Monday, December 11, 2006

Thursday 7 December 2006

We continued with our look at criminal attempts.

In Jones [1990] - D was distraught when his girlfriend ended their relationship and began associating with P. He armed himself with a sawn-off shotgun a hatchet and a length of cord and got into P’s car as the latter dropped his daughter off at school. Whilst P’s attention was diverted, D took the shotgun from a holdall and pointed it at P at a range of about 12 inches and said, “You are not going to like this”. In the ensuing struggle, P managed to grab the gun and to escape despite having the cord thrown around his neck. The safety catch was found still to be on and P could not remember whether D’s finger was ever on the trigger. D claimed that he had only wanted to kill himself. D’s conviction was upheld. After strongly supporting the view of Lord Lane CJ in Gullefer that the Act must be construed without reference to the pre-existing common law, the court argued that, though the acts of:

  • obtaining and shortening the gun

  • loading it

  • going to the school

could only be regarded as preparatory, whilst:

  • getting into the car

  • taking out the gun

  • pointing it with the intention of killing P

constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to be allowed to determine whether D had done ‘an act more than merely preparatory’.

Campbell [1991] - the police had evidence that an attempt might be made to carry out a robbery at a sub-post office. D was seen in the vicinity. He rode a motor cycle along the road and walked around, approaching to within about 30 yards of the post office. He looked around before turning away. He returned half an hour later and walked back towards the post office. The police arrested him outside and, on searching him, found an imitation gun and a threatening note. He admitted that his intention had been to carry out a robbery but that he had changed his mind and was arrested before he could leave. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal against conviction for attempted robbery and held that there were numerous things still to be done before he could carry out the robbery.

So far as attempting the impossible is conbcerned, before the 1981 Act, the leading authority was Haughton v Smith where the House of Lords held that if what D had tried to do was absolutely impossible, regardless of how he set about it, he would have a good defence. If, on the other hand, D had simply used an inappropriate means of achieving his objective, he could still be convicted. In Haughton v Smith the accused received what he believed to be stolen corned beef. In fact, the corned beef had ceased to be stolen in law because it had been restored to lawful possession after the police had taken control of it. The House of Lords held that he could not be guilty of attempted handling.

Since the 1981 Act, the law has changed and was clarified by the House of Lords in Shivpuri [1986] which overruled the majority view in Anderton v Ryan [1985]. Haughton v Smith would almost certainly now result in a conviction.

Regard must be had to s1(2) and (3) which require the court to consider the facts as D, albeit mistakenly, believed them to be. If the facts as D perceived them would have necessitated a breach of the criminal law, D may be convicted of an attempt.

As long as D’s acts would have been more than merely preparatory, and he intended to commit the crime attempted, the prosecution will succeed. In Shivpuri [1986] S was guilty of attempting to knowingly be concerned in dealing with a prohibited drug even though the substance in the suitcase was actually a vegetable material, so that he was incorrect in his belief that he was dealing in heroin.

According to s1(4), there can be no liability for an attempt:

  • to commit a summary offence

  • engage in a statutory/common law conspiracy

  • be a secondary party to an offence

  • to impede apprehension or prosecution of an offender

  • to conceal an offence.

In conclusion, there are many cases where there will be little or no problem in deciding whether or not there is an attempt. Consider:

  • D fires a gun at a pillow intending to kill someone. Guilty of attempted murder.

  • D puts poison in a drink intending to kill V, the dose being too weak. Guilty of attempted murder.

  • D tries to break into a safe with the wrong tools, intending to steal. Guilty of attempt theft.

  • D takes an umbrella from a stand in a pub, believing he has stolen it from another customer. In fact it belongs to him. Cannot be guilty of theft as the property does not belong to another, but is guilty of attempt theft. Obviously there will be problems for the prosecution proving the mens rea, and it could be argued that such an offence is ludicrous, but it is the current state of the law.

We are now turning to offences against the person, beginning with fatal offences.

Unlawful homicide usually encompasses:

  • murder

  • manslaughter

  • infanticide

  • causing death by dangerous driving

  • child destruction

  • abortion

It is the first two that you can expect in the exam!

Murder and manslaughter share the same actus reus, i.e. one person unlawfully kills another. The difference lies in the intent.

