Friday, December 01, 2006

Thursday 30 November 2006

We began with a look at the criminal liability of corporations. A corporation (or company) is a separate person in law. It is an individual in its own right, quite distinct from those persons (human beings) who act on its behalf. It can own property, buy and sell property, have its own money and bank account; it can sue and be sued, and it can prosecute and be prosecuted; see Salomon v Salomon & Co. [1897], in which the court held that a company’s debts belonged to and were the responsibility of the company, and not the man who ran it effectively as a one-man business and who owned the vast majority of shares in it.

There are obvious limits on corporate liability under the criminal law; e.g. a company cannot commit crimes such as rape and bigamy because these offences can only be committed by certain human beings. Also a company cannot commit a crime that is punishable only by imprisonment (e.g. murder). But it is worth noting that a company may be guilty of manslaughter: P & O European Ferries Ltd [1990] though the prosecution resulting from the Zeebrugge disaster failed on the evidence. It is in the area of gross negligence manslaughter that interest lies.

In 1994, OLL Ltd and its managing director, Kite, were convicted of manslaughter. Four teenagers pursuing activities organised by OLL Ltd had drowned when crossing Lyme Bay in canoes. There was clear evidence that Kite knew that the safety procedures and the general standards of skill and competence of instructors were seriously defective: R v Kite & OLL Ltd [1994].

In the leading case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] the House of Lords, per Lord Reid said:

“A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these; it must act through living persons. Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company … He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate … If [his mind] is a guilty mind, then that guilt is the guilt of the company.”

Thus, crimes committed by those persons who control the company (the “BRAINS”) could be attributed to the company; whereas the offences committed by mere servants of the company (the “HANDS”) could not (except, of course, by the vicarious liability rules). The case is concerned with a trading standards offence, where the store manager was said to be only the hands of the company.

In the Lyme Bay case (above), OLL Ltd was a very small company and it was easy to identify it with Kite, the managing director, and to attribute to it his knowledge and failures. As the P & O European Ferries Ltd case shows, in larger companies it may not be so easy to establish the appropriate culpability in anyone who can be identified with the company.

It does look like reform is on the way. The Corporate Manslaughter & Homicide Bill 2006 received it second reading on 10th October 2006.

We then turned to the subject of inchoate offences. Inchoate is simply another word for an offence which is incomplete. It is desirable that the Police should have the opportunity to prevent the full offence from being committed whilst at the same time prosecuting those who contemplated it. Unlike secondary offences the full crime need not have taken place before the accused is guilty of an inchoate offence. An inchoate offence is criminal only in relation to the full offence, it is important that one is not guilty of an attempt, but, for example, of attempted murder. There are three inchoate offences:

  • incitement     }     this sequence shows the movement

  • conspiracy     }     towards the commission of the full

  • attempt          }     offence
     
     although some other statutory offences have a similar effect. Here are two:
     
The mens rea for all of the inchoate offences is specific intent, recklessness is not enough.
     
INCITEMENT. It is a common law crime to incite another person to commit any criminal offence, apart from conspiracy (see s5(7) CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1977), whether or not that offence is committed. It does not matter whether or not the solicitation has any effect: Higgins [1801].
     
The offence is punishable with a fine or imprisonment within the discretion of the judge when the case is tried on indictment, even though the principal offence’s maximum is much less. An accused can be more severely punished for incitement the offence than the person who actually commits it!
     
The usual case offered is Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976], which also confirms that the persuasion need not be oral. The company advertised for sale an instrument useful in evading police speed traps, & were found guilty of inciting an offence (the use of the product with a Home Office wireless licence).
     
If the crime incited is committed, the inciter may be guilty of incitement and/or be treated as a secondary party to that crime.
     
What the defendant has incited must amount to a crime: Whitehouse [1977]. There it was held that W could not be guilty of inciting his 15-year old daughter to have incestuous sexual intercourse with him. By s11 SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 1956, it is impossible for a girl under 16 to be guilty of incest; neither could such a girl be guilty of aiding and abetting a man to commit incest with her. Thus, W had effectively been charged with inciting his daughter to commit a crime which she could not commit!

The persuasion/encouragement should come to the attention of the person who is to be influenced, though it need not be effective: Krause [1902]. If it is effective and the person incited agrees to commit a crime, he and the inciter are likely to be guilty of conspiracy.
     
If the inciter suggests an inappropriate means of committing the crime so that it cannot come about, the inciter will still be guilty provided he had the necessary mens rea. Where what was incited could never be achieved regardless of the means adopted, the inciter will also be guilty provided he had mens rea. In McDonough [1962] McD was convicted of inciting another to handle stolen lamb carcasses which did not exist. It is assumed that this decision was reached on the basis that McD mistakenly believed that the carcasses did exist.
     
We then turned to CONSPIRACY. The main form of conspiracy is statutory conspiracy which consists of an agreement that one or more of the parties to the agreement will commit a criminal offence (s1 CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1977). All common law conspiracies were abolished by s5 of the 1977 Act except for conspiracy to defraud. Conspiracies to corrupt public morals and to outrage public decency were also preserved as common law conspiracies but only if the courts should decide that such activities were not offences in themselves; though doubts remain, it may well be that both are now offences in their own right so that agreeing to do either will be a statutory conspiracy (however, see the comments on such conspiracies below).
     
