Friday, January 05, 2007

Thursday 4 January 2007

Welcome back after the holidays.

We continued with our look at diminished responsibility. The high profile case of Martin [2001] is a further example. Following an appeal to the Court of Appeal it was accepted that evidence should have been heard of Tony Martin’s paranoid personality disorder and depression. The murder verdict was overturned, and he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.

Can diminished responsibility and intoxication sit together? If the abnormality was due to such acute intoxication that D’s brain was damaged so that his judgment and emotional responses were grossly impaired, or where D had such a craving for drink that his intoxication was involuntary (he could not resist the impulse to drink), D may rely on the defence – Tandy [1988]. T, having drunk most of a bottle of vodka, strangled her 11-year old daughter after she said she had been sexually interfered with and wanted to go to live with her grandmother. Since T could have refrained from taking the first drink she was not suffering from a disease within the meaning of s2(1), and her conviction for murder was upheld.

A plea of diminished responsibility should not be left to the jury where there is no medical evidence to support it - Dix [1982].

Section 4 HA 1957 creates a defence where the killing is in pursuance of a suicide pact. Although it is murder intentionally to kill someone even though he wishes to die, i.e. he kills with malice aforethought, an exception is made where the killing is in pursuance of a suicide pact. This requires:

  1. An agreement between 2 or more persons

  2. which has as its object the death of all parties to it

  3. a settled intention of dying.

The survivor of such agreement is liable to be convicted of manslaughter.

The SUICIDE ACT 1961 abolished the crime of suicide, though s2(1) preserves the offences of aiding, abetting. counselling or procuring the suicide of another.

There are two main varieties of INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER:

  • Gross negligence manslaughter

  • unlawful and dangerous act (constructive) manslaughter.

Until 1983, it was generally thought that involuntary manslaughter consisted of

  • gross negligence manslaughter;

  • unlawful act manslaughter;

  • possibly subjective recklessness manslaughter. This third group has now gone.

Gross negligence manslaughter extended to any conduct, whether unlawful in itself or not (for example, driving a car).

The Court of Appeal in Stone and Dobinson [1977] obscured matters, first by equating gross negligence as recklessness.

The death of reckless manslaughter finally occurred in Prentice and Others [1993], when the Court of Appeal insisted that the objective recklessness test, requiring that a risk be ‘obvious’ would not necessarily be appropriate to breach of duty cases, perhaps involving expert fields beyond the knowledge of an “ordinary prudent individual” and where risks of injury might already exist independently of D’s conduct (as in medical treatment).

Subsequently, an appeal from Prentice was heard by the House of Lords under the name of Adomako [1994] where the revival of gross negligence was upheld in accordance with the original decision of the Court of Appeal.

Gross negligence manslaughter requires proof of:

  1. any conduct (act or omission). It does not have to be unlawful in itself, so that it may arise out of any activity which poses a risk of injury, for example employment or medical treatment: in Prentice, one case concerned an inexperienced doctor who had administered a fatal spinal injection without having proper information available and under the supervision of another doctor who believed himself merely to be supervising the injection procedure and not the suitability of the drug for such injection: another, an anaesthetist (Adomako) who had failed to notice that a tube had become disconnected; and the third, an electrician who did not discover that he had wired live to earth in a central heating installation; and

  2. AMOUNTING TO BREACH OF A DUTY.

  3. WHICH CREATES A RISK OF DEATH/SERIOUS INJURY.

  4. AND ACTUALLY CAUSES DEATH - causation as previously considered;

  5. SOME FURTHER ELEMENT, whether described as a state of mind or not, which supplies the requisite degree of culpability; which makes it gross negligence. The defendant does something that is so bad that he ought to be punished by the criminal law.

A couple of cases may help to conclude this.

R v Wacker [2003]. You may remember this awful case where the defendant was trying to smuggle into the UK 61 Chinese illegal immigrants. He closed the air vents in the back of the vehicle, causing the death of 60 of the immigrants. He was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. Look at the checklist above and it is easy to see why.

Willoughby [2005]. The defendant owned a disused public house which was destroyed by fire and an explosion. The victim was killed when the building collapsed in the explosion. The defendant was injured and was found outside the building in a state of shock. The Crown alleged that he (the defendant) had recruited the victim to help him to set fire to the building, that they had used petrol as an accelerant, and that the victim had died when the petrol was ignited, whether deliberately or by accident.

The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, reckless arson contrary sl(2) and 1(3) Criminal Damage Act 1971 and with gross negligence manslaughter. On the latter offence, the trial judge directed the jury that, even if the defendant and victim were engaged in a joint enterprise to destroy the public house, nevertheless there was evidence to support the proposition that the defendant owed a duty of care to the victim.

