standards are raised .
it is wrong to punish people who have not voluntarily broke the law. They are not blameworthy, and the penalties are sometimes very severe, e.g. in Larsonneur she was deported.
it is especially wrong to punish a person who has taken all reasonable care. In Callow v Tillstone [1900] a butcher was convicted of exposing meat for sale which was not fit for human consumption despite the fact that he had a veterinary surgeon’s certificate certifying it as sound. Consider also Storkwain.
strict liability offences are not always rigorously enforced. For example, factory inspectors do not prosecute without warning the offender first. Do such offences fit easily within criminal law?
respect for the law is lessened, a person has a conviction who is not blameworthy.
people, such as butchers, would be put out of work if the rules were strictly enforced, and that is not what the public really wants.
when a judge deals with a strict liability offence the jury is excluded from all arguments regarding intention etc., yet they are relevant to the sentence.
Should the government decide to pass a law that made it a crime to have flu, a condition which you are powerless to prevent, there would be an outcry. Earlier we looked at 2 cases, namely Winzar v C.C. of Kent [1983] & Larsonneur [1933]. In the former the defendant had been removed from a hospital and gently placed on the pavement, & was then arrested for being ‘found drunk’. In the later the defendant was deported from Ireland to England, & was then convicted of being an illegal immigrant. In neither case could the defendant do anything to prevent the situation.
And now for something completely different. We turn our attention to general defences to crime. Whilst defences such as provocation and diminished responsibility are defences that are specific to a particular crime, in this case murder, other defences have a general application towards most, if not all, crimes.
INFANCY - DOLI INCAPAX. A child under 10 years cannot commit a crime. Such a child is irrebuttably presumed to be incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong (i.e. doli incapax) - s50 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1933 as amended by s16 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1963. For implications, see Walters v Lunt [1951] where parents could not handle a “stolen” bike because the bike could not be stolen by their seven-year old son.
Once the person reaches 10 years of age they are deemed to be responsible for their own actions in exactly the same way as adults, although the sentencing framework is different.
Since changes in the law it is highly unlikely that the defence will figure in an examination.
We then looked at INSANITY. The defence is rarely raised today, for a variety of reasons including, the use of diminished responsibility, the punishment of an indeterminate time in a mental hospital may be less attractive than a few years in prison.
REMEMBER, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THAT THE DEFINITION GIVEN IS A LEGAL ONE, NOT A MEDICAL ONE.
the defendant’s sanity may be raised at either of two stages before trial.
(1) unfit for trial – may have nothing to do with the offence
(2) insane at the time of committing the offence
If the defendant has been committed in custody awaiting trial, the Home Secretary may order him to be detained in a hospital because of his mental state – ss 47 & 48 Mental Health Act 1983.
When the defendant is brought up for trial, he may be unfit to plead because of his mental state. The CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 s4 as amended by the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY AND UNFITNESS TO PLEAD) ACT 1991, and further amended by s22 Domestic Violence Crime & Victims Act 2004, provides for a judge to determine whether or not the defendant was insane at the time he committed the act. If this is the case a jury is empanelled to decide whether or not the defendant committed the actus reus of the crime. He can’t have possessed the mens rea remember, because of his mental state. Relying on the evidence adduced to that point, and any further evidence which may be adduced, the jury may acquit the defendant if they find that he did not do the act or make the omission. Otherwise, the jury will determine that the defendant did do the act or omission. Where found unfit to plead, the defendant may be subject to any one of four orders (s5 as amended by the 1991 Act):
admission to a hospital specified by the Secretary of State - this is no longer automatically accompanied by restriction on release though the judge has power to make such a direction;
for guardianship;
for supervision and treatment this will be by a social worker or probation officer and for a specified period of not more than two years;
for an absolute discharge.
However in the case of any offence for which the penalty is specified by law, i.e. murder, the judge must make an admission to hospital order and must direct that release be restricted without limit of time.
Many defendants suffering from some type of mental disorder would not stand trial but would be detained under the Mental Health Act.
