Saturday, November 18, 2006

Thursday 16 November 2006

We began by looking at duress. In Ortiz [1986] the Court of Appeal said: “the essence of [this] defence is that the will of the subject of the threats is no longer entirely under his own control because of the fear engendered by those threats.”

In duress, the harmful consequence which D seeks to avoid must be death or serious injury to himself or others. The threat to inflict such injury must be made with the specific aim of compelling D to commit an offence - Cole [1994] (below) - and must be “immediate” or “imminent” in the sense that it could be carried out immediately, so that D has no opportunity to avoid it in any other way than by committing the offence.

His response must have been such as might be expected of an ordinary person of reasonable courage and firmness but otherwise sharing D’s characteristics (an objective test).

In Valderrama-Vega [1987] D may have been impelled to bring drugs into the UK for X because of threats of death and serious injury to himself and his mother, threats to disclose his homosexuality and because of general financial difficulties he was experiencing. It was held that only the first threats were sufficient for duress but that they would remain so even if D acted for a mixture of reasons, as long as he would not have done so without the first threats.

The threats may be made against D or anyone else. The questions are whether D’s will was overborne and whether that of a reasonable man would have been.

The requirement that there be no other course of action open to D has not always been interpreted by the courts quite as might have been expected. In R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] the defendants were two young women who lied in giving evidence in a criminal trial because of threats made to them by friends of the person on trial. At first instance the trial judge said that the defence of duress was not available to them because they could have sought the protection of the court and, thus, the threats could not have been carried out immediately. However, on appeal, their convictions were quashed because they genuinely felt under compulsion at the time. Account was taken of the fact that they were young and that any protection would have been of limited duration so that they would have been vulnerable in the days ahead.

In Hasan [2005] Lord Bingham doubted the correctness of the above decision because of the lack of immediacy.

In Cole, D’s defence failed where it appeared that threats by moneylenders to cause serious injury to D and D’s girlfriend and baby if money was not repaid were not accompanied by an insistence that he commit the building society robberies with which he was charged. There was an insufficient link between the duress and the offences and the “imminence” requirement was not satisfied.

Although duress may be a complete defence to most crimes, it will not be a defence to either murder or attempt murder - Howe [1987] and Gotts [1992] respectively. Their Lordships based the decision on the need to protect the lives of ordinary and innocent people, the D should have to sacrifice his own life rather than knowingly cause the loss of life of another.

Before HOWE, it had been held by the House of Lords in DPP for NI v Lynch [1975] that duress could be pleaded by a D charged with aiding and abetting murder (although, on the facts, the defence failed).

D may be denied the defence where he has been in some way at fault in associating himself with those whom he knows might bring pressure on him to commit an offence. This situation developed in the context of terrorist organisations (for example, Fitzpatrlck [1977] in which duress was not available as a defence to robbery committed under IRA threats because D had voluntarily joined the IRA) but was then applied to membership of any kind of criminal gang in Sharp [1987] where D had tried to withdraw from a conspiracy to rob after he discovered that guns were to be used. Under threat of being shot, he participated in the robbery in which V was killed. His defence of duress was rejected and his conviction for manslaughter was upheld.

More recently, the principle has been extended to voluntary association with an individual. So, in Ali [1995] D was unable to use duress as a defence to a robbery at a building society. D was a drug user who had agreed to sell drugs on for his dealer, X, and was in no doubt that X would behave violently if D did not hand over the proceeds of sale. When D failed to do so, X gave him a gun and told him to get the money by robbing a bank or building society.

A weird and infrequently used defence, but still in the syllabus, is marital coercion: s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925. This provides a defence for a wife charged with offence other than murder or treason if she can show that she carried out the crime in the presence of her husband and under his coercion. This puts the burden of proof on D, whereas previously it had been presumed that the wife was coerced.

It is unknown which fact situations would give rise to the defence. It is said to be wider than duress, & would cover such matters as a threat by the husband not to buy food for the wife & children, a threat of desertion, or a threat to bring a mistress into the marital home. The defence was rejected in Ditta and Others [1988] where the wife was acting out of loyalty. This is the most recent authority, so nothing to get excited about!

On three occasions, in 1978, 1989 & 1993 the Law Commission recommended abolition of the defence, but it still remains.