Conspiracy consists of an agreement between two or more persons; there is no maximum number. Agreement is often difficult to establish and may have to be deduced from all the evidence.
     
Apart from an agreement in which all the conspirators are in contact with each other, agreements may be established by proof that one person acted as the central contact (the “hub” of a “wheel”) or by proof that the conspirators were linked in a ‘chain’. In these forms, a conspirator may know the identity of only one other conspirator but will be held to have agreed with all the others provided that he knows that others are involved and that they are all working towards a common end.
     
The agreement must be between two or more people. The CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1977 s2 provides that there is no statutory conspiracy where, apart from D the only other party to the conspiracy is :
     
  • D’s spouse

  • A person under the age of criminal responsibility

  • An intended victim of the offence, e.g. Tyrrell [1894] where D, who was under 16, could not be guilty of aiding and abetting X to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her.

Section 1(1) of the 1977 Act requires proof that D made an agreement:

with any other person(s) that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either

  1. will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence(s) by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or

  2. would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence(s) impossible.

This appears to mean that D must intend that the agreement be carried out by himself and/or at least one other party to the agreement. Not so.

In Anderson [1985] the House of Lords considered that the making of the agreement was enough, even if D, as happened in the case, never intended that it should be carried out and believed that it could not be carried out without his participation (he intended to take the money but not do the job). The only exception recognised was where D was a “respectable citizen” such as a police officer, whose purpose was to expose and frustrate the criminal purpose of the others. Even here, the police officers must not intend, as part of their plan to gain information, that the object of the agreement be pursued.

The Court of Appeal in Siracusa [1989] held that the defendant’s agreement is all that is necessary.

Criminal liability is generally territorial; that is, English courts have jurisdiction only in relation to offences committed within England and Wales. Thus, courts only have jurisdiction over conspiracies when they consist of agreements to commit offences in England and Wales.

However, a British citizen may be indicted for murder in England no matter where in the world the murder occurred. Consequently, an agreement in England to commit murder abroad is indictable as a conspiracy in this country. More generally, by virtue of s1(4) of the 1977 Act, any agreement by anyone in England, whether British subject or not, to commit murder abroad is indictable in this country. An agreement abroad to commit any offence in England is indictable as a conspiracy in England, whether or not any acts have been done in England in pursuit of the conspiracy. The simple way to understand this:

Conspire to murder someone abroad? Yes
Conspire to steal the Mona Lisa from the Louvre? No - because the theft could not be tried in England and Wales

For CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD, Lord Diplock said that common law conspiracy was “the least systematic, the most irrational branch of English penal law.”

There is no clear definition of “fraud” for these purposes. According to the House of Lords in Scott v MPC [1974] it includes dishonestly causing economic loss:

“by dishonestly to deprive a person of something which is his or to which he is or would be or might be entitled … and by dishonesty to injure some proprietary right of his …”

Deception is not a requirement so that in Scott the defendant was guilty of conspiring with cinema employees to borrow films for copying and distribution for profit in breach of copyright.

Later cases suggest that it is probably sufficient that they agree to do things which they know will defraud, whether or not they have that purpose. In Cooke [1986] British Rail stewards were guilty of conspiracy to defraud British Rail by selling their own sandwiches and making profits for themselves whilst at work, even though their main aim was probably simply to make the money for themselves. They must have known that the effect would be to damage British Rail’s economic interests.

Dishonesty must also be shown, and here it seems that the tests in Ghosh [1982] apply; i.e.

  1. was D’s conduct dishonest according to the standards of ordinary decent people? If it was,

  2. was D aware of this? Both questions must be answered in the affirmative for a finding of dishonesty.

We will look at this case more closely when we deal with theft.
So far as CONSPIRACY TO CORRUPT PUBLIC MORALS OR OUTRAGE PUBLIC DECENCY is concerned, it is true to say that the law is confused. Prior to Shaw it had been unheard of. However, the House of Lords in Shaw v DPP [1961] and in Knuller v DPP [1972] held that such agreements do constitute criminal offences.

In Shaw, S published a “Ladies Directory” containing the names and addresses of prostitutes and the sort of sexual activities they performed, and was convicted of conspiracy to corrupt public morals.

In Knuller, it was held that an agreement to publish advertisements which would assist in the commission of homosexual acts between consenting adult males in private was also a conspiracy to corrupt public morals. Although there is no residual power for the House of Lords to create offences (the Declaratory Theory), Lord Simmonds stated in Shaw;

“There remains in the Courts of Law a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the state”.

In Gibson [1990] the defendant was an artist who included in a public display of his work a pair of earrings made from freeze dried foetuses. The Court of Appeal held that, since the object of the common law offence was to protect the public from feelings of outrage, there was no requirement for the prosecution to prove that D had an intention to outrage or appreciated the risk of such outrage and determined nevertheless to run that risk.