On appeal against conviction for manslaughter, the defendant asserted that the trial judge’s direction was inadequate because it merely suggested that two men had set fire to the public house owned by one of them. Though this was an inherently risky business, there were no grounds for saying that the owner of premises owes a duty of care to a co-actor merely by virtue of being co-actors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating:

  1. a duty cannot arise simply because the defendant was the owner of the premises.

  2. a duty could arise out of the combination of factors (the defendant was the owner, his property was to be destroyed for financial gain, he had enlisted the help of the victim, and victim’s roles was to spread the petrol).

  3. whether a duty arises is a matter for a jury.

  4. it would have been simpler had the case been left to the jury as one of unlawful act manslaughter.

  5. given the circumstances, a charge may be appropriate by reason of an unlawful and dangerous act, and by reason of gross negligence. (This hasn’t happened yet, and it is difficult to envisage how it could)

Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act is also known as constructive manslaughter. The essence of this form of manslaughter is that D caused V’s death whilst engaged in an act (not an omission) which was both a crime and created a risk of some personal injury (was dangerous). Typically, it occurs when D attacks V intending relatively minor injury (an act which is a crime and, self-evidently, creates a risk of some personal injury) and V sustains unexpectedly severe injuries from which death results (say, because he falls backwards and breaks his skull). Rewind the clock five minutes before the killing and it is usually the case that the death would not be foreseen.

The “unlawful act” must be a crime. This means that civil wrongs are not enough. It also means that all the elements of the crime must be proved, both actus reus and mens rea. In Lamb [1967] the D shot and killed his friend whilst having a joke with a revolver which he did not believe to be loaded in such a way that it would fire on the first press of the trigger. His conviction was quashed because, though he had clearly committed the actus reus of an offence such as battery, he neither intended nor was reckless as to (did not foresee) any injury to his friend. So, he had committed the actus reus of a crime, in the course of which he had brought about V’s death, but he would not have been guilty of any crime prior to the death because of lack of mens rea.

In Cato [1976] D’s act of injecting V with heroin at V’s request was a crime (unlawfully and maliciously administering a noxious thing) because, in law, V could not give consent. The Court’s further, alternative, suggestion that D could have been convicted on the basis of the injection of the drug which he had unlawfully taken into his possession is more difficult. The injection was dangerous but (on this assumption) not unlawful, whilst the possession was unlawful but, in itself, hardly dangerous!

The decision of Church [1966] (below) was approved of in the House of Lords in DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976]. The two defendants threw a half paving stone from a bridge into the path of an approaching train. It smashed through the windscreen of the cab and killed the guard. Their convictions for manslaughter were upheld but their Lordships totally failed to identify the relevant “unlawful act”. In truth, the case was mainly concerned with the second element in this form of manslaughter, namely whether the unlawful act was “dangerous” (below) and their comments on the 1st element were brief and superficial. Assuming neither intention nor recklessness in relation to personal injury the most obvious unlawful act for which D1 and D2 would have had mens rea was criminal damage. It has been objected that committing a property offence should not be sufficient for liability for manslaughter unless accompanied, at least, by awareness of the risk of personal injury.

The crime must be “of a dangerous kind”. According to the Court of Appeal in Church [1965] this means that the act must be “such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom”.

In Goodfellow [1986] D was convicted of manslaughter when he set fire to his council house (arson) as a way of trying to persuade the local authority to re-house him and his family. Unfortunately, family members who were in the house at the time and who were supposed to be led to safety were killed in the fire.

Compare the case of Cato (above) with Dias [2002]. The defendant prepared the heroin syringe concoction and handed it to the victim, who injected himself. He was to die as a result. Dias was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter (in line with Cato), but was acquitted on appeal. Here’s why, and it’s important in Cato the defendant had administered a noxious thing to the victim – and that’s a crime. In Dias he had handed the syringe to the victim, who self-injected. It is not a crime to inject oneself, hence no offence of manslaughter. Additionally, he could not be a secondary party to the killing as there was no principal offender.

Section 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIME & VICTIMS ACT 2004 creates a new offence of failing to prevent the death of a child. Where a child is unlawfully killed by a member of her family, any adult member of the family who knew (or should have known) the risk of such an event, and did not do what he reasonably could to prevent it, is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for up to 14 years. The prosecution is not required to prove who actually killed the child - it may even have been the adult himself. (This new offence is intended to meet the situation where a child has been killed by one of its parents, each of whom exercises the right to remain silent as to the circumstances of the death.)

We will continue with other fatal offences next week. They are of secondary importance to what we have discussed thus far.

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