Duress of circumstances has recently been developed by the courts in a series of cases which, initially, all involved driving offences committed while under some external threat.:

Willer [1986]: D’s conviction for reckless driving (as it then was) was quashed because the judge had refused to leave the defence of necessity to the jury on evidence which showed that D may have driven onto a pavement to escape from a gang of youths threatening violence to himself and his passenger. However, somewhat confusingly, the Court characterised the defence as one of duress.

Conway [1989] established the defence of duress of circumstances. D drove recklessly to escape from two men who had approached his car. He did so because, 2 weeks earlier, his passenger had narrowly escaped serious injury when the target of an attack on another vehicle. His conviction was quashed even though the 2 men proved to be plain-clothed police officers. The Court of Appeal stated that the facts amounted to duress of circumstances; duress was an example of necessity; and that whether duress of circumstances was called duress or necessity did not matter.

Martin [1989]: D’s stepson was late for work. D’s wife, who had suicidal tendencies, threatened suicide if D did not drive his stepson to work. D was currently disqualified from driving. His conviction for driving whilst disqualified was quashed.

DPP v Bell [1992] D’s conviction for driving with excess alcohol was quashed when it was accepted that he had driven away from a public house to escape from a gang of men intent on injuring him and had stopped in a lay-by as soon as he believed himself to be out of danger.

Obviously, duress of circumstances is a defence with many of the characteristics of the defence of necessity. However, it is restricted to threats of death or serious injury whereas a general defence of necessity would simply weigh the harmful consequence sought to be avoided against the harm involved in the commission of the offence. In the USA this is recognised as a ‘choice of evils’.

SELF-DEFENCE & PREVENTION OF CRIME


Section 3 CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1967 provides:

A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.

This might be thought to have superseded any common law defence but the conventional view is that D may not always technically be acting “in the prevention of crime” when seeking to defend himself or others, since the attacker may not have mens rea, may be insane and so on and, thus, not guilty of an offence. However, the courts have gradually modified the common law defence so as to remove any special rules (for instance, those relating to a duty to “retreat” before striking a blow in self-defence) which could have distinguished the common law from the statutory defence - Julien [1969].

Thus, though there may be two defences, their rules are essentially the same and the use of force will be reasonable if two conditions are satisfied:

§ that the use of some force is necessary - this question must be answered in relation to the facts as they actually were or in relation to the facts as D believed them to be, even if he was mistaken. Any mistake as to the facts (which could be about whether any attack was taking place, or about the amount of force being used in the attack, or both) merely has to be genuine. It does not have to be reasonable – look back at the defence of mistake with regard to Beckford, Gladstone Williams.

§ the use of the actual force must be justifiable - this is an objective test, how would it be perceived by a reasonable person?”.

There has been considerable controversy in the past few years, with allegations that the Police and Crown Prosecution Service have been far too willing to prosecute innocent citizens who were merely defending themselves (or, more usually, their property) from attack. Moved by adverse publicity accorded to official response to some of these incidents, in 1995 the Home Secretary went so far as to request that the police and prosecuting authorities should show more sympathy to those acting in self-defence or prevention of crime in such circumstances.

Passions were particularly aroused by the finding in the civil case Revill v Newbery [1996] where the D, a 76 year old man, was liable in negligence to pay compensation to V, whom he had shot and injured when V tried to break into D’s allotment shed. When he fired his shotgun from inside the shed, D could not see V and did not know that he was directly in front of the door. D was convicted of criminal offences in connection with the incident but, though prosecuted for wounding V, D was acquitted. These incidents raise very clearly the difficulties surrounding application of the objective test.

Unlike duress, there is no restriction on the offences to which self-defence can be a defence. In particular, the defence can be, and often is, pleaded to a charge of murder. However, if D kills when using more force than is justifiable, even though some force was necessary, he will lose the defence entirely and will be convicted of murder, not merely of manslaughter. This proposition was starkly illustrated in the case of Clegg [1995], where a British soldier serving in Northern Ireland had shot at a car which had broken through a checkpoint and had killed a passenger. He was adjudged to have used excessive force since the danger to himself and his comrades had passed and he had not sought to suggest that he believed himself to be dealing with terrorists who might be going on to commit serious offences (in fact, they were merely joyriders, but the House of Lords decision provoked some subsequent controversy over D’s actual beliefs on this point). The House of Lords declined to recognise a ‘half-way house’ defence in which D could be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder when using excessive force in circumstances where some force was justified. Accordingly, D’s conviction for murder was upheld. He was released from prison a relatively short time afterwards, remains in the Army, and has been since promoted.