Murder consists of unlawful killing with malice aforethought. That simply means intention.

Manslaughter is initially classified as:

voluntary or
involuntary

In voluntary manslaughter all the elements of murder are usually present, but there is also an additional extraneous or mitigating factor which reduces liability. This will be provocation, diminished responsibility or being a participant in a suicide pact.

In involuntary manslaughter D acts with mens rea but not with the necessary intention, i.e. malice aforethought.

I drew a flow chart on the board that I cannot recreate here. Ask a fellow student for a copy.

Looking first at the actus reus of both murder and manslaughter, the principal requirement is that D’s act should have caused the victim’s death, and this is a question of fact for the jury. Since death is a natural process, it is more accurate to say that D must accelerate that process. Thus, it matters not that the victim may be suffering from a terminal illness.

The rules on causation have already been extensively discussed. The cases frequently concerned homicide, and it will be sufficient to emphasise again that the prosecution must prove:

  • causation in fact and in law

  • D’s conduct does not have to be the sole cause but must make a significant contribution

  • intervening events which may be alleged to have broken the chain of causation. Such events include:

(i)      a refusal of treatment by V
(ii)      V’s especial susceptibility
(iii)      an attempt by V to escape
(iv)      negligent medical treatment

The Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 has abolished the old common law rule that no one could be convicted of homicide unless the victim’s death followed within a year and a day after the accused’s act which was said to have caused the death.

This no longer applies, but if either the injury which is alleged to have caused the death occurred more than three years before the death or the accused has previously been convicted of an offence in circumstances alleged to be connected with the death the consent of the Attorney General is required.

The death must be of a human being. This will rarely cause any difficulty for the prosecution but it means, for instance, that to be a potential victim of homicide a child must be born alive, whether injured before or after birth (preventing a child being born alive is not homicide). In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] the House of Lords were faced with a decision as to whether a charge of homicide was appropriate where the child was injured whilst being carried by the mother, but died after being born.

On 26 April 1990 B stabbed his girlfriend M who was to his knowledge between 22 and 24 weeks pregnant with his child. M made a good recovery from the wound but on 11 June 1990, without further trauma, she gave birth to a grossly premature child and it was found that the stab wound had penetrated the foetus. Despite receiving exemplary medical care, the child only survived 121 days. Before the child died B was charged with wounding M with intent to do her grievous bodily harm to which he pleaded guilty. On the death of the child B was charged with the child’s murder. At the end of the prosecution case, on a submission that B had no case to answer, the judge ruled that the facts did not give rise to a verdict of murder or manslaughter; thus, he directed the jury to acquit B.

On a reference by the Attorney-General to the Court of Appeal under s36 Criminal Justice Act 1972 for the Court’s opinion :

  1. whether the crimes of murder or manslaughter could be committed where the unlawful injury was deliberately inflicted on a child in utero, or a mother of a child in utero where the child was subsequently born alive but thereafter died and the injuries while in utero caused or made a substantial contribution to the death; and

  2. whether the fact that the death of the child was caused solely as a consequence of injury to the mother rather than as direct injury to the foetus could negative any liability for murder or manslaughter in those circumstances.

The Court of Appeal held (1) that murder or manslaughter could be committed where unlawful injury was deliberately inflicted to a child in utero or to a mother carrying a child in utero in such circumstances; and (2) that the requisite intent to be proved in the case of murder was an intention to kill or cause really serious bodily harm to the mother.

On a further reference to the House of Lords at B’s request it was held that the mother and foetus were separate organisms, and rejected that the doctrine of transferred malice could be extended to cover such a situation. The defendant could not be guilty of murder. However, for the purposes of manslaughter in such circumstances, it does not matter that at the time of the unlawful act the foetus was not a living person. The defendant could therefore be convicted of manslaughter.

The D’s conduct must be unlawful. This will absolve from blame an executioner who was carrying out his duties.

More commonly, a doctor performing an abortion within the terms of the ABORTION ACT 1967 would not be guilty if the child initially survived but then died because he would have been acting lawfully. A comatose person who has already suffered brain death cannot subsequently be a victim of homicide.  Similarly, the successful use of the defence of self-defence negates an unlawful killing.

