Monday, January 15, 2007

Thursday 15 January 2007

Following on from fatal offences, we turned our attention to non-fatal offences.

The offences of assault and battery were always thought to be common law offences (common assault) but are now considered to be statutory (s39 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988 ).

‘ASSAULT’ is often used to mean ‘BATTERY’, but the two offences are distinct and it is important to be clear about the sense in which the terms are being used. Parliament added to the confusion by using “assault” when either assault or battery might suffice, as in the offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and indecent assault. The simple distinction between them is that:

ASSAULT involves causing a person to fear immediate unlawful violence;
BATTERY is the actual infliction of the violence.

The actus reus of assault is that D causes V to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence, e.g. by raising a fist or a weapon, aiming a kick, throwing a stone or making some other menacing gesture. V must be aware of it, so that, for example striking from behind is not an assault nor is throwing a brick which is badly aimed and of which the intended victim is unaware.

There is some doubt as to whether menacing words alone are sufficient. In Wilson [1955] stated obiter that the words “get out the knives” would amount to an assault. Conversely, words can help to make it clear that an otherwise threatening gesture is not intended to lead to the immediate infliction of violence, as in Tuberville v Savage [1669] where D put his hand on his sword and said, “If it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you”.

The requirement that V must apprehend immediate violence is interpreted generously, so that D was convicted of assault when he looked through the window of a house and frightened a woman in her dressing gown, even though it was unclear how quickly he would have been able to gain entry to the house: Smith v Superintendent of Woking Police Station [1983].

The actus reus of battery requires infliction of unlawful personal violence. “Violence” means nothing more than some touching, including of the clothes where the blow is felt and possibly even where it is not, as where D slashes V’s leather coat without the victim being aware of it. So, in Thomas [1985] there were obiter suggestions that D would have been guilty of an assault in touching a girl’s skirt and rubbing it. The touching can be by direct contact between D and V, or through the medium of a weapon (held or thrown) and even, perhaps, in less direct ways. So, in Martin [1881] D was guilty of unlawful and malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm (an offence at that time believed to require proof of an assault/battery) when he barred the exits to a theatre, turned out the lights and caused members of the audience to panic and injure themselves.

The touching need not be ‘hostile’, but it be unlawful and more than merely trivial. So there is no battery where V expressly or impliedly consents to it, as in the contact which commonly occurs when people find themselves in crowds (where, in addition, the touching may be merely trivial). In Donnelly v Jackman [1970] it was held that D, a police officer, did not commit battery when he tapped V on the shoulder to attract his attention.

In view of the direct and immediate nature of the injury threatened or inflicted in assault or battery, it has been argued that an act (rather than an omission) is required.

Compare Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] where D had accidentally driven his car onto a police officer’s foot whilst parking it under his direction and had then knowingly delayed removing it. His conviction for assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty was upheld on the grounds that the whole conduct constituted a continuing act. A mere failure to act would not have been enough.

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DPP v K [1990] the court appears to have upheld a conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm on the basis of D’s failure to clear acid from a drying machine in a toilet, in consequence of which V suffered facial injuries when operating the machine.

The mens rea of assault and battery is intention or subjective recklessness in relation to causing apprehension of, or the actual infliction of, unlawful personal violence.

Since the assault or battery must be unlawful, D must intend it to be so, in the sense at least that D knows the facts which make it so. In Blackburn v Bowering [1994] D’s conviction for assaulting an officer of the court (an offence equivalent to assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty) was quashed when it appeared that he may not known that V was a court bailiff trying to execute a judgment debt. It was not necessary to prove that D knew that V was a bailiff and was acting in the execution of his duty. So, if the infliction of violence was unlawful, this offence could have been committed even if D had no idea of the identity and status of V. However, D’s intention to defend himself could not be an intention to inflict unlawful violence if he did not know that V was a court officer acting in the execution of his duty.

In R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1997] the House of Lords was required to interpret “bodily harm” to a person in ss 18, 20 or 47 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861, so as to include recog­nisable psychiatric injury. Moreover, an of­fence of inflicting grievous bodily harm within s20 can, in law, be committed where no physical violence was applied directly or indirectly to the body of the victim, and a silent telephone caller may be guilty of an as­sault within s47 depending on the circum­stances of the cases, in particular the impact of the calls on the victim.