We then changed tack completely, to look at PARTICIPATION IN CRIME.

A person may participate in crime:

as a principal offender - that is, as the person who actually commits the actus reus with the appropriate mens rea (if any is required);
as secondary party (accomplice) - that is, as a person who in some way renders assistance to the perpetrator in the commission of the crime without actually committing the actus reus of the crime itself. There can be no liability as a secondary party unless an offence has actually been committed by a perpetrator (there are three exceptions which follow). However, where no offence has been committed, a person who might otherwise have been guilty as a secondary party may be guilty of either of the inchoate offences of incitement and conspiracy. Additionally, if the perpetrator gets to the stage of committing an attempt, the other person can be guilty as a secondary party to that attempt.

It is necessary to make the distinction between perpetrators and secondary parties because, for example:

secondary participation in an offence requires proof of actus reus and mens rea elements which are different from those required for proof as a perpetrator of the offence;
even in strict liability offences the secondary party must have mens rea;
a person cannot be vicariously liable for secondary participation.

A principal is one who commit the crime by virtue of engaging in the commission of the actus reus with the appropriate mens rea. In the crime of murder, the perpetrator is the one who shoots or stabs or batters the victim. In the crime of theft, the perpetrator is the one who takes the money or drives away the car or takes the food out of the supermarket without paying for it.

However, it is quite possible for there to be more than one perpetrator arising out of the same incident. If two or more beat a victim to death, they are all guilty of murder as perpetrators. If they do so independently and no joint enterprise can be established by proof of prior agreement or deduced from their actions, then the Crown will have to make out the case separately against each - Petters and Parfitt [1995].

It is also possible for a person to be a perpetrator through the innocent agency of another. So, an adult who exploits a child under ten years old by getting the child to ‘steal’, himself commits the theft since the child is too young to be guilty of any offence Manley [1844], for example.

The situation does not arise simply because the ‘principal’ has a defence. If a postman delivers a parcel bomb no-one would think of charging him as an offender, but the person who sent the parcel would be a principal offender. In STRINGER [1991] the defendant dishonestly sent bogus invoices through a firm’s accounting system & as a result money was transferred to him. He was held to be guilty of theft as a principal because he was responsible for what the accounts staff had done in appropriating what he intended to steal.

A secondary party is one who gives some advice, encouragement or assistance to the perpetrator before or at the time of the commission of the offence or who acts to bring about the commission of the offence. Section 8 ACCESSORIES AND ABETTORS ACT 1861 provides:

Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence … shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

A similar provision in s44 MAGISTRATES’ COURTS ACT 1980 extends liability for secondary participation to summary offences.

The penalties for a secondary party is identical to that of the principal. No better example of this can be seen from the famous case of Craig & Bentley [1952]. The accused who killed (Craig) could not be hanged because he was under age. The secondary party, by virtue of s8, is liable to be punished as a principal & was hanged.

The original view of this legislation was that it created two broad ways of secondary participation, namely, to counsel or procure and to aid and abet.

Persons who aid, abet, counsel or procure are now described as secondary parties or accomplices, no matter when they do so. In practice, offenders are usually charged as “aid & abet” or “counsel & procure”, but the courts have decided to pursue a more complicated scheme.

In A-G’s REFERENCE (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] the Court of Appeal insisted that since Parliament had used four different terms then it must be possible to attribute distinct meanings to them all. Thus, it should be possible to assert that the party was an aider or abettor or counsellor or procurer.

D’s conviction as a secondary party depends upon an offence having been committed by a perpetrator - Vaux [1951], but not upon the conviction of a perpetrator, who may not have been apprehended or who may have been acquitted because of some failure of evidence.

There are three occasions where a principal is not required, namely:

(1) An innocent agent: Manley (above).
(2) Principal has a defence: Bourne (1952) where the defendant is forced to have sex with the family Alsatian under the threat of death or serious injury from her husband (duress). The defence is not available here to the secondary party.

(3) The defendant lacks mens rea: Millward [1994]. X, under instructions from his employer, D, towed a trailer on a main road with D’s tractor. The tractor’s hitch was poorly maintained, the trailer became detached during the journey and hit a car and killed a passenger. X was charged with causing death by reckless driving (as it then was) and D with procuring the offence. The recklessness alleged was the state of the hitch mechanism. X was acquitted but D was convicted.

We’ll begin next week with looking at the actus reus of secondary participation.

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