Thursday 8 March 2007
We continued with the peripheral crimes contained in the syllabus, all contained in the Theft Act 1968 (TA).
s21(1) TA 1968 states:
A person is guilty of blackmail if with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief:
that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; AND
that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.
The main limit on the demand is that it must be made with a view to gain or with intent to cause loss.
“MENACES” was described by the House of Lords in Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] as not limited to threats of violence but … including threats of any action detrimental to or unpleasant to the person addressed. It may also include a warning that in certain events such action is intended.
Trivial threats are excluded: Harry [1974] where a student “rag” committee offered to exclude shopkeepers from “inconvenience” that might be caused by their activities.
As to the mens rea, it must be shown that D:
intended to make a demand with menaces,
with a view to gain for himself or another, or with intent to cause loss to another,
either not believing that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand or not believing that the use of menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.
“WITH A VIEW TO GAIN …” etc. is interpreted in accordance with s34(2)(a) TA 1968 so that “gain” and “loss” are to be seen in terms of money or other property, either permanent or temporary. “Gain” includes keeping what one has as well as getting what one has not. “Loss” includes not getting what one might get, as well as parting with what one has.
When we discussed robbery I did mention a tie in with blackmail. There may well be circumstances where offences of both robbery and blackmail exist in the same circumstances - “Your money or your life”. There may also be occasions where the circumstances appear to be robbery but, in fact, the charge should be blackmail. Can you recall my example of a woman with a baby in a pram?.
By s22(1) TA 1968:
otherwise than in the course of stealing
knowing or believing them to be stolen goods
dishonestly receives
or
dishonestly
undertakes or assists in the
retention - removal - realisation - disposal
of those goods
by or for the benefit of another person
or
if he arranges to do so
Prior to 1968 only “receiving” was a crime. Now there are 18 ways of committing 1 crime - Nicklin [1977].
Goods must be stolen at the time of handling as per Haughton v Smith [1975], otherwise it is an attempt. T
Goods representing stolen goods in the hands of a thief or a handler are also stolen goods:
(i) A steals £2,000 & buys a fur coat
(ii) A gives the coat to B
(iii) B doesn’t like the coat, & swaps it for pearls
B later sells the pearls for £600
Only the £2,000 & coat are stolen goods, unless B knows of the original theft, the proceeds of which bought the coat, & she becomes a handler. Then the £600 & pearls will also be stolen goods. A further example follows below.
Goods cease to be stolen when they have been restored:
to the person from whom they were stolen, or
to lawful possession or custody, or (usually the police)
after that person and any other person claiming through him have otherwise ceased as regards those goods to have any right in respect of the theft (an insurance company who had paid out on the theft).
If the goods are merely marked to facilitate the observation of their whereabouts they do not cease to be stolen. The fact that, for example, a police officer has traced the goods does not per se mean that they have been restored to lawful possession. Much will depend on the intention of the officer: A-G’s Reference (No. 1 of 1974) [1974], where a police officer had removed the rotor arm of a car thereby immobilising it so that he could question the driver. The officer suspected that there were stolen goods in the car. It was held that the jury must distinguish between two possible interpretations. If the officer had decided to take possession of the goods when he removed the rotor arm, they had thereby been restored to lawful possession. But if he kept an open mind when removing the rotor arm and would only decide what to do after he had questioned the defendant. they had not been so restored, and could still be stolen.
“Goods” includes money and every other description of property except land, and includes things severed from the land by stealing.
The meaning of “stolen” is set out in s24(1) and (4), so that goods will be “stolen” if:
they have been stolen contrary to s1 TA 1968; or
they have been acquired by blackmail contrary to s21 TA 1968; or
if they had been the subject of a crime committed abroad which would have been regarded as theft, blackmail or obtaining by deception had it been committed in England or Wales.
The full meaning of s24(2) may best be illustrated as follows:
A steals a vase, and sells it to B for £500.
The vase and the cash which A has received are stolen goods.
If A then uses £250 of that £500 to repay a debt which he owes to C, and C knows that it represents part of the stolen goods, C is also guilty of handling.
