Friday, January 19, 2007

Thursday 18 January 2007

We concluded our lecture on non-fatal offences.

The other distinction between Ss 18 and 20 OAP 1861 is that s18 talks about “causing” gbh, whereas s20 involves “inflicting” gbh. Once upon a time judges got quite excited in deciding what the difference was. Read on and you will see that they have decided what most of us knew for years, there is no difference …

Clearly, “inflicts” suggests more limited ways of bringing about the injury than causes and until the decision of the House of Lords in Wilson [1983] the convenient distinction was founded upon presence or absence of the elements of an assault (probably in the sense of battery). To inflict required proof of a battery. To cause did not.

The argument was settled once and for all by the House of Lords in Burstow [1997]. You may remember that he was a stalker, and the victim suffered psychiatric illness (considered to be g.b.h.) their Lordships stated that there was no reason to believe that there was any significance between the two words.

ASSAULT OCCASIONING ACTUAL BODILY HARM is created by s47 OAP 1861. There is no definition of a.b.h. in the Act. All harm must be ‘actual’! The offence carries 5 years imprisonment, so is an either-way offence.

The Court of Appeal in CHAN-FOOK [1994] has analysed the requirements as follows:

“harm” requires hurt or injury;
“actual” requires that it is not so trivial as to be wholly insignificant;
“bodily” is not limited to “skin, flesh, bones” since the body includes organs, the nervous system, and the brain.

From this it is apparent that psychiatric injury is included, for the quote to remember was “bodily means the whole man, not just the physical man.”

In R v Morris [1997] THE TIMES 13 NOVEMBER the victim al­leged that, as a result of being ‘stalked’ by the defendant, she suffered pains in her joints and abdomen, sleeplessness, tension and fear of being alone. No psychiatric evidence was adduced. The Court of Appeal held that psychiatric evidence had to be adduced to show that the symptoms apart from the pain amounted to psychological injury and that the pains experienced by the appellant resulted from the non-physical assault by the defendant.

The mens rea of s47 is identical to that of assault. Once the mens rea and actus reus of an assault or battery is proved, the prosecution only have to show that it (i.e. the assault or battery) caused abh, determined objectively. D is liable for injuries which any reasonable man could be expected to foresee. In Roberts [1971] D assaulted a woman by trying to take off her coat which led her to jump out of a car whilst it was moving, as a result of which she was injured. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal, holding that the only question was whether her actions were the natural consequence of his behaviour, in that it could reasonably have been foreseen that she might react in the way that she did.

If D is charged under s20, he may nevertheless be convicted of offence under s47 since the latter is impliedly included in the former – Wilson (above). By s6(3) CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1967, a person may be convicted of an offence other than that with which he is expressly charged if the allegations against him are capable of including, expressly or by implication, an allegation of the other offence.

Remember my earlier comment regarding whether it is possible to assault (Batter) someone by an omission?:

Director of Public Prosecutions v Santana-Bermudez [2003] Crim LR 471. A police officer approached the respondent as she suspected that he was acting as a ticket tout. She informed him that she intended to carry out a full body search pursuant to s1 PACE 1984. She asked him to turn out all his pockets and place the contents on the table. Those items included one or more syringes without needles. The respondent was asked if he was sure that he had no needles or sharps on him and replied “No”. The police officer then commenced the search. She put two fingers into one of the small pockets in his jacket. Her finger was pierced by a hypodermic needle. She noticed that the respondent had a smirk on his face. He also immediately took another needle from another pocket. When the officer said “I thought you didn’t have any sharps on you”, the respondent merely shrugged his shoulders and again smirked. He was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was convicted in the magistrates’ court and appealed. At the end of the prosecution case before the Crown Court, a submission was made that there was no case to answer because an omission to act could not amount to an assault or battery. The court concluded the submission was well founded and correct in law. It was of the opinion that the evidence did not disclose any positive act committed by him and that his untruthful answers to questions did not convert a negative omission to act into a positive act. The prosecution appealed by way of case stated.

Held, allowing the appeal, where someone by act or word or a combination of the two created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury which materialised, there was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. However, it remained necessary for the prosecution to prove an intention to assault or appropriate recklessness. In the present case, the respondent by giving the police officer a dishonest assurance about the contents of his pockets, thereby exposed her to a reasonably foreseeable risk of an injury which materialised. It was therefore erroneous of the court to conclude that there was no evidential basis for the actus reus of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

That’s it for offences against the person, leaving only property offences under the Theft Acts and Criminal Damage Act 1971 to cover. We began with the building block for all offences of dishonesty, namely theft.

Theft is defined in s1(1) THEFT ACT 1968; the dishonest (mens rea) appropriation (actus reus)of property (actus reus) belonging to another (actus reus) with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it (mens rea).

All elements must be proved, otherwise the offence is not made out.

Section 3(1) defines APPROPRIATION as any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping it or dealing with it as an owner.

So there are two separate times where it is possible to appropriate:

(1) when one assumes the rights of the owner, usually at the same time as the other elements, or
(2) where one later assumes those rights, being unaware of the existence of the property until that moment.

There seems to be a contradiction in s3(1), i.e. it begins by requiring an assumption of the rights (plural) of an owner, but later talks of assuming a right (singular). The major authority on this element is the decision of the House of Lords in the consolidated appeals of R v Morris [1983]. The House of Lords indicated that only one of the rights need be assumed. In the case, D had gone through the checkout before being arrested. We shall be looking at this case closely next week.

The House of Lords decision in Lawrence v MPC [1971] suggested that the consent given by the person deceived does not prevent there being an appropriation, so that almost all cases of obtaining by deception would also be cases of theft. The defendant was a taxi-driver who took advantage of the fact that his customer was unfamiliar with English money. V indicated the address to which he wished to be taken and D said it was a long way and very expensive. V proffered £1 for what should have been a fare of half that value, and D reached over and took a further £6 from the wallet which V was still holding open. He then drove V to the address. This looks like a fairly straightforward case of deception but it was prosecuted as theft. D was convicted and his conviction was upheld both by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

D’s belief that the owner, with full knowledge of the circumstances, did or would consent did not prevent the appropriation taking place but, instead, prevented the defendant from being dishonest. What is true is that the ‘consent’ took place only because of the deception, and this will probably be true of all deceptions.

We’ll continue from here next week.

I hope everyone got home safely, given the appalling weather.

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