Friday, November 10, 2006

Thursday 9 November 2006

We continued with our look at defences with the defence of automatism. Described by Lawton LJ in R v Quick [1973] as “a quagmire of law seldom entered into nowadays save by those in desperate need of some kind of defence.”

Since the actus reus must be a voluntary act a defendant will have a good defence if he can show that he was not in control of his bodily movements, i.e. his mind was not in control of his bodily movements, e.g. a reflex or spasm. The defence is available to any criminal charge. In Hill v Baxter [1958] the judge asserted that it would be automatism if the defendant were to be attacked by a swarm of bees whilst driving and unable to control his limbs because of bee stings (obiter).

Remember, a simple distinction between automatism and insanity can be explained as:

AUTOMATISM – the defence is available if the offence is committed because of an external factor.

INSANITY – the defence is available if the offence is caused by an internal factor.

To raise this defence D must present evidence of a fundamental loss of control not merely a partial loss as might occur when a person’s movements are poorly co-ordinated through tiredness, illness or drink. Consequently. it was held in A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] that D’s claim to ‘have been driving without awareness’ (an allegedly trance-like state caused by prolonged driving on featureless motorway’s) and during which he had collided with two vehicles on the hard shoulder and killed two people could not amount to automatism. There was no evidence of total destruction of control, merely impaired, reduced or partial control.

In R v T [1990] a Crown Court judge allowed D’s plea of automatism to charges of robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm to go before the jury on evidence that she had been raped three days before the offences were committed and that this had resulted in post traumatic stress disorder during which she had acted without conscious mind or will. The rape was presumably regarded as a precipitating external factor.

It must not be supposed that D will inevitably be acquitted if the evidence shows that he was acting involuntarily at the time of the offence. If D was in some way at fault in becoming an a automaton then he may still be liable. Thus, a person who is an automaton through drink or drugs voluntarily taken will be subject to the rules on intoxication. In Lipman [1969] where D killed his girlfriend while suffering hallucinations caused by taking LSD, the fact that he was an automaton merely helped to establish that he did not have the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm required for murder (an offence of specific intent). It did not enable him to escape conviction for manslaughter (an offence of basic intent).

A person who is at fault in some way not involving involuntary intoxication will not be restricted to pleading automatism to specific intent offences but may still be liable it the prosecution can prove that, at the time when he could have prevented himself becoming an automaton, he had an appropriate mental state in relation to the offence which he later allegedly committed.

In Hardie [1984] the Court of Appeal heard that the defendant was distressed by the breakdown of his relationship with V, D had taken about five valium (tranquilliser) tablets prescribed for V some eight years before. He had then set fire to a wardrobe in their bedroom. His defence of automatism on account of the effects of the valium was rejected by the judge on the grounds that his voluntary intoxication could provide no defence to the basic intent criminal damage offence with which he was charged. Allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal considered that voluntary consumption of valium, a sedative or soporific drug not known by D or by the public in general to promote aggressive behaviour or incapacity to appreciate risks, did not fall within the rules on voluntary intoxication. Therefore, the Court considered the jury should have been directed to consider whether D was reckless in taking the valium. Yet it concluded rather lamely, “we are unable to say what would have been the appropriate direction with regard to the elements of recklessness in this case …”

Note that the prosecution will not be obliged to disprove a plea of automatism unless D introduces some credible evidence to support it. If D does not do so, the jury will be told to disregard it. Where, according to the rules discussed above the prosecution fails to show beyond reasonable doubt that D was acting voluntarily (that is, where the plea of automatism succeeds), D is entitled to a complete acquittal.

From a practical point of view, counsel has to choose between advising a client to:

plead guilty & possibly get a light sentence, or
plead automatism, and risk the route to insanity opening up.

A far more important defence, common to most offences of violence is that of intoxication. I drew a flowchart on the board which I cannot replicate here. You should try to get a copy from a fellow student who was present.

The rules apply to drink, drugs and any other substance commonly perceived as producing the effects associated with drink and drugs, e.g. lighter fluid, white spirit etc.

The law is confused as there are two conflicting principles involved. The first is the need to punish people who have acted wrongly; whilst on the other hand accepting that an accused who is intoxicated may not realise what he is doing and is not, therefore, deserving of punishment. Hmm…

A distinction is drawn between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he knew he was ingesting intoxicants even though he may have been mistaken as to their strength - Allen [1989] - D intentionally drank wine and was held to be voluntarily intoxicated despite his claim not to have been aware of its high alcoholic content. A person is involuntarily intoxicated if he was unaware that he was ingesting intoxicants, as where, for instance, he drinks a “soft” drink “spiked” with alcohol or eats a piece of cake containing a hallucinogenic drug.