Suppose C then uses the £250 to buy a ring for his fiancée, D, the ring is thus stolen goods, and D may be guilty of handling if she is aware of the origin of the money used to pay for it.
If D subsequently sells the ring to E who was unaware that it represents stolen property, and E sells it to F, the cash which E receives will not be stolen goods because E lacks mens rea and is not a handler.
There are many different forms of handling, i.e. ways of committing the offence. According to the House of Lords in Bloxham [1982], they are:
receiving;
undertaking the retention, removal, disposal or realisation for the benefit of another;
assisting in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation by another: and
arranging to do (1), (2), or (3).
“Receiving” means that D took exclusive possession or control of the goods, either by himself or jointly with another. D need not have immediate physical possession of them; it suffices if he receives through his servant or agent. His receipt may be only temporary.
“Arranging to receive” indicates that D may be guilty when he simply prepares to receive, even though his preparations may not amount to an attempt to receive.
As long as he knows or believes the goods are stolen, he may be convicted. If he is mistaken in this belief, he may be guilty of an attempt. An agreement to handle goods which will be stolen in the future may constitute a conspiracy to handle, but will not amount to the full offence - PARK [1987].
“Undertaking or assisting in …” shows there are two ways of retaining, removing, disposing or realising stolen goods
“Retention” means keeping possession of what one already has, continuing to have it, not losing it.
An omission to act can only constitute handling if there is a legal duty to act, so that merely failing to tell the police of the presence of the goods is not enough: Brown [1970].
“Removal” comprises moving goods from one place to another.
“Disposal” covers a variety of cases, e.g. giving away the goods, dumping them, or destroying them.
“Realisation” means exchanging the goods for money or other property - Bloxham.
Handling may consist of “arranging” to undertake or assist in; for example, D agrees to help another person to transport stolen goods.
The act of handling must take place “otherwise than in the course of the stealing”. Thus, if D took part in the theft, his participation therein cannot amount to an act of handling.
In Bloxham [1982] B sold a stolen car. The House of Lords, quashing his conviction, held that where D sells stolen goods he does not realise them for the benefit of another, because the purchaser is not “another”. The purchaser benefits from the purchase, not from the realisation; the realisation benefits only the vendor.
The mens rea consists firstly of “knowing or believing” that the goods are stolen. This is a purely subjective test, although the reasonableness of the belief will almost certainly be relevant evidence of D’s state of mind.
D must also act “dishonestly”: Ghosh [1982].
In cases where D is found in possession of recently-stolen property, it may he said that the “doctrine of recent possession” applies. This is really a matter of common sense, rather than legal “doctrine”. It means simply that a jury may infer that D had the necessary knowledge or belief if he offers no (credible) explanation as to why he came to possess recently-stolen property. In view of the potential difficulty of proving the necessary knowledge or belief, s27(3) TA 1968 provides that the court may admit:
evidence that he has had in his possession, or has undertaken or assisted in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation of, stolen good from any theft taking place not earlier than 12 months before the offence charged; and
(provided that 7 days notice in writing has been given to him of the intention to prove the conviction) evidence that he has within the 5 years preceding the date of the offence charged been convicted of theft or of handling stolen goods.
There is a statutory preventative measure known as GOING EQUIPPED TO STEAL. According to s25(1) TA 1968:
A person shall be guilty if when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary (s9) or theft (s1 & s12). Cheat was also included, but this now falls under the Fraud Act 2006, which repealed this part of s25.
The crime is aimed at preventing the accused from committing offences even before he has attempted to steal.
The “article” need not be made or adapted for use in the commission of one of the specified offences. What is important is that D must intend to use it in the course of or in connection with one of them. Potentially, therefore, the offence is very wide. Thus, it is probably true that the article must be one which D would not have with him but for the fact that he has one of the specified purposes in mind.
It must be shown that D “has with him” the article, and this bears the same meaning as in s10 (aggravated burglary). Thus, D has the article with him if he has immediate possession or control of it, or if it is only a short distance away so that he can pick it up when he needs it.
