Thursday 23 November 2006
After watching a short DVD concerning the famous case of R v Dudley & Stephens we turned to the actus reus of secondary participation.
AID means to give some assistance either before or at the time of the commission of the offence (for instance, by supplying weapons or a car, or by driving the perpetrators to the scene, stopping help getting to the victim of an attack and so on). It does not require the perpetrator to be aware of the assistance and, therefore, need not cause him to commit the crime. A good example can be found in Bainbridge [1959] (below) where D supplied cutting equipment to be used in a theft from a bank.
To ABET and to COUNSEL involve giving advice and encouragement and, obviously, require some communication between perpetrator and secondary party, even if the perpetrator would have committed the offence anyway. They seem to be distinguished only by the time at which they occur - counselling is advice and encouragement away from the scene of the crime, abetting is at the scene of the crime. In Calhaem [1985] D was convicted of counselling a murder by hiring a private detective to carry out the killing under her instructions. The private detective alleged that he had never intended to kill V but had done so in a panic when confronting V for the purposes of making a pretence of carrying out the plan. D’s conviction was upheld because the killing was within the scope of the authority which she had given by her encouragement of it, even if not directly caused by that encouragement.
To PROCURE involves striving to bring about the commission of the offence by the perpetrator, whether or not the perpetrator is aware of what the secondary party is doing. The usual explanation offered is “to prduce by endeavour”, but that seems a bit woolly to me. To procure means wanting something to occur and taking all the steps necessary to bring it about. In A-G’s Reference No. 1 of 1975f, it was held that D could have been guilty as a procurer of the offence of driving with excess alcohol when he “spiked” his friend’s drink with alcohol, knowing that his friend would subsequently drive his car.
A person does not generally become a secondary party to an offence merely by witnessing its commission and doing nothing to prevent it: Clarkson [1971]. Here the D was not guilty of aiding or abetting a rape when he stumbled across the offence and stayed to witness it. See also Coney [1882] where D’s conviction for aiding and abetting an illegal prize fight merely by being a spectator was quashed because his simple presence was not enough.
We then turned to the mens rea of secondary participation. This is not easy to define with absolute confidence. What I can say is that the mens rea is distinct from that of the perpetrator. For instance, though a perpetrator must intend death or serious injury to be guilty of murder, D may be a secondary party to murder if he knows that he is assisting or encouraging a person who possesses, or may possess, that intention, whether or not he himself wants death or serious injury to occur: Ward [1987].
It need not be the purpose of the secondary party that the offence be committed. It is sufficient that he knows that what he is doing will assist or encourage the perpetrator: DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975].
When giving assistance, encouragement and so on to the perpetrator, D must know either the facts which would make the perpetrator guilty of a particular offence or the facts which would make him guilty of one or more of a limited range of offences. Though D may well have some particular offence in mind, so that he could specify precise details of the date, time, location and victim, such detailed knowledge is not required (for instance, the particular bank which is to be robbed: Bainbridge [1959].
Once a secondary party has given the assistance or encouragement, he is “in the hands” of the perpetrator. He cannot be absolutely certain what the outcome will be. This is especially evident in the case of the aider, counsellor or procurer who is not present at the scene of the crime. An important issue arises. For what exactly is the secondary party liable? In particular, what if results occur which D not only did not intend but which he did not even foresee?
In a nutshell, the answer is that the secondary participant will be liable for all the things that occur by accident, but not for those things that happen intentionally, unless those things were within the scope of the joint enterprise or contemplated as such.
It was held by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu [1984] that where D engages in a joint enterprise, he will be liable not only for anything to which he expressly or impliedly assents but also for that which he contemplates.
In Hyde and Others [1990], H, S and C took part in an attack on D, in the course of which one of them delivered what was described as, in effect, a “place kick” to D’s head. This crushed the front of his skull and led to his death some months later. It was not possible to identify with certainty which of the three had delivered the fatal kick but the prosecution argued that all were equally responsible for murder, either because all intended serious injury or because each knew that that was the intention of the others when he took part. Upholding their convictions for murder, the Court of Appeal said:
“If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may kill or intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to participate with A in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient mental element for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the requisite intent, kills in the course of the venture … B has in those circumstances lent himself to the enterprise and by so doing he has given assistance and encouragement to A in carrying out an enterprise which B realises may involve murder”.