Assuming a medicine to be known by D or generally to be known to be capable of producing effects equivalent to intoxication, then D will be involuntarily intoxicated if he takes it in accordance with medical instruction. Though the point is not absolutely clear he will be regarded as voluntarily intoxicated if he takes medicine not prescribed for him or not in accordance with instructions.

As confirmed by the House of Lords in DPP v Majewski [1976], offences are divided into two categories, specific intent on the one hand, basic intent on the other.

Specific intent offences are satisfied by proof of nothing less than an intention. They include murder, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm, theft and robbery.

Basic intent offences are satisfied by proof of recklessness and include manslaughter, inflicting grievous bodily harm and lesser forms of assault/battery, and criminal damage.

Anyone charged with a specific intent offence may introduce evidence of intoxication in asserting that, at the time of the offence, he did not have the required intention. This does not mean that anyone who was drunk inevitably avoids liability for such an offence. The effect of the intoxication must be evaluated by the jury and the accused avoids liability if it tends to show that he did not form the intention. As is well known, intoxication often simply makes people more aggressive or less inhibited and, if this was the case, it would not assist D.

Anyone charged with a basic intent offence is simply not allowed to introduce evidence of intoxication to explain why he was not aware of a risk (was not reckless). Consequently, if he has no other independent argument to advance, it is almost certain that he will be convicted. A person who raises evidence of intoxication to avoid conviction for a specific intent offence will inevitably be convicted of any associated basic intent offence.

The rationale expressed by the House of Lords in Majewski for denying the defence of intoxication in basic intent offences was that the drunkenness itself supplies the evidence of the mens rea since it is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is enough to constitute the mens rea in a basic intent offence.

A person who is involuntarily intoxicated is allowed to introduce evidence of such intoxication as he would be allowed to introduce any other evidence to refute existence of mens rea so this is not restricted to specific intent crimes. However, the effect of the intoxication must be that D did not form the required mens rea, not merely that D would not have formed it but for the intoxication. This was established by the House of Lords in Kingston [1994]. D was in a business dispute with Y, who engaged X to lure D into a trap so that he could be blackmailed into resolving the dispute. D had paedophiliac homosexual tendencies and was invited by X, who also had such tendencies, to participate in the sexual abuse of a boy of 15 whom X had brought to his flat and drugged. D was photographed and taped abusing the unconscious boy. The plan was then for X to supply this evidence to Y. Both D and X were charged with indecent assault. A search of X’s flat revealed the presence of sedative drugs and it was argued that X had added some to a drink given to the boy. D claimed that he, too, had been given such a drink and that he had no recollection of anything after seeing the boy lying on the bed until he woke in his own home the next morning. D sought to claim that, though he knew what he was doing, he would not have done it but for the involuntary intoxication. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal which had held that there was no true mens rea because “a man is not responsible for a condition produced by stratagem of fraud of another”. Their Lordships were disturbed by how this principle would fit into current approaches to “irresistible impulse”, were fearful of the difficulties of evidence and proof which its adoption would create and preferred to allow justice to be served by appropriate adjustments of sentence.

The rule in Majewski does not apply where a statute provides that a particular belief will be a good defence - Jaggard v Dickinson [1980] and s5(2) CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971 which provides a potential defence to a charge of criminal damage to property where D acted with a “lawful excuse”; (later). In this case D acted with a lawful excuse because she believed (in her drunken state) that she had the consent, of the person she thought capable of giving valid consent, to damage the property. This provides an exception to the general rule that “a drunken mistake is still a mistake”. We will look at the statute and the case in further detail much later.

Note that, in the highly unlikely event that D forms the intention to commit and offence, deliberately becomes intoxicated to gain courage to do so, and then commits it whilst so intoxicated as not to have the intention, his original intention will suffice - A-G for N Ireland v Gallagher [1963] - ‘Dutch courage’.

Note also that persistent intoxication may give rise to degenerative changes which can be regarded as a disease of the mind and so give rise to a plea of insanity and that, in some cases, it may be a foundation for the defence to a charge of murder of diminished responsibility - Tandy [1989]. The fact that the disease is caused by drunkenness is irrelevant.

A defendant’s plea of mistake is generally either:

a denial of mens rea or
an assertion that had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would have had a defence to the crime with which he is charged.

Mistake or ignorance of the law will not absolve a defendant: Bailey [1800].