D must not be at his place of abode. This is obviously in recognition of the general right of privacy. Where D has no place he regards as his home, but lives in his car, it has been held that his car was his “place of abode” only when it was on a site where he intended to abide: Bundy [1977], where, although D lived in his car, he was not at his place of abode while he was driving his car when arrested by the police.
The two elements of mens rea are:
knowledge of possession of the article; and
an intention that the article should be used in the course of or in connection with any of the specified crimes.
s25(3) was enacted to assist in the proof of the necessary intent. It provides:
Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use.
Thus, the evidential burden is placed on the accused, so that if (s)he does not give a satisfactory explanation (s)he runs the risk of being found to have had the appropriate intent. The burden is on the balance of probabilities.
We then began our last crime, that of CRIMINAL DAMAGE. The basic offence is contained in s1(1) CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971 which provides that it is an offence for a person:
without lawful excuse,
to destroy or damage any property
belonging to another,
intending to do so or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged.
A separate crime, often referred to as an aggravated form of the offence is contained in s1(2), which says that it is an offence for a person, without lawful excuse, to destroy or damage any property:
intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damage; and
intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered.
By s1(3), if the destruction or damage is caused by fire, the offence is arson.
WITHOUT LAWFUL EXCUSE. By s5(2), a person has a lawful excuse:
If at the time of the alleged offence he believed that the persons(s) whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction /damage had so consented, or would have so consented if he/she/they had known of the destruction/ damage and its circumstances; or
If he destroyed/damaged the property in order to protect property belonging to himself or another or a right or interest in property which was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the alleged offence he believed
(i) that the property right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and
(ii) that the means of protection adopted were reasonable in the circumstances.
Thus in Denton [1982] D set fire to his employer’s mill damaging the premises and machinery. D said he had been encouraged by his employer to do this so that the latter could make a fraudulent insurance claim. D was held not guilty of arson.
D must intend or be reckless as to the destruction/damage of property. Intention comes from Woollin [1997], discussed much earlier, and recklessness is subjective (Cunningham [1957]) since the House of Lords decision in R v Gemmill & Richards [2003].
We will continue this next week. I shall also hand out a previous examination paper so that you can prepare for the following week, when I will go through the whole thing with you.
s21(1) TA 1968 states:
A person is guilty of blackmail if with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief:
that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; AND
that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.
The main limit on the demand is that it must be made with a view to gain or with intent to cause loss.
“MENACES” was described by the House of Lords in Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] as not limited to threats of violence but … including threats of any action detrimental to or unpleasant to the person addressed. It may also include a warning that in certain events such action is intended.
Trivial threats are excluded: Harry [1974] where a student “rag” committee offered to exclude shopkeepers from “inconvenience” that might be caused by their activities.
As to the mens rea, it must be shown that D:
intended to make a demand with menaces,
with a view to gain for himself or another, or with intent to cause loss to another,
either not believing that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand or not believing that the use of menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.
“WITH A VIEW TO GAIN …” etc. is interpreted in accordance with s34(2)(a) TA 1968 so that “gain” and “loss” are to be seen in terms of money or other property, either permanent or temporary. “Gain” includes keeping what one has as well as getting what one has not. “Loss” includes not getting what one might get, as well as parting with what one has.
When we discussed robbery I did mention a tie in with blackmail. There may well be circumstances where offences of both robbery and blackmail exist in the same circumstances - “Your money or your life”. There may also be occasions where the circumstances appear to be robbery but, in fact, the charge should be blackmail. Can you recall my example of a woman with a baby in a pram?.
By s22(1) TA 1968:
otherwise than in the course of stealing
knowing or believing them to be stolen goods
dishonestly receives
or
dishonestly
undertakes or assists in the
retention - removal - realisation - disposal
of those goods
by or for the benefit of another person
or
if he arranges to do so
Prior to 1968 only “receiving” was a crime. Now there are 18 ways of committing 1 crime - Nicklin [1977].