In R v Greatrex and Bates [1999] the Court of Appeal decided that a secondary party is not liable for acts of the principal offender which are fundamentally different from those he foresaw. In the two defendants were involved, with other youths, in an attack on the victim, whom they kicked violently. B also used an iron bar and it was from a blow by B with the iron bar that the victim died. The judge directed that in the case of each defendant the jury could convict only if they were sure that there was a shared intention to cause really serious bodily harm. G appealed on the basis that he neither intended nor foresaw the act (the blow with an iron bar) which caused the. death and that he did not know of the existence of the weapon by which it was caused. The court held:
(1) The question of whether the acts of one participant in a concerted attack were outside the common purpose was one of degree.
(2) If the acts of one party are so fundamentally different from those of the others as to be regarded as outside the common purpose, each of the others can he regarded as parties to those acts only if he foresaw such acts.
Note that the doctrine of transferred malice applies in secondary liability so that D is liable on the same basis as X. However, the doctrine was held not to apply in the celebrated case of Saunders and Archer [1573]. There D1, acting on the advice of D2, gave his wife a poisoned apple with the intention of killing her. She ate a small portion of it, and gave the rest to their child, and the child died. D1 was guilty of murder, but D2 was not an accomplice on the facts of the particular case. The court accepted that, by failing to intervene when the apple was passed to the child in the presence of D1, D1 had acted outside the scope of the agreement.
If a statute is created with the purpose of protecting a defined class, e.g. a girl under 16, a member of that class, a victim, cannot be guilty of accomplice liability in that instance. In Tyrrell [1894], a girl under the age of 16 was found not guilty of aiding and abetting a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her.
It is possible for a potential secondary party to withdraw from the enterprise and so avoid liability if this is done in a sufficiently unequivocal manner (though there would still remain the possibility of liability for inchoate offences such as incitement and attempt). Inevitably, the further advanced the execution of the crime, the more extreme the action required to withdraw.
In Becerra [1975] however, D’s shout of “Let’s go”, followed by his actual flight, was not enough when X stabbed and killed a person who had disturbed them in the midst of a violent burglary. Here, withdrawal would have needed, at the least, some warning to the victim or, even, some attempt by D physically to protect the victim.
Police officers and others who involve themselves in plans to commit crime as a way of gaining evidence about those crimes and the participants must be careful that they do not leave themselves open to conviction as perpetrators or secondary parties. A distinction is sometimes drawn between merely joining in an enterprise which has already been designed or is in progress (no liability for secondary participation) and actually setting up some criminal enterprise (as where policemen, convinced that X is a distributor of drugs, go to him with a plan to import drugs) - in this case, there may be liability.
The next topic was vicarious liability, far less important than when studying the law of tort.
Vicarious liability means that one person may be legally responsible for the actions of another. Historically, in civil law, it was applied to the relationship between master and servant, and has more recently been used in the context of the employer/employee relationship. In criminal law, it applies to a wider variety of relationships. Today, vicarious liability for criminal offences can arise in one of two ways:
(a) In what is sometimes known as cases of EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION the law may simply deem the actions of an employee to be those of the employer. This is the result of an extended construction of certain verbs that appear in criminal statutes. It commonly occurs where something is being sold; see, for example Coppen v Moore (No. 2) [1898]. The accused, who owned a number of shops (and therefore could not be present in all of them for all of the time), was convicted of selling goods bearing a false trade description. Contrary to his instructions, one of the assistants had sold an American ham as a “Scotch” ham. It is probably correct that, under this principle, only the employee’s act can be imputed to the employer. Thus the employer can only be criminally liable if he has mens rea; otherwise, it is confined to strict liability offences.
(b) The principle of DELEGATION fixes the delegator with liability for the delegatee’s acts and mental element and is especially useful to the prosecution in connection with crimes which can only be committed by those persons who come within a particular class. See e.g. the LICENSING ACTS. Thus, if a licensee delegates his responsibilities as licensee to another, and the delegatee acts in breach of one of those delegated responsibilities, the delegatee’s acts and state of mind are imputed to the delegator.
Vicarious liability only arises where there has been complete delegation of responsibilities. Thus, the licensee must have delegated all his managerial duties to another; see Vane v Yiannopoullos [1964]. The House of Lords there held that a restaurateur was not guilty of what would now be knowingly selling intoxicants to unpermitted persons. One of the waitresses, contrary to the restaurateur’s instructions, sold an intoxicant to a customer who was not having a meal. The restaurateur had gone to the basement at the time, but he had not delegated control of the restaurant to the waitress. By a three to two majority in the House of Lords it was held that there was only a partial delegation, which was not sufficient for a conviction.