In Malcherek, Steel [1981] D’s claim not to have caused V’s death because doctors had not carried out the full range of checks to determine brain death was rejected. The doctors had acted properly, V was brain dead (and, therefore, legally dead) when life-support machines were switched off, and so D’s conduct must have caused the death.

In the very important case, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] the House of Lords had to face for the first time the issue of the duty on doctors to continue to treat a patient in a persistent vegetative state and in whom there was no prospect of a recovery of any degree of consciousness. V was severely injured when he was crushed in a crowd of football supporters attending an FA Cup semi-final game in April 1989. By the time that resuscitation treatment was administered to him, his brain had been deprived of oxygen for a significant period and the cerebral cortex (the centre of consciousness and all higher functions in the brain) had effectively been destroyed. However, his brain stem functioned normally and he was not dead in any sense recognised by law or medicine. Since he could not swallow, he was fed by means of a tube threaded into his stomach down which food was mechanically pumped. Drugs were administered to suppress infections, and other surgical intervention had been required.

The judgments make use of the rules and principles enunciated above, though there was a strong plea from Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill that Parliament should intervene to lay down rules to govern the conduct of doctors in such situations. It was held that the doctors were under no duty to continue to “treat” V and so would not be guilty of any offences should they cease to do so (V died a short time after treatment stopped). Their Lordships began by arguing that, though the fundamental principle is the sanctity of life, the principle is not absolute. There is no absolute rule that treatment must be given which will prolong life (for instance, the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his patient must yield to the principle of self-determination - the patient could require life-support to be discontinued). However, it is not lawful to act only for the purpose of bringing about death, even if this is motivated by a desire to end suffering. Importantly, the feeding had to be seen in the context of the whole regime and, especially, the requirement to use an invasive technique (the tube). The feeding could therefore be seen as “treatment”, and its cessation as cessation of treatment and not merely as “starving to death”.

Withdrawal of the treatment was to be viewed as an omission, permitting enquiry into whether the doctors were under any duty to continue to treat. Their duty was to act in accordance with what responsible and competent medical opinion would consider to be the best interests of their patient. If, according to such opinion, it would not be in the best interests of a patient to prolong life by the use of invasive techniques, then no such duty existed. If doctors then withdrew treatment, the death would result from the pre-existing condition and, in law, would be caused by the injury or disease which had brought about that condition. In all the circumstances, and despite the fact that V could experience no discomfort, it was proper to conclude that, according to responsible medical opinion, no benefit was conferred on him by the continuation of the treatment. It was not in his best interest and the doctors were under no duty to persist.

Se also Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2000].

The mens rea of both murder and voluntary manslaughter  is malice aforethought. This is a purely technical term, and is potentially misleading. There need be no malice in the sense of spite or ill-will nor any real forethought: murder is not necessarily concerned with premeditated killings.

The prosecution must prove that, at the time he committed the fatal act, D intended to kill or seriously injure; see, e.g. Moloney [1985]. The meaning of intention was fully considered previously, together with the important cases, most of which concern murder or attempted murder.

The crime is one of specific intent, which can be either oblique or direct in nature.

The rule regarding serious injury extends to all kinds of serious injury, even that which no one would expect to be life-threatening in the ordinary run of things. So, if D intended to break V’s leg and V died on account of some unexpected medical complication, this could be murder.

(Voluntary) Manslaughter by Provocation. The fact that the killing was provoked may be sufficient mitigation to reduce liability from murder to manslaughter.

Provocation was, and remains, a common law defence, though its elements have been modified significantly by s3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. Its essence is that D, though prima facie guilty of murder:

  • killed whilst suffering a sudden and temporary loss of self-control in response to something said and/or done by another person, and

  • D’s response must be such as might have been expected of a reasonable person in the same situation.

If any evidence that D was provoked to lose his self-control appears at the trial, whether the issue is expressly raised by D or not (even if, say, D) asserts an alibi or that he did not kill V - Cambridge [1994] - then the judge must put the defence to the jury, which has the task of deciding both whether D did lose his self-control on account of the provocation (the subjective test) and whether a reasonable person would have done as D did (the objective test). As we shall see later, this mythical reasonable person is said to have the same characteristics as the defendant, as long as those characteristics are not ‘fault based’. The onus is on the Crown to disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt.

What conduct can be provocation? This is where we shall begin next week.

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