When the defendant contends that he was insane at the time of commission of the alleged offence, the defence of insanity is based on the rules developed in M’Naghten [1843]. The defendant, believing that he was being persecuted by the Tories, fired his gun at Prime Minister Peel, but killed his secretary, Edward Drummond. Medical opinion showed that he was suffering from morbid delusions which might have affected his perception of right & wrong. From this developed the test for insanity:
Everyone is rebuttably presumed to be sane.
To rebut this presumption, the defendant must show (on a balance of probabilities) that at the time of committing the actus reus he was labouring from such a defect of reason, caused by a disease of the mind, that either he did not know the nature and quality of his act or he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
In Bratty v A.G. for Northern Ireland [1963] a disease of the mind was said to be ‘any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur’. This is nonsense, for you do not have to be violent. In Burgess [1991] the Court of Appeal said that the absence of danger of recurrence is not a reason for saying it cannot be a disease of the mind.
A “defect of reason” means the defendant was incapable of exercising a power of reasoning. Mere failure to exercise power of reason, e.g. through temporary absent-mindedness, is not enough: Clarke [1972].
To compare a “disease of the mind” by the cases of:
Kemp [1957]: arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries within the brain came within the phrase.
Charlson [1955]: a cerebral tumour did not.
The meaning of a disease of the mind was expressed by Lord Diplock in Sullivan [1984]:
“It did not matter whether the impairment itself was organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself was permanent or transient or intermittent, provided it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act, since the purpose of the legislation relating to insanity was to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous state no matter how temporary the duration of the suspension of facilities might be. It followed therefore that if the occurrence of an epileptic fit brought about a temporary suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding during the course of which the offence was committed, the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was appropriate.”
Thus, various forms of epilepsy may constitute disease of the mind: Sullivan. S was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and his defence was that he did not know what he was doing because he was recovering from a minor epileptic fit at the time. When the trial judge ruled that the defence raised was one of insanity, S changed his plea to guilty. The House of Lords upheld the trial judge’s ruling. The main limit seems to be that the disease must be caused by some internal, not external, factor.
Clearly, however, not all epileptics ought to be detained. In Sullivan he suffered from a rare form of the disease which manifested itself in violence.
Diabetes is a disease in which the body does not produce enough insulin to break down blood sugar. If not reduced, increasing levels of blood sugar (hyperglycaemia) will result progressively in confusion, disorientation, possible drunken-like behaviour and aggression, lack of consciousness, coma and death. Excessively low levels of blood sugar (hypoglycaemia) produce almost identical effects. The former condition results from lack of insulin, the latter from too much (usually in combination with a failure to maintain a correct diet). The courts have categorised lack of voluntariness due to hyperglycaemia as insanity (an internal factor, the disease itself) but involuntariness due to hypoglycaemia as automatism (an external factor, the taking of the insulin).
In Hennessy [1989] the defendant claimed that he had taken a conveyance without consent and had driven whilst disqualified when suffering from hyperglycaemia brought about by his failure to take insulin, in part because of stress, anxiety and depression caused by marital problems. The Court of Appeal characterised the latter as internal factors and held that the defence was insanity because the hyperglycaemic state resulted from the disease of diabetes itself.
Compare with Quick [1973] where the defendant’s conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm was quashed when it was accepted by the Court of Appeal that, at the time of the attack, he was in a state of hypoglycaemia produced by a combination of an insulin injection and lack of food.
Sleepwalking used to be regarded as an example of automatism not arising from a disease of the mind and therefore not an example of insanity. However, it was almost inevitable that that view would be revised in the light of the definition of “disease of the mind” adopted in Sullivan and this did indeed occur in Burgess [1991] (above). THE defendant admitted that he must have hit the defendant on the head with a bottle and a video recorder and grasped her throat. However, he claimed that they had both fallen asleep whilst watching a video tape and that the incidents occurred whilst he was still asleep. The judge ruled that the defendant’s explanation amounted to a plea of insanity and the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. On appeal, he contended that his plea was one of non-insane automatism. Sleepwalking was held by the Court of Appeal to arise from an internal and not external cause and, despite its transitory nature, to be an abnormality, whether functional or organic, which had manifested itself in violence. It was a disorder or abnormality which might recur, though the possibility of it recurring in the form of serious violence was unlikely. Thus, the condition fell squarely within the description of insanity proposed in Sullivan and, however incongruous the result, only Parliament could alter it.