Next week we begin with a look at the criminal liability of corporations.
AID means to give some assistance either before or at the time of the commission of the offence (for instance, by supplying weapons or a car, or by driving the perpetrators to the scene, stopping help getting to the victim of an attack and so on). It does not require the perpetrator to be aware of the assistance and, therefore, need not cause him to commit the crime. A good example can be found in Bainbridge [1959] (below) where D supplied cutting equipment to be used in a theft from a bank.
To ABET and to COUNSEL involve giving advice and encouragement and, obviously, require some communication between perpetrator and secondary party, even if the perpetrator would have committed the offence anyway. They seem to be distinguished only by the time at which they occur - counselling is advice and encouragement away from the scene of the crime, abetting is at the scene of the crime. In Calhaem [1985] D was convicted of counselling a murder by hiring a private detective to carry out the killing under her instructions. The private detective alleged that he had never intended to kill V but had done so in a panic when confronting V for the purposes of making a pretence of carrying out the plan. D’s conviction was upheld because the killing was within the scope of the authority which she had given by her encouragement of it, even if not directly caused by that encouragement.
To PROCURE involves striving to bring about the commission of the offence by the perpetrator, whether or not the perpetrator is aware of what the secondary party is doing. The usual explanation offered is “to prduce by endeavour”, but that seems a bit woolly to me. To procure means wanting something to occur and taking all the steps necessary to bring it about. In A-G’s Reference No. 1 of 1975f, it was held that D could have been guilty as a procurer of the offence of driving with excess alcohol when he “spiked” his friend’s drink with alcohol, knowing that his friend would subsequently drive his car.
A person does not generally become a secondary party to an offence merely by witnessing its commission and doing nothing to prevent it: Clarkson [1971]. Here the D was not guilty of aiding or abetting a rape when he stumbled across the offence and stayed to witness it. See also Coney [1882] where D’s conviction for aiding and abetting an illegal prize fight merely by being a spectator was quashed because his simple presence was not enough.
We then turned to the mens rea of secondary participation. This is not easy to define with absolute confidence. What I can say is that the mens rea is distinct from that of the perpetrator. For instance, though a perpetrator must intend death or serious injury to be guilty of murder, D may be a secondary party to murder if he knows that he is assisting or encouraging a person who possesses, or may possess, that intention, whether or not he himself wants death or serious injury to occur: Ward [1987].
It need not be the purpose of the secondary party that the offence be committed. It is sufficient that he knows that what he is doing will assist or encourage the perpetrator: DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975].
When giving assistance, encouragement and so on to the perpetrator, D must know either the facts which would make the perpetrator guilty of a particular offence or the facts which would make him guilty of one or more of a limited range of offences. Though D may well have some particular offence in mind, so that he could specify precise details of the date, time, location and victim, such detailed knowledge is not required (for instance, the particular bank which is to be robbed: Bainbridge [1959].
Once a secondary party has given the assistance or encouragement, he is “in the hands” of the perpetrator. He cannot be absolutely certain what the outcome will be. This is especially evident in the case of the aider, counsellor or procurer who is not present at the scene of the crime. An important issue arises. For what exactly is the secondary party liable? In particular, what if results occur which D not only did not intend but which he did not even foresee?
In a nutshell, the answer is that the secondary participant will be liable for all the things that occur by accident, but not for those things that happen intentionally, unless those things were within the scope of the joint enterprise or contemplated as such.
It was held by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu [1984] that where D engages in a joint enterprise, he will be liable not only for anything to which he expressly or impliedly assents but also for that which he contemplates.
In Hyde and Others [1990], H, S and C took part in an attack on D, in the course of which one of them delivered what was described as, in effect, a “place kick” to D’s head. This crushed the front of his skull and led to his death some months later. It was not possible to identify with certainty which of the three had delivered the fatal kick but the prosecution argued that all were equally responsible for murder, either because all intended serious injury or because each knew that that was the intention of the others when he took part. Upholding their convictions for murder, the Court of Appeal said:
“If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may kill or intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to participate with A in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient mental element for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the requisite intent, kills in the course of the venture … B has in those circumstances lent himself to the enterprise and by so doing he has given assistance and encouragement to A in carrying out an enterprise which B realises may involve murder”.