It may turn out that, completely unknown to the parties, it is impossible for them to achieve their objective. For example, they plan to burgle a house to steal a particular painting, not knowing that the painting was sold and removed a short time before they made their agreement.  This is usually described as impossibility. The law used to be that the nature of the conspiracy determined whether or not impossibility could provide a good defence. If the conspiracy was very narrow and precise so that the agreed course of conduct could never produce the result/circumstances prohibited by law, then D was not liable: DPP v Nock and Others [1978]. There D and others could not be guilty of conspiring to produce cocaine by extracting it from a particular powder, because their agreement was limited to the use of the specific powder and cocaine could not be obtained from it. However, this distinction has now been abolished, at least in relation to statutory conspiracies.

Even though what the parties to such a conspiracy have agreed to cannot be materialised, they may still be convicted. This is implicit in s1(1)(a) CLA 1977 (as amended), and is put beyond doubt by s1(1)(b).

Notwithstanding the need for at least two parties to a conspiracy, A may be convicted of conspiring with B (and with no-one else), whereas B may be acquitted of conspiring with A (and with no-one else). This is true where A and B are tried separately (DPP v Shannon [1974]), or where they are tried together by the same jury (Longman and Cribben [1980]).

In the first case, different juries may come to different conclusions about the evidence against the parties, in the latter there may be strong evidence against one party but only weak evidence against the other. This rule is firmly supported by s5(8). Naturally, if the evidence against each party is of equal weight and cogency, a jury should return the same verdict against each of them.

ATTEMPTS were formerly common law, but now governed by the CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS ACT 1981. The rationale behind the law can be explained as:

  • People who are dangerous should be prosecuted. A person who shoots and misses is just as blameworthy as one who shoots and hits.

  • People should not be penalised for simply thinking about committing a crime, therefore the police have to hold back until the point is reached where the defendant commits the “act that is more than merely preparatory”, even though they may be certain that the defendant intends to commit the full offence.

  • Each time a new indictable offence is created, an offence of attempting to commit the offence is automatically created.

  • The mens rea of an attempt is nothing less than intent to commit the full offence, even though the mens rea for the full offence is satisfied by recklessness. Section 1(1) provides:

If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies…

It would appear, therefore, that the mens rea of an attempt is intention to commit the full offence. However, it should be noted that where an offence can be committed with an intention to cause lesser injury than actually must occur (in murder, for instance, death must occur but D will be guilty if he intends death or serious injury), the attempt will require an intention to cause nothing less than the full injury. Thus, the mens rea of attempted murder is an intention to kill, an intention to cause serious injury is not enough.

A doubt is sometimes raised about so-called conditional intent. The term is often used to describe D’s state of mind when engaged in acts with the aim of seeing whether it is worth his while to continue and might be found especially in theft, where D may want to see whether anything is worth taking.

In Easom [1971] D was caught when he rifled through V’s handbag in a cinema. V was a policewoman specially planted for the purpose and it was clear that D had not actually taken anything because there was nothing that interested him. His conviction for theft was quashed but, at that time, he could have been convicted of attempted theft and it would appear that that would also now be true under the 1981 Act.

Actus reus:

D must do something which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence attempted. Whether or not D has acted in this way is a question of fact.

The idea of this phrase, was to try to solve the problems associated with the previous law, where there were several attempts to decide on just when an attempt had been committed. Anything that takes place too early cannot be an attempt, conversely if it is too late it means that the full offence has been committed. Trying to take one step back from when the full offence was committed is what caused all of the problems.

Prior to the 1981 Act many different formulations had been tried to solve the problem, including:

a proximity test, which was the most used. In Eagleton [1855] it was said that “Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the full offence are not to be considered as attempts, but acts immediately connected with it are.” The Law Commission suggested as late as 1980 that in a report on which the 1981 Act was based that the proximity test should be consigned to the dustbin of history.

an equivocality test, which asked whether the accused’s conduct had any purpose other than the commission of the full offence, as in Davey v Lee [1968].

a last act test, asked whether the defendant did the last act dependent on him. In DPP v Stonehouse [1978] Lord Diplock  described the last act as “crossing the Rubicon and burning his boats.”

None of these tests are satisfactory, and it has been argued that none should apply to the Criminal Attempts Act. The Courts have recently asserted that the common law cases should no longer be cited in explanation of the statute since they represent conflicting and unsatisfactory lines of authority. The following points may be made:

  1. all acts are in some sense “preparatory” so if any distinctions are to be made between acts which are sufficient to amount to an attempt and those which are not, then the word “merely” must be significant;

  2. whether an act is “more than merely” preparatory must be a question of degree in all the circumstances, including the definition of the completed offence itself;

  3. though D need not have reached the stage of the “last act” which it is necessary and possible for him to do, it is clear that if he has reached this stage then he must be guilty of an attempt;

  4. the respective functions of judge and jury are laid down by the 1981 Act s4(3) as follows:


  • the judge must decide whether there is some evidence of an act more than merely preparatory. If there is none then he must withdraw the issue from the jury;

  • if the judge decides that there is such evidence, he must leave the issue to the jury to decide as a question of fact. This is so even if he considers that D must be guilty because he has reached the stage of the last act.

We will continue with this next week.

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home