Goods must be stolen at the time of handling as per Haughton v Smith [1975], otherwise it is an attempt. T
Goods representing stolen goods in the hands of a thief or a handler are also stolen goods:
(i) A steals £2,000 & buys a fur coat
(ii) A gives the coat to B
(iii) B doesn’t like the coat, & swaps it for pearls
B later sells the pearls for £600
Only the £2,000 & coat are stolen goods, unless B knows of the original theft, the proceeds of which bought the coat, & she becomes a handler. Then the £600 & pearls will also be stolen goods. A further example follows below.
Goods cease to be stolen when they have been restored:
to the person from whom they were stolen, or
to lawful possession or custody, or (usually the police)
after that person and any other person claiming through him have otherwise ceased as regards those goods to have any right in respect of the theft (an insurance company who had paid out on the theft).
If the goods are merely marked to facilitate the observation of their whereabouts they do not cease to be stolen. The fact that, for example, a police officer has traced the goods does not per se mean that they have been restored to lawful possession. Much will depend on the intention of the officer: A-G’s Reference (No. 1 of 1974) [1974], where a police officer had removed the rotor arm of a car thereby immobilising it so that he could question the driver. The officer suspected that there were stolen goods in the car. It was held that the jury must distinguish between two possible interpretations. If the officer had decided to take possession of the goods when he removed the rotor arm, they had thereby been restored to lawful possession. But if he kept an open mind when removing the rotor arm and would only decide what to do after he had questioned the defendant. they had not been so restored, and could still be stolen.
“Goods” includes money and every other description of property except land, and includes things severed from the land by stealing.
The meaning of “stolen” is set out in s24(1) and (4), so that goods will be “stolen” if:
they have been stolen contrary to s1 TA 1968; or
they have been acquired by blackmail contrary to s21 TA 1968; or
if they had been the subject of a crime committed abroad which would have been regarded as theft, blackmail or obtaining by deception had it been committed in England or Wales.
The full meaning of s24(2) may best be illustrated as follows:
A steals a vase, and sells it to B for £500.
The vase and the cash which A has received are stolen goods.
If A then uses £250 of that £500 to repay a debt which he owes to C, and C knows that it represents part of the stolen goods, C is also guilty of handling.
Suppose C then uses the £250 to buy a ring for his fiancée, D, the ring is thus stolen goods, and D may be guilty of handling if she is aware of the origin of the money used to pay for it.
If D subsequently sells the ring to E who was unaware that it represents stolen property, and E sells it to F, the cash which E receives will not be stolen goods because E lacks mens rea and is not a handler.
There are many different forms of handling, i.e. ways of committing the offence. According to the House of Lords in Bloxham [1982], they are:
receiving;
undertaking the retention, removal, disposal or realisation for the benefit of another;
assisting in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation by another: and
arranging to do (1), (2), or (3).
“Receiving” means that D took exclusive possession or control of the goods, either by himself or jointly with another. D need not have immediate physical possession of them; it suffices if he receives through his servant or agent. His receipt may be only temporary.
“Arranging to receive” indicates that D may be guilty when he simply prepares to receive, even though his preparations may not amount to an attempt to receive.
As long as he knows or believes the goods are stolen, he may be convicted. If he is mistaken in this belief, he may be guilty of an attempt. An agreement to handle goods which will be stolen in the future may constitute a conspiracy to handle, but will not amount to the full offence - PARK [1987].
“Undertaking or assisting in …” shows there are two ways of retaining, removing, disposing or realising stolen goods
“Retention” means keeping possession of what one already has, continuing to have it, not losing it.
An omission to act can only constitute handling if there is a legal duty to act, so that merely failing to tell the police of the presence of the goods is not enough: Brown [1970].
“Removal” comprises moving goods from one place to another.
“Disposal” covers a variety of cases, e.g. giving away the goods, dumping them, or destroying them.
“Realisation” means exchanging the goods for money or other property - Bloxham.
Handling may consist of “arranging” to undertake or assist in; for example, D agrees to help another person to transport stolen goods.
The act of handling must take place “otherwise than in the course of the stealing”. Thus, if D took part in the theft, his participation therein cannot amount to an act of handling.
In Bloxham [1982] B sold a stolen car. The House of Lords, quashing his conviction, held that where D sells stolen goods he does not realise them for the benefit of another, because the purchaser is not “another”. The purchaser benefits from the purchase, not from the realisation; the realisation benefits only the vendor.