In R v Greatrex and Bates [1999] the Court of Appeal decided that a secondary party is not liable for acts of the principal offender which are fundamentally different from those he foresaw. In the two defendants were involved, with other youths, in an attack on the victim, whom they kicked violently. B also used an iron bar and it was from a blow by B with the iron bar that the victim died. The judge directed that in the case of each defendant the jury could convict only if they were sure that there was a shared intention to cause really serious bodily harm. G appealed on the basis that he neither intended nor foresaw the act (the blow with an iron bar) which caused the. death and that he did not know of the existence of the weapon by which it was caused. The court held:
(1) The question of whether the acts of one participant in a concerted attack were outside the common purpose was one of degree.
(2) If the acts of one party are so fundamentally different from those of the others as to be regarded as outside the common purpose, each of the others can he regarded as parties to those acts only if he foresaw such acts.
Note that the doctrine of transferred malice applies in secondary liability so that D is liable on the same basis as X. However, the doctrine was held not to apply in the celebrated case of Saunders and Archer [1573]. There D1, acting on the advice of D2, gave his wife a poisoned apple with the intention of killing her. She ate a small portion of it, and gave the rest to their child, and the child died. D1 was guilty of murder, but D2 was not an accomplice on the facts of the particular case. The court accepted that, by failing to intervene when the apple was passed to the child in the presence of D1, D1 had acted outside the scope of the agreement.
If a statute is created with the purpose of protecting a defined class, e.g. a girl under 16, a member of that class, a victim, cannot be guilty of accomplice liability in that instance. In Tyrrell [1894], a girl under the age of 16 was found not guilty of aiding and abetting a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her.
It is possible for a potential secondary party to withdraw from the enterprise and so avoid liability if this is done in a sufficiently unequivocal manner (though there would still remain the possibility of liability for inchoate offences such as incitement and attempt). Inevitably, the further advanced the execution of the crime, the more extreme the action required to withdraw.
In Becerra [1975] however, D’s shout of “Let’s go”, followed by his actual flight, was not enough when X stabbed and killed a person who had disturbed them in the midst of a violent burglary. Here, withdrawal would have needed, at the least, some warning to the victim or, even, some attempt by D physically to protect the victim.
Police officers and others who involve themselves in plans to commit crime as a way of gaining evidence about those crimes and the participants must be careful that they do not leave themselves open to conviction as perpetrators or secondary parties. A distinction is sometimes drawn between merely joining in an enterprise which has already been designed or is in progress (no liability for secondary participation) and actually setting up some criminal enterprise (as where policemen, convinced that X is a distributor of drugs, go to him with a plan to import drugs) - in this case, there may be liability.
The next topic was vicarious liability, far less important than when studying the law of tort.
Vicarious liability means that one person may be legally responsible for the actions of another. Historically, in civil law, it was applied to the relationship between master and servant, and has more recently been used in the context of the employer/employee relationship. In criminal law, it applies to a wider variety of relationships. Today, vicarious liability for criminal offences can arise in one of two ways:
(a) In what is sometimes known as cases of EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION the law may simply deem the actions of an employee to be those of the employer. This is the result of an extended construction of certain verbs that appear in criminal statutes. It commonly occurs where something is being sold; see, for example Coppen v Moore (No. 2) [1898]. The accused, who owned a number of shops (and therefore could not be present in all of them for all of the time), was convicted of selling goods bearing a false trade description. Contrary to his instructions, one of the assistants had sold an American ham as a “Scotch” ham. It is probably correct that, under this principle, only the employee’s act can be imputed to the employer. Thus the employer can only be criminally liable if he has mens rea; otherwise, it is confined to strict liability offences.
(b) The principle of DELEGATION fixes the delegator with liability for the delegatee’s acts and mental element and is especially useful to the prosecution in connection with crimes which can only be committed by those persons who come within a particular class. See e.g. the LICENSING ACTS. Thus, if a licensee delegates his responsibilities as licensee to another, and the delegatee acts in breach of one of those delegated responsibilities, the delegatee’s acts and state of mind are imputed to the delegator.
Vicarious liability only arises where there has been complete delegation of responsibilities. Thus, the licensee must have delegated all his managerial duties to another; see Vane v Yiannopoullos [1964]. The House of Lords there held that a restaurateur was not guilty of what would now be knowingly selling intoxicants to unpermitted persons. One of the waitresses, contrary to the restaurateur’s instructions, sold an intoxicant to a customer who was not having a meal. The restaurateur had gone to the basement at the time, but he had not delegated control of the restaurant to the waitress. By a three to two majority in the House of Lords it was held that there was only a partial delegation, which was not sufficient for a conviction.
Next week we begin with a look at the criminal liability of corporations.

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