Another problem with “disease of the mind” is its uncertainty. In Charlson [1955] (above) a father asked his son to look out of the window to see a rat swimming in the river. When he did so he hit the boy over the head with a hammer and threw him from the window. He said that he knew he was killing him, but had no idea why. As the defendant was suffering from a brain tumour, the trial judge directed that this was a physical disease, outside of M’Naghten. This was disapproved of by Lord Denning in Bratty, and is at odds with Kemp [1957].
The “nature and quality of the “act refers to the physical nature of the act, not its moral or legal nature. See Codere [1916] where the defendant thinks he is chopping wood when he is in fact chopping someone’s head off!
“Knowing the act is wrong” was interpreted by Windle [1952] as meaning legally wrong. W, whose wife had often talked about committing suicide, persuaded her to take 100 aspirins because he thought she would be better off dead. On appeal. it was held that the trial judge had correctly ruled out insanity because W had admitted that he knew he would be hanged for what he had done. He knew it was illegal. He was hung.
If the defendant pleads insanity successfully, the verdict is “not guilty by reason of insanity”; s1 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (known as the ‘special verdict’). Following such a verdict, it was very likely that the defendant would be detained in a secure hospital and no doubt this deterred many Ds from pleading the defence (many changed their pleas to guilty on being faced with this prospect during trial). In consequence of the amendments to s5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 made by the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY AND UNFITNESS TO PLEAD) ACT 1991, the judge now has the range of options available (above).
SOME THOUGHTS:
insanity is caused by an internal factor, automatism by an external factor.
Lord Diplock has suggested that the rules are meant to differentiate between dangerous & non-dangerous individuals. Why are epileptics dangerous, but some diabetics not?
If a person is insane he can still plead guilty, but is still dangerous.
Including epileptics as insane has led some Crown Court judges to refuse to follow Sullivan. In McFarlane [1990] the judge directed the jury that the accused was not guilty if she was undergoing a fit when she occasioned a.b.h. on a constable who was searching her home for stolen goods.
In Quick [1973] Lawton LJ said that a ‘disease of the mind’ should not cause incredulity to normal people, and so labelling a sleepwalker as insane seems inappropriate.
The definition dates from 1843 and has not developed to take account of modern-day medicine.
The 1953 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment heard that the rules were “entirely obsolete and misleading”.
A medically insane person may well know the nature and quality of his act, and know it is wrong, but still commit the offence through illness.
A legally insane person may not be medically insane, yet medical treatment is imposed!
Article 5 ECHR protects liberty, and states that a person of unsound mind can only be detained where proper account of medial expertise is taken,.
There is a danger, as we shall see, where a defendant alleges automatism. He runs the risk of being proved insane by the prosecution.
We’ll begin with automatism next week.
(1) The presumption is particularly strong where the offence is “truly criminal”. What does that mean? Serious, perhaps all, offences against the person would be so regarded. Which others would? No problem with rape, murder and theft. But some violations involving strict liability offences can be very serious, e.g. a victim may be killed as a result of speeding.
(2) It applies to statutory crimes and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute. Clearly, the words of the statute will be very important and the following may be factors:
(a) some words import mens rea, e.g. “knowingly” does, “permits” may do, as may “wilfully”, but “causes” does not. See: Alphacell v Woodward [1972].
(b) comparison of different sections of the same statute; absence of mens rea words in the section in question but their presence in others suggests strict liability, for example MEDICINES ACT 1968 ss58(2) and 63-65: Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Storkwain).
(3) The statute must deal with an issue of social concern, including:
drugs - Warner v MPC [1969] (discussed previously).
pollution - Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] the House of Lords held that a company was guilty of polluting a river. They had installed a device in an effort to prevent pollution, but the pumps became blocked by vegetation and polluted water overflowed into the river. There was no evidence that the company was negligent or that it knew of the pollution.
public safety - Gammon (above) concerned deviation from approved building plans in consequence of which part of a building collapsed.
owning or being in charge of a dog dangerously out of control in a public place contrary to the DANGEROUS DOGS ACT 1991 s3(1).