The mens rea consists firstly of “knowing or believing” that the goods are stolen. This is a purely subjective test, although the reasonableness of the belief will almost certainly be relevant evidence of D’s state of mind.
D must also act “dishonestly”: Ghosh [1982].
In cases where D is found in possession of recently-stolen property, it may he said that the “doctrine of recent possession” applies. This is really a matter of common sense, rather than legal “doctrine”. It means simply that a jury may infer that D had the necessary knowledge or belief if he offers no (credible) explanation as to why he came to possess recently-stolen property. In view of the potential difficulty of proving the necessary knowledge or belief, s27(3) TA 1968 provides that the court may admit:
evidence that he has had in his possession, or has undertaken or assisted in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation of, stolen good from any theft taking place not earlier than 12 months before the offence charged; and
(provided that 7 days notice in writing has been given to him of the intention to prove the conviction) evidence that he has within the 5 years preceding the date of the offence charged been convicted of theft or of handling stolen goods.
There is a statutory preventative measure known as GOING EQUIPPED TO STEAL. According to s25(1) TA 1968:
A person shall be guilty if when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary (s9) or theft (s1 & s12). Cheat was also included, but this now falls under the Fraud Act 2006, which repealed this part of s25.
The crime is aimed at preventing the accused from committing offences even before he has attempted to steal.
The “article” need not be made or adapted for use in the commission of one of the specified offences. What is important is that D must intend to use it in the course of or in connection with one of them. Potentially, therefore, the offence is very wide. Thus, it is probably true that the article must be one which D would not have with him but for the fact that he has one of the specified purposes in mind.
It must be shown that D “has with him” the article, and this bears the same meaning as in s10 (aggravated burglary). Thus, D has the article with him if he has immediate possession or control of it, or if it is only a short distance away so that he can pick it up when he needs it.
D must not be at his place of abode. This is obviously in recognition of the general right of privacy. Where D has no place he regards as his home, but lives in his car, it has been held that his car was his “place of abode” only when it was on a site where he intended to abide: Bundy [1977], where, although D lived in his car, he was not at his place of abode while he was driving his car when arrested by the police.
The two elements of mens rea are:
knowledge of possession of the article; and
an intention that the article should be used in the course of or in connection with any of the specified crimes.
s25(3) was enacted to assist in the proof of the necessary intent. It provides:
Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use.
Thus, the evidential burden is placed on the accused, so that if (s)he does not give a satisfactory explanation (s)he runs the risk of being found to have had the appropriate intent. The burden is on the balance of probabilities.
We then began our last crime, that of CRIMINAL DAMAGE. The basic offence is contained in s1(1) CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971 which provides that it is an offence for a person:
without lawful excuse,
to destroy or damage any property
belonging to another,
intending to do so or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged.
A separate crime, often referred to as an aggravated form of the offence is contained in s1(2), which says that it is an offence for a person, without lawful excuse, to destroy or damage any property:
intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damage; and
intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered.
By s1(3), if the destruction or damage is caused by fire, the offence is arson.
WITHOUT LAWFUL EXCUSE. By s5(2), a person has a lawful excuse:
If at the time of the alleged offence he believed that the persons(s) whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction /damage had so consented, or would have so consented if he/she/they had known of the destruction/ damage and its circumstances; or
If he destroyed/damaged the property in order to protect property belonging to himself or another or a right or interest in property which was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the alleged offence he believed
(i) that the property right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and
(ii) that the means of protection adopted were reasonable in the circumstances.
Thus in Denton [1982] D set fire to his employer’s mill damaging the premises and machinery. D said he had been encouraged by his employer to do this so that the latter could make a fraudulent insurance claim. D was held not guilty of arson.
D must intend or be reckless as to the destruction/damage of property. Intention comes from Woollin [1997], discussed much earlier, and recklessness is subjective (Cunningham [1957]) since the House of Lords decision in R v Gemmill & Richards [2003].
We will continue this next week. I shall also hand out a previous examination paper so that you can prepare for the following week, when I will go through the whole thing with you.

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