Thursday 26 January 2007
We continued our discussion on appropriation.
Remember that Lawrence had decided that one could appropriate with consent. This was to be (wrongly) blown out of the water by the case of R v Morris [1984]. The hold heard that the defendant had switched price labels on items in a supermarket, and in one case had paid before being arrested, in the other had been stopped before reaching the cashier. Undoubtedly, this was not an authorised act and so was clearly an appropriation (subject to the doubts about assumption of the rights previously dealt with). Consequently, anything said about consent by the House of Lords must be interpreted as obiter. Even so, Lord Roskill had no doubt that “the concept of appropriation … involves not an act expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner but an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those rights”. For now, remember that this is an obiter dicta statement. The court is saying that if you pick up something from a supermarket and go and pay, you are NOT appropriating, but if you run off with it you do appropriate. In other words – you cannot appropriate by consent.
This isn’t correct, but was blindly followed for several years. We had a conflict between Morris and Lawrence (the issue of consent), yet Lord Roskil thought not. He offered no explanation for this, other than to say that it was “beyond question” that there was a dishonest appropriation in Lawrence.
So we now had two House of Lords cases had suggested directly conflicting approaches to the issue of consent but the second had not acknowledged the conflict with the first.
Morris had asserted that appropriation must be adverse to the wishes of the owner.
Lawrence asserted the complete opposite. Most cases followed Morris.
Finally, the House of Lords was asked to resolve the issue in Gomez [1993]. The defendant had told the manager of the store in which he worked that he had verified that building society cheques being offered by X in payment for expensive electrical goods were valid. In truth, the defendant and X were in collusion and the cheques had been stolen.
His conviction for theft was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that, following Morris, there was no appropriation of the electrical goods because they were obtained with the consent of the manager, albeit induced by fraud. Thus, at last, a case had come before the House of Lords which directly concerned the issue of consent, in which there could be no doubt that it would be a matter of ratio decidendi.
By a majority of 4 to 1, the House of Lords reversed the decision and adopted the approach in Lawrence v MPC. Appropriation is a neutral term. It is the combination with dishonesty (along with other ingredients) which converts it into theft. Thus, V’s consent or authorisation becomes relevant not to the appropriation but to proof of dishonesty in D.
There are some surprising implications of this decision:
(1) Where persons deal with property that belongs initially to others there is now no way of distinguishing between who may and who may not be a thief by reference to what they do, only by reference to the state of mind in which they do it. All persons who deal with the property of others appropriate that property (including all who take goods down from supermarket shelves, buy goods over the counter, get gifts, hire goods etc.). Thieves do so (additionally) dishonestly and with intent permanently to deprive.
(2) Because an appropriation is an assumption of any of the rights of the owner, even an authorised preliminary dealing with the property which D intends as a step on the way towards permanent deprivation amounts to theft (repositioning an item at the end of a shelf so as to be able to slip it into a bag more easily later).
Gomez ought to have brought to an end 23 years of uncertainty in the interpretation of appropriation but the Court of Appeal did their best to mess it up. Suggestions form them decided that the goods must be taken away, but it doesn’t say that in the statute. It did in the Larceny Act 1916 (known as ‘asportation’).
The House of Lords was again to confirm that appropriation may take place with or without the consent of the owner in R v Hinks [2000]. A woman H was the carer of an older man of low intelligence, and persuaded him to make gifts to her totalling some £60, 000 and a olour television set. . The jury found as a fact that D had acted dishonestly and convicted her of theft. The House of Lords affirmed the conviction, and said there can be an appropriation even where the victim gives the money voluntarily to the thief.
PROPERTY is defined in s4(1): property includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property.
A thing in action is intangible in that it has no physical existence, but may confer valuable rights on its owner; e.g. a debt, company shares, a copyright or trade mark. But confidential information falls outside s4; in Oxford v Moss [1978] a sneak preview of an examination paper was not theft of property belonging to the university as D did not take the examination paper but merely copied the questions from it.
A credit balance in a bank account and the right to overdraw are examples of things in action; see e.g. Kohn [1979].
Though land is property, under s4(2) it can only be stolen by a person not in possession of it if that person severs it or appropriates it after it has been severed. So, stripping lead or tiles from a roof, taking bricks from the fabric of a building or removing turf or topsoil can all be theft.
However, it is not possible to steal mushrooms growing wild on any land, or flowers, fruit or foliage picked from a plant growing wild on any land unless this is done for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose (s4(3)).
A tenant in possession of the land can only be guilty of theft if he appropriates the whole or part of any fixture or structure let to be used with the land.
Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, are also property but, again, cannot be stolen unless either already reduced into possession by or on behalf of another person without possession having since been lost or abandoned, or in the course of being reduced into possession by another (s4(4)). Essentially, the poacher does not steal by capturing wild creatures himself but can steal from the landowner, gamekeeper or another poacher, any of whom got to the wild creature before him.
A human corpse cannot be owned by anyone and cannot be stolen. But fluid from a living body can be stolen - Rothery [1976] where a driver who had provided a specimen of blood was convicted of theft of the container. It seems that he would also have been guilty of stealing the sample. Presumably, other parts of a living body can also be stolen.
In R v Kelly [1998] the Court of Appeal confirmed that there is no property n a corpse, but subject to an exception where the corpse had undergone a process of skill with a view to preserving it, e.g. embalming, or for scientific examination. It then becomes property and is capable of being stolen. Here the bodu parts were taken from the Royal College of Surgeons and used for artistic purposes.
Electricity cannot be stolen under s1, but s13 is concerned with the offence of abstracting electricity.
