Sunday, March 04, 2007

We began this week with the offence of TWOC – taking a motor vehicle without consent. Section 12(1) TA 1968 states:

“ … a person shall be guilty of an offence if, without having the consent of the owner or other lawful authority, he takes any conveyance for his own or another’s use or, knowing that any conveyance has been taken without such authority, drives it or allows himself to be carried in or on it”.

There are two offences:

taking and driving
allowing oneself to be driven after it was taken

By virtue of s37 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988 the offence is triable summarily only. Therefore, it is not possible to charge an attempt. There is an offence under s9 CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS ACT 1981 of vehicle interference which covers the gap in the main, except it refers only to motor vehicles.

“Taking” requires two elements; i.e. assumption of possession or control of the conveyance, and a minimal degree of movement of it: Bogacki [1973], where the defendant started the engine of a bus but made no attempt to move it. Thus, there could be no taking.

An unlawful taking may occur even though D is originally in lawful possession of the conveyance: McKnight v Davies [1974], where the accused used his employer’s lorry for his own private purposes, instead of returning it to the depot at the end of the day.

Where X has “taken” a conveyance but has then subsequently abandoned possession of it, D (who is totally unconnected with X) can be guilty of a subsequent “taking” of the conveyance - DPP v Spriggs [1993]. Thus you can “TWOC” from a “TWOC’er”.

“For his own or another’s use”: in Bow [1976] it was held that “use” meant use as a conveyance. B released the handbrake so that the vehicle coasted downhill, and this was sufficient for a taking since he rode in it. The fact that B’s motive was to remove the vehicle as an obstruction was irrelevant.

“Conveyance” is defined in s12(7)(a) as “ … any conveyance constructed or adapted for the carriage of a person by land, water or air, except that it does not include a conveyance constructed or adapted for use only under the control of a person not carried in or on it”.

The exception refers mostly commonly to a pram or pushchair.

Bicycles are excluded by s12(5) which creates a separate offence.

A conveyance need not have wheels or an engine, but it has been held that a horse is not a conveyance for the purposes of s12: Neal v Gribble [1978].

‘Without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority’ means that liability will only be avoided if the owner has actually consented. Even if the owner would have consented to the taking had he been asked, an offence will still be committed: Ambler [1979].

s12(6) provides a possible defence based on believed authority. Thus, a person does not commit an offence by anything done in the belief that he had the lawful authority to do it or that he would have had the owner’s consent of the owner knew of his doing it and the circumstances of it. Provided D discharges the evidential burden of raising the issue, it will be for the prosecution to show that D did not think he had lawful authority/the owner’s consent.

As for the mens rea, D must know that the conveyance had been taken without authority or consent at the time he drove it or allowed himself to be carried in it.

Following a number of highly publicised incidents the AGGRAVATED VEHICLE-TAKING ACT 1992 was born. The Act amends the THEFT ACT 1968 to create in s12A a new offence of aggravated vehicle taking, in which the “basic offence” is committed by D and, at any time after the vehicle was unlawfully taken (whether by him or another) and before it was recovered, one or more of the following occurred:

the vehicle was driven dangerously on a road or other public place;
owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which injury was caused to any person;
owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which damage was caused to any property, other than the vehicle;
damage was caused to the vehicle.

“Dangerously” is as in the ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1991 (and a vehicle is “recovered” when it is restored to its owner or to other lawful possession or custody.

D can avoid liability by proving that, as regards any such driving, injury or damage referred to above, it occurred before he committed the basic offence or he was neither in nor on nor in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle when that driving, accident or damage occurred.

In the case of R v Marsh [1996] it was decided that where the prosecution relies on the occurrence of a road accident as an ingredient of aggravated vehicle taking, it is not necessary for the prosecution to also show an element of fault on the part of the driver in relation to the accident.

We then turned to some brand new legislation, the FRAUD ACT 2006. I am very hopeful for this new statute, as it greatly simplifies the law on deceptions, and removes the previous common law exceptions. It is really a quite straightforward statute although, as time will tell, the courts may decide otherwise.

All deceptions under the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978, plus the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996 are repealed. Only s3 Theft Act 1968 (making off without payment) remains.

The Act provides for a general offence of fraud with three ways of committing it, which are:

(i) by false representation
(ii) by failing to disclose information and
(iii) by abuse of position.

It creates new offences of:

(iv) obtaining services dishonestly and
(v) possessing, making and supplying articles for use in frauds.

Offences of fraudulent trading are also created, but not relevant to us.

The effect of the new legislation is to move the law to criminalise the conduct of the fraudster rather than to look at the consequence of the fraudster's activities.

There are two basic requirements applicable to all the offences:

(1) the defendant must act dishonestly: Ghosh [1982].
(2) it must be his intention to make a gain, or cause a loss to another. The definitions can be found in the offence of blackmail, which will be discussed next week. However, there is no need to prove that this gain or loss occurred, or that the victim was deceived by the defendant’s behaviour.

Each offence is punishable by 10 years imprisonment.

Section 2 makes it an offence to commit fraud by false representation in any form. A representation is defined as false if it is untrue or misleading and the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.

A representation may also be implied by conduct. An example of a representation by conduct is where a person dishonestly misuses a credit card to pay for items. By tendering the card, he is falsely representing that he has the authority to use it for that transaction. It is immaterial whether the merchant accepting the card for payment is deceived by the representation.

This offence would also be committed by someone who engages in "phishing": i.e. where a person disseminates an email to large groups of people falsely representing that the email has been sent by a legitimate financial institution. The email prompts the reader to provide information such as credit card and bank account numbers so that the "phisher" can gain access to others' assets.

Subsection (5) provides that a representation may be regarded as being made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention). The main purpose of this provision is to ensure that fraud can be committed where a person makes a representation to a machine and a response can be produced without any need for human involvement. (An example is where a person enters a number into a "CHIP and PIN" machine.)

Section 3 makes it an offence to commit fraud by failing to disclose information to another person where there is a legal duty to disclose the information. A legal duty to disclose information may include duties under oral contracts as well as written contracts. Such a duty may derive from statute (such as the provisions governing company prospectuses), from the fact that the transaction in question is one of the