To these we can add two much later decisions:
Harrow LBC v Shah [1999]: selling a lottery ticket to a person under 16 years is a strict liability offence, even though the offence carries imprisonment of up to three months.
B v DPP [2000]: the House of Lords held that gross indecency with a child under the age of 14 years is so serious that mens rea as to age is required.
(4) Even so, strict liability must be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance not to commit the prohibited act. The arguments in favour are:
if a person runs a business properly, the law should not be broken. If the actus reus is committed, the business is improperly run.
that it is easier to obtain convictions; guilty people will not escape through lack of evidence, especially companies (Alphacell v Woodward).
strict liability raises standards all round, certain activities must be prohibited for the public good (regulatory offences).
it is easier to enforce the law when mens rea is irrelevant (Storkwain).
strict liability deters others from committing the same offence.
a person who creates a risk & takes a profit from it ought to be liable if the creation of the risk causes problems.
it avoids the increased length of trials. Courts are not overburdened with prosecutions seeking to prove petty violations
Some arguments against:
there is no evidence that standards are raised .
it is wrong to punish people who have not voluntarily broke the law. They are not blameworthy, and the penalties are sometimes very severe, e.g. in Larsonneur she was deported.
it is especially wrong to punish a person who has taken all reasonable care. In Callow v Tillstone [1900] a butcher was convicted of exposing meat for sale which was not fit for human consumption despite the fact that he had a veterinary surgeon’s certificate certifying it as sound. Consider also Storkwain.
strict liability offences are not always rigorously enforced. For example, factory inspectors do not prosecute without warning the offender first. Do such offences fit easily within criminal law?
respect for the law is lessened, a person has a conviction who is not blameworthy.
people, such as butchers, would be put out of work if the rules were strictly enforced, and that is not what the public really wants.
when a judge deals with a strict liability offence the jury is excluded from all arguments regarding intention etc., yet they are relevant to the sentence.
Should the government decide to pass a law that made it a crime to have flu, a condition which you are powerless to prevent, there would be an outcry. Earlier we looked at 2 cases, namely Winzar v C.C. of Kent [1983] & Larsonneur [1933]. In the former the defendant had been removed from a hospital and gently placed on the pavement, & was then arrested for being ‘found drunk’. In the later the defendant was deported from Ireland to England, & was then convicted of being an illegal immigrant. In neither case could the defendant do anything to prevent the situation.
And now for something completely different. We turn our attention to general defences to crime. Whilst defences such as provocation and diminished responsibility are defences that are specific to a particular crime, in this case murder, other defences have a general application towards most, if not all, crimes.
INFANCY - DOLI INCAPAX. A child under 10 years cannot commit a crime. Such a child is irrebuttably presumed to be incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong (i.e. doli incapax) - s50 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1933 as amended by s16 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1963. For implications, see Walters v Lunt [1951] where parents could not handle a “stolen” bike because the bike could not be stolen by their seven-year old son.
Once the person reaches 10 years of age they are deemed to be responsible for their own actions in exactly the same way as adults, although the sentencing framework is different.
Since changes in the law it is highly unlikely that the defence will figure in an examination.
We then looked at INSANITY. The defence is rarely raised today, for a variety of reasons including, the use of diminished responsibility, the punishment of an indeterminate time in a mental hospital may be less attractive than a few years in prison.
REMEMBER, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THAT THE DEFINITION GIVEN IS A LEGAL ONE, NOT A MEDICAL ONE.
the defendant’s sanity may be raised at either of two stages before trial.
(1) unfit for trial – may have nothing to do with the offence
(2) insane at the time of committing the offence
If the defendant has been committed in custody awaiting trial, the Home Secretary may order him to be detained in a hospital because of his mental state – ss 47 & 48 Mental Health Act 1983.