I appealed from the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his appeal against con­viction on 6 February 1995 at Newport (Gwent) Crown Court, having pleaded guilty to three counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s47 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861. The Court of Appeal certified as being of general public importance the question “as to whether the making of a series of silent telephone calls can amount in law to an assault”. B appealed from the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his appeal against conviction on 4 March 1996 in Reading Crown Court, having pleaded guilty to unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 of the 1861 Act. B had changed his plea following a ruling by the judge that an offence of unlawfully and maliciously inflict­ing grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 might be committed where no physical vio­lence had been applied directly or indirectly.

Their Lordships held that the word “inflict” can embrace the idea of inflicting psychiatric injury. As a matter of law the caller may be guilty of an assault: whether he is or not will de­pend on the circumstance and in particular on the impact of the caller’s potentially men­acing call or calls on the victim. Such a prosecution case under s47 may be fit to leave to the jury. And a trial judge may, depending on the circumstances, put a common-sense consideration before jury, namely what, if not the possibility of imminent personal violence, was the victim terrified about?

DEFENCES TO ASSAULT & BATTERY

Consent: must be genuine. But fraud only invalidates consent where it relates to D’s identity or the nature of his act - Clarence [1888]. C was suffering from a form of gonorrhoea. He had sex with his wife and thereby infected her with venereal disease. Prima facie she consented to the intercourse, but under the mistaken assumption that C was not suffering from any such disease. But since she knew who he was, and she was not mistaken about what he was doing, the deception that he practised (in not telling her about his VD) did not invalidate her apparent consent.

This explains the decision in Richardson [1998] where a dentist, unknown to her patients, had been suspended form her work but continued to treat them. The court held that the patients knew what was being administered and by whom, the fraud was not relevant.

This decision in Clarence is no longer good law, see R v Dica [2003] where a man knew he was infected with the HIV virus; he persuaded two women to consent to unprotected sex (each on more than one occasion) without telling them of his condition. They were subsequently diagnosed HIV positive and the defendant was convicted of causing them grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.

In physical sports etc., consent traditionally has been a defence provided the harm was ordinarily incidental to the game: Billinghurst [1978] where D who deliberately hit an opponent in a rugby match, thereby breaking his jaw, when the ball was some distance away from them, was guilty of aggravated assault. However, the main criterion now seems to be that of public policy the victim can only consent to those assaults and batteries insofar as they are consistent with what is in the public interest.

In Jones and Another [1987] rough horseplay was regarded as a defence to quite serious physical assaults. This was a case involving injuries to schoolboys who had been tossed in the air. It seems to have been decided on the basis that boys do sometimes behave in a rather rough and undisciplined manner, and that since the boys were consenting, or may have been thought by D to be consenting, there should be no liability. However, it must not be D’s intention to cause injury in such circumstances.

This rule is not confined to the activities of children and youths. In Aitken [1992] newly qualified RAF flying officers engaged in celebratory drunken horseplay setting fire to each others’ fire-resistant flying suits. D’s conviction for inflicting g.b.h. on V when he set him on fire was quashed. He had not intended the injury and either V was consenting or D believed him to be consenting.

In Brown and Others [1993] the House of Lords faced a claim for an extension to the categories of exception. The defendants were a group of homosexual men who found great pleasure in sado-madochistic practices. All willingly participated in the activities. None had suffered any permanent injury or sought medical treatment and no complaint had been made by any of them. The police had discovered the practices when they found a videotape recording of some of the sessions which had been made by the group for distribution purely amongst members of the group. The practices included “branding” with metal wire heated by blow-lamp, beating with a cat-o’-nine-tails and various acts of genital torture involving the use of wires, fish hooks, thistles and safety pins.

During their trial for offences under ss 47 and 20 of the OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861, the trial judge ruled that the prosecution were not required to prove lack of consent to injuries of this nature. They then changed their pleas to guilty and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 2 to 4½ years. They appealed against the judge’s ruling on consent.

In a very narrowly based judgment, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeals and asserted that, as the injuries were not merely transient or trifling, the victims could only consent if the circumstances of their infliction fell within the exceptional ‘good reason’ recognised for surgical operations, manly sports and so on. However, the “satisfying of sado-masochistic libido” did not fall within any category of good reason.