The leading case is the decision of the House of Lords in DPP v Morgan [1975] that D would not be guilty of rape if he genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believed that V consented to sexual intercourse. The reasonableness of his mistake was relevant only to the credibility of his assertion that he had made the mistake. Before this case, courts were apt to require any mistake to be reasonable no matter what the mental element for the crime. Of course, if the mistake results from intoxication, then D will not be allowed to introduce this explanation if the offence is one of basic intent. So, the jargon to remember is:

The mistake as to a fact does not have to be reasonable, just honestly held. So the more bizarre the story offered, the less likely it is to be believed. Good examples can be found in:

Gladstone Williams [1983], where M witnessed a youth snatching a woman’s handbag, chased after him, caught him and knocked him to the ground. D, who then came on the scene, was told by M that he (M) was arresting the youth and that he was a police officer (which he was not). D asked M to produce his warrant card, but of course he could not do so. A struggle then ensued between them during which D punched M. Quashing his conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the Court of Appeal held that D would lack the necessary mens rea if, on the facts as he mistakenly believed them to be, he was entitled to use reasonable force either in self-defence or in prevention of crime. The reason for this was that the mens rea is the intent to use unlawful force on another person.

Beckford [1987] B, an armed police officer, went to investigate a report of an armed and dangerous man terrorising his family. The Crown alleged that B and another shot and killed the man who was in fact unarmed. B claimed that the man had fired at the police and had been shot by them when they returned fire. The Privy Council quashed B’s conviction for murder, and held that the plea was one of self-defence based on a mistake as to the facts. In such a case, as stated in Williams (above) the accused had to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be. As long as no more than reasonable force was used in those (mistakenly) perceived circumstances, there was no criminal liability.

Tolson [1889] is presents an obstacle to the construction of any coherent theory of the effect of mistake in criminal law. D married again some five years after her husband had deserted her and had been reported to have drowned at sea. In fact, he was still alive and D could not come within the statutory defence to bigamy which required continual absence for seven years. D’s conviction was quashed but only because her mistake was reasonable, the Court asserting that the common law only allowed a defence of mistake if it was honest and reasonable.

Even so, there are situations in which a mistake of law may prevent D from having the mens rea required for the offence. For instance, theft requires a dishonest appropriation of another’s property. According to the THEFT ACT 1968 s2(1)(a), a person is not dishonest if he believes that in law he has the right to the property. So, a misinterpretation of the law by D which leads him to believe that he is the owner of property currently in V’s possession will mean that he is not dishonest when he appropriates it.

A similar proviso appears in the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971. We’ll cover both later.

NECESSITY = no choice
DURESS = forced by other
DURESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES = forced by circumstance
SELF DEFENCE = forced by third party

At first glance they seem to have little to do with one another, but at the end I will provide examples that seem to suggest a less than coherent approach by the judiciary.

In all these defences, D claims that when he committed the alleged offence, he had to make a choice between two courses of action, to commit the offence or to allow some other harmful consequence to occur. He claims that the nature of the harmful consequence was such that, in reality, he was compelled to stop it happening by committing the offence. His will was overborne. The broad concept, of which the other two are more restricted examples, is necessity, but the courts have been reluctant to accept any general defence of necessity and have been more prepared to develop the narrower forms of duress and duress of circumstances.

In a general defence of necessity, D would be entitled to argue that his decision to commit any crime was excused or justified by the need to avert an even more harmful consequence. It would be necessary to show that there was no other way of achieving this and that the other consequence was significantly more harmful than the commission of the offence itself. You could argue that this is a definition of duress of circumstances! Judges have never been able to bring themselves to acknowledge this broad proposition.

They rejected it in the very unusual case of Dudley and Stephens (1884) where D1 and D2 killed and fed on the cabin boy (Parker) when set adrift after a shipwreck. Ten days after killing the boy, they were rescued by a passing ship. They were charged with murder and, even after a special verdict, were found guilty (although the death sentence was commuted). Parker had not volunteered to die, and he might have lived had he been allowed to eat one of the others. It was said that the accused had no defence, but it is not certain as to what they had no defence. There are three views:

there is no general defence of necessity in criminal law.
necessity is no defence to murder.
on the facts given necessity simply did not arise.

There is a god file on my internet site covering this case. Whatever the true view, the development of the law has been impeded. Note:

The facts of the case are peculiar. It was an emergency requiring immediate action on the facts as the defendants believed them to be. Even Parker’s relatives thought that the defendants should not be blamed.
The courts are reluctant to grant a defence where there is some immorality. The weakest had been selected for killing, whereas the issue was that people were under a duty to sacrifice their lives.
Because of the extreme circumstances it was no deterrent to punish the defendants.
To convict in these circumstances was above a standard of reasonable people, it was nearer to saintliness.
In a US decision, US v Holmes [1846], the court held that there should have been a selection by lot. It is interesting to note that the defendants in this case were sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, the same as in Dudley v Stephens.

We also discussed situations occurring in the Zeebrugge disaster and the Andes mountains where, in both cases, the English law would argue against the necessity of saving lives at the risk of losing other lives.

In the conjoined twins case Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2000] the judge in the Court of Appeal quoted the three conditions necessary for a defence of necessity to operate:

(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil, and
(ii) no more should be done than reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved, and
(iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.

This was not the case in Dudley & Stephens (above) as it meant the taking of innocent life.

We will begin with duress next week.

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home