When the defendant is brought up for trial, he may be unfit to plead because of his mental state. The CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 s4 as amended by the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY AND UNFITNESS TO PLEAD) ACT 1991, and further amended by s22 Domestic Violence Crime & Victims Act 2004, provides for a judge to determine whether or not the defendant was insane at the time he committed the act. If this is the case a jury is empanelled to decide whether or not the defendant committed the actus reus of the crime. He can’t have possessed the mens rea remember, because of his mental state. Relying on the evidence adduced to that point, and any further evidence which may be adduced, the jury may acquit the defendant if they find that he did not do the act or make the omission. Otherwise, the jury will determine that the defendant did do the act or omission. Where found unfit to plead, the defendant may be subject to any one of four orders (s5 as amended by the 1991 Act):
admission to a hospital specified by the Secretary of State - this is no longer automatically accompanied by restriction on release though the judge has power to make such a direction;
for guardianship;
for supervision and treatment this will be by a social worker or probation officer and for a specified period of not more than two years;
for an absolute discharge.
However in the case of any offence for which the penalty is specified by law, i.e. murder, the judge must make an admission to hospital order and must direct that release be restricted without limit of time.
Many defendants suffering from some type of mental disorder would not stand trial but would be detained under the Mental Health Act.
When the defendant contends that he was insane at the time of commission of the alleged offence, the defence of insanity is based on the rules developed in M’Naghten [1843]. The defendant, believing that he was being persecuted by the Tories, fired his gun at Prime Minister Peel, but killed his secretary, Edward Drummond. Medical opinion showed that he was suffering from morbid delusions which might have affected his perception of right & wrong. From this developed the test for insanity:
Everyone is rebuttably presumed to be sane.
To rebut this presumption, the defendant must show (on a balance of probabilities) that at the time of committing the actus reus he was labouring from such a defect of reason, caused by a disease of the mind, that either he did not know the nature and quality of his act or he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
In Bratty v A.G. for Northern Ireland [1963] a disease of the mind was said to be ‘any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur’. This is nonsense, for you do not have to be violent. In Burgess [1991] the Court of Appeal said that the absence of danger of recurrence is not a reason for saying it cannot be a disease of the mind.
A “defect of reason” means the defendant was incapable of exercising a power of reasoning. Mere failure to exercise power of reason, e.g. through temporary absent-mindedness, is not enough: Clarke [1972].
To compare a “disease of the mind” by the cases of:
Kemp [1957]: arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries within the brain came within the phrase.
Charlson [1955]: a cerebral tumour did not.
The meaning of a disease of the mind was expressed by Lord Diplock in Sullivan [1984]:
“It did not matter whether the impairment itself was organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself was permanent or transient or intermittent, provided it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act, since the purpose of the legislation relating to insanity was to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous state no matter how temporary the duration of the suspension of facilities might be. It followed therefore that if the occurrence of an epileptic fit brought about a temporary suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding during the course of which the offence was committed, the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was appropriate.”
Thus, various forms of epilepsy may constitute disease of the mind: Sullivan. S was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and his defence was that he did not know what he was doing because he was recovering from a minor epileptic fit at the time. When the trial judge ruled that the defence raised was one of insanity, S changed his plea to guilty. The House of Lords upheld the trial judge’s ruling. The main limit seems to be that the disease must be caused by some internal, not external, factor.
Clearly, however, not all epileptics ought to be detained. In Sullivan he suffered from a rare form of the disease which manifested itself in violence.
Diabetes is a disease in which the body does not produce enough insulin to break down blood sugar. If not reduced, increasing levels of blood sugar (hyperglycaemia) will result progressively in confusion, disorientation, possible drunken-like behaviour and aggression, lack of consciousness, coma and death. Excessively low levels of blood sugar (hypoglycaemia) produce almost identical effects. The former condition results from lack of insulin, the latter from too much (usually in combination with a failure to maintain a correct diet). The courts have categorised lack of voluntariness due to hyperglycaemia as insanity (an internal factor, the disease itself) but involuntariness due to hypoglycaemia as automatism (an external factor, the taking of the insulin).
In Hennessy [1989] the defendant claimed that he had taken a conveyance without consent and had driven whilst disqualified when suffering from hyperglycaemia brought about by his failure to take insulin, in part because of stress, anxiety and depression caused by marital problems. The Court of Appeal characterised the latter as internal factors and held that the defence was insanity because the hyperglycaemic state resulted from the disease of diabetes itself.