The House of Lords upheld that decision by a three to two majority. Lord Templeman, for instance, accepted that violence could be intentionally inflicted and result even in wounding or serious bodily harm without an offence being committed, if the injury was a foreseeable incident of a lawful activity in which the victim was participating (surgery, violent sports. etc.). This decision has since been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. It held that society is bound to protect itself against a cult of violence which is injurious to the participants and unpredictably dangerous (the level of violence could rise if excitement rose; there were dangers in transmission of infections through blood and through instruments). The argument that the law would be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 (the right to private and family life) was summarily dismissed. Article 8 could not invalidate a law which forbade violence intentionally harmful to mind and body.

In the minority, Lord Mustill distinguished between the criminal law of violence and the criminal law of private sexual relations. His view was that the case had been treated as being about violence when it should have been treated as being about sexual relations. The issue should not be looked at as one where all infliction of bodily harm beyond a certain level was unlawful unless falling within an exception justified on policy grounds. The courts were poorly equipped to determine issues of policy of that kind. Instead, the issue was whether the 1861 Act, clearly intended to penalise conduct of a different nature, should be interpreted so as to make this conduct criminal. His view was that it should not he so interpreted.

The judgment puts injuries inflicted during consensual sexual activity on a par with those inflicted in street fights between participants who have consented in the sense of agreeing to fight. It does not even equate such activity with ‘rough horseplay’ let alone recognise that sexual activity is an area of private life in which the application of the full rigour of the law may be entirely inappropriate.

See the file on my website for a good explanation of the case.

In Wilson [1996] the Court of Appeal refused to accept that it was bound by the decision in Brown to uphold a conviction for deliberately inflicted actual bodily harm where the victim had genuinely consented. In the course of a medical examination, Mrs Wilson’s doctor discovered that she had scars on her buttocks which appeared to be the letters, A and W. He reported this to the police, who interviewed the husband, the accused and discovered that he had burnt his initials onto her with a hot knife. It was not disputed that he had done so with her consent as an alternative to the tattooing (which he did not believe he could do) which she had requested. The wife never made any complaint, considering it to be an adornment. On the accused’s trial for assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the judge held that he was bound by Brown and directed the jury to convict. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and expressed its disquiet that the prosecuting authority should have thought it necessary to bring the proceedings, which served no useful purpose and yet involved considerable public expense. The court held:

Brown does not lay down a proposition that consent is never a defence to deliberately inflicted actual bodily harm. All their Lordships had recognised that there are exceptions;
the law should develop upon a case by case basis rather than by the application of general propositions;
the speeches in BROWN recognised that consensual adult tattooing is not an offence, despite deliberate infliction of actual bodily harm. She had clearly indicated that she regarded the carving of the initials (which was not significantly different from a tattoo) as a desirable piece of physical adornment. This was analogous with piercing of nostrils and tongues for decorative jewellery;
the case was markedly different from Brown, which was at the very extreme and involved physical torture which carried risks of serious physical injury and blood infection;
public policy and public interest (considerations regarded as relevant by the House of Lords in Brown) certainly did not demand that the accused’s activities should be visited by the sanctions of the criminal law.

LAWFUL CHASTISEMENT/CORRECTION: may be used to justify assaults and batteries by parents and persons in loco parentis.

SELF-DEFENCE AND PREVENTION OF CRIME: as discussed.

WOUNDING AND G.B.H.

Sections 18 and 20 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861 each contain 2 quite separate crimes involving wounding or grievous bodily grievous bodily harm (gbh).

s18, with a maximum of life imprisonment, contains the more serious offences, primarily because of the need to show D acted with an ulterior intent, viz. to do gbh, or to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of a person. Such ulterior intent need not be shown for s20, which carries a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.

Wound requires all the layers of the skin to be broken - JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1983]. D fired an air pistol and a pellet hit a young man in the area of his left eye. The Divisional Court held that even though internal blood vessels may have been ruptured by the blow, there had been no wound, because there had been no breaking of the continuity of the whole skin.

Gbh means really serious injury. The point to note here is that gbh may occur even though there has been no wounding. Conversely, there may be a technical wounding, although there has been no gbh.

For s18 only an intent will suffice; mere recklessness is not enough: Belfon [1976]. D seriously injured another man by attacking him with a razor. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction under s18 (and substituted a conviction under s20), because the trial judge had wrongly directed the jury that it would suffice if D had thought it likely that his actions would cause gbh, i.e. he had been reckless as to whether such injury might occur.

Subjective recklessness will suffice for s20.

We will continue this next week.

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