We’ll look at s5 – belonging to another – next week.
Remember that Lawrence had decided that one could appropriate with consent. This was to be (wrongly) blown out of the water by the case of R v Morris [1984]. The hold heard that the defendant had switched price labels on items in a supermarket, and in one case had paid before being arrested, in the other had been stopped before reaching the cashier. Undoubtedly, this was not an authorised act and so was clearly an appropriation (subject to the doubts about assumption of the rights previously dealt with). Consequently, anything said about consent by the House of Lords must be interpreted as obiter. Even so, Lord Roskill had no doubt that “the concept of appropriation … involves not an act expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner but an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those rights”. For now, remember that this is an obiter dicta statement. The court is saying that if you pick up something from a supermarket and go and pay, you are NOT appropriating, but if you run off with it you do appropriate. In other words – you cannot appropriate by consent.
This isn’t correct, but was blindly followed for several years. We had a conflict between Morris and Lawrence (the issue of consent), yet Lord Roskil thought not. He offered no explanation for this, other than to say that it was “beyond question” that there was a dishonest appropriation in Lawrence.
So we now had two House of Lords cases had suggested directly conflicting approaches to the issue of consent but the second had not acknowledged the conflict with the first.
Morris had asserted that appropriation must be adverse to the wishes of the owner.
Lawrence asserted the complete opposite. Most cases followed Morris.
Finally, the House of Lords was asked to resolve the issue in Gomez [1993]. The defendant had told the manager of the store in which he worked that he had verified that building society cheques being offered by X in payment for expensive electrical goods were valid. In truth, the defendant and X were in collusion and the cheques had been stolen.
His conviction for theft was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that, following Morris, there was no appropriation of the electrical goods because they were obtained with the consent of the manager, albeit induced by fraud. Thus, at last, a case had come before the House of Lords which directly concerned the issue of consent, in which there could be no doubt that it would be a matter of ratio decidendi.
By a majority of 4 to 1, the House of Lords reversed the decision and adopted the approach in Lawrence v MPC. Appropriation is a neutral term. It is the combination with dishonesty (along with other ingredients) which converts it into theft. Thus, V’s consent or authorisation becomes relevant not to the appropriation but to proof of dishonesty in D.
There are some surprising implications of this decision:
(1) Where persons deal with property that belongs initially to others there is now no way of distinguishing between who may and who may not be a thief by reference to what they do, only by reference to the state of mind in which they do it. All persons who deal with the property of others appropriate that property (including all who take goods down from supermarket shelves, buy goods over the counter, get gifts, hire goods etc.). Thieves do so (additionally) dishonestly and with intent permanently to deprive.
(2) Because an appropriation is an assumption of any of the rights of the owner, even an authorised preliminary dealing with the property which D intends as a step on the way towards permanent deprivation amounts to theft (repositioning an item at the end of a shelf so as to be able to slip it into a bag more easily later).
Gomez ought to have brought to an end 23 years of uncertainty in the interpretation of appropriation but the Court of Appeal did their best to mess it up. Suggestions form them decided that the goods must be taken away, but it doesn’t say that in the statute. It did in the Larceny Act 1916 (known as ‘asportation’).
The House of Lords was again to confirm that appropriation may take place with or without the consent of the owner in R v Hinks [2000]. A woman H was the carer of an older man of low intelligence, and persuaded him to make gifts to her totalling some £60, 000 and a olour television set. . The jury found as a fact that D had acted dishonestly and convicted her of theft. The House of Lords affirmed the conviction, and said there can be an appropriation even where the victim gives the money voluntarily to the thief.
PROPERTY is defined in s4(1): property includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property.
A thing in action is intangible in that it has no physical existence, but may confer valuable rights on its owner; e.g. a debt, company shares, a copyright or trade mark. But confidential information falls outside s4; in Oxford v Moss [1978] a sneak preview of an examination paper was not theft of property belonging to the university as D did not take the examination paper but merely copied the questions from it.
A credit balance in a bank account and the right to overdraw are examples of things in action; see e.g. Kohn [1979].
Though land is property, under s4(2) it can only be stolen by a person not in possession of it if that person severs it or appropriates it after it has been severed. So, stripping lead or tiles from a roof, taking bricks from the fabric of a building or removing turf or topsoil can all be theft.
However, it is not possible to steal mushrooms growing wild on any land, or flowers, fruit or foliage picked from a plant growing wild on any land unless this is done for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose (s4(3)).
A tenant in possession of the land can only be guilty of theft if he appropriates the whole or part of any fixture or structure let to be used with the land.
Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, are also property but, again, cannot be stolen unless either already reduced into possession by or on behalf of another person without possession having since been lost or abandoned, or in the course of being reduced into possession by another (s4(4)). Essentially, the poacher does not steal by capturing wild creatures himself but can steal from the landowner, gamekeeper or another poacher, any of whom got to the wild creature before him.
A human corpse cannot be owned by anyone and cannot be stolen. But fluid from a living body can be stolen - Rothery [1976] where a driver who had provided a specimen of blood was convicted of theft of the container. It seems that he would also have been guilty of stealing the sample. Presumably, other parts of a living body can also be stolen.
In R v Kelly [1998] the Court of Appeal confirmed that there is no property n a corpse, but subject to an exception where the corpse had undergone a process of skill with a view to preserving it, e.g. embalming, or for scientific examination. It then becomes property and is capable of being stolen. Here the bodu parts were taken from the Royal College of Surgeons and used for artistic purposes.
Electricity cannot be stolen under s1, but s13 is concerned with the offence of abstracting electricity.
We’ll look at s5 – belonging to another – next week.

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