Compare with Quick [1973] where the defendant’s conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm was quashed when it was accepted by the Court of Appeal that, at the time of the attack, he was in a state of hypoglycaemia produced by a combination of an insulin injection and lack of food.
Sleepwalking used to be regarded as an example of automatism not arising from a disease of the mind and therefore not an example of insanity. However, it was almost inevitable that that view would be revised in the light of the definition of “disease of the mind” adopted in Sullivan and this did indeed occur in Burgess [1991] (above). THE defendant admitted that he must have hit the defendant on the head with a bottle and a video recorder and grasped her throat. However, he claimed that they had both fallen asleep whilst watching a video tape and that the incidents occurred whilst he was still asleep. The judge ruled that the defendant’s explanation amounted to a plea of insanity and the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. On appeal, he contended that his plea was one of non-insane automatism. Sleepwalking was held by the Court of Appeal to arise from an internal and not external cause and, despite its transitory nature, to be an abnormality, whether functional or organic, which had manifested itself in violence. It was a disorder or abnormality which might recur, though the possibility of it recurring in the form of serious violence was unlikely. Thus, the condition fell squarely within the description of insanity proposed in Sullivan and, however incongruous the result, only Parliament could alter it.
Another problem with “disease of the mind” is its uncertainty. In Charlson [1955] (above) a father asked his son to look out of the window to see a rat swimming in the river. When he did so he hit the boy over the head with a hammer and threw him from the window. He said that he knew he was killing him, but had no idea why. As the defendant was suffering from a brain tumour, the trial judge directed that this was a physical disease, outside of M’Naghten. This was disapproved of by Lord Denning in Bratty, and is at odds with Kemp [1957].
The “nature and quality of the “act refers to the physical nature of the act, not its moral or legal nature. See Codere [1916] where the defendant thinks he is chopping wood when he is in fact chopping someone’s head off!
“Knowing the act is wrong” was interpreted by Windle [1952] as meaning legally wrong. W, whose wife had often talked about committing suicide, persuaded her to take 100 aspirins because he thought she would be better off dead. On appeal. it was held that the trial judge had correctly ruled out insanity because W had admitted that he knew he would be hanged for what he had done. He knew it was illegal. He was hung.
If the defendant pleads insanity successfully, the verdict is “not guilty by reason of insanity”; s1 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (known as the ‘special verdict’). Following such a verdict, it was very likely that the defendant would be detained in a secure hospital and no doubt this deterred many Ds from pleading the defence (many changed their pleas to guilty on being faced with this prospect during trial). In consequence of the amendments to s5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 made by the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY AND UNFITNESS TO PLEAD) ACT 1991, the judge now has the range of options available (above).
SOME THOUGHTS:
insanity is caused by an internal factor, automatism by an external factor.
Lord Diplock has suggested that the rules are meant to differentiate between dangerous & non-dangerous individuals. Why are epileptics dangerous, but some diabetics not?
If a person is insane he can still plead guilty, but is still dangerous.
Including epileptics as insane has led some Crown Court judges to refuse to follow Sullivan. In McFarlane [1990] the judge directed the jury that the accused was not guilty if she was undergoing a fit when she occasioned a.b.h. on a constable who was searching her home for stolen goods.
In Quick [1973] Lawton LJ said that a ‘disease of the mind’ should not cause incredulity to normal people, and so labelling a sleepwalker as insane seems inappropriate.
The definition dates from 1843 and has not developed to take account of modern-day medicine.
The 1953 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment heard that the rules were “entirely obsolete and misleading”.
A medically insane person may well know the nature and quality of his act, and know it is wrong, but still commit the offence through illness.
A legally insane person may not be medically insane, yet medical treatment is imposed!
Article 5 ECHR protects liberty, and states that a person of unsound mind can only be detained where proper account of medial expertise is taken,.
There is a danger, as we shall see, where a defendant alleges automatism. He runs the risk of being proved insane by the prosecution.
We’ll begin with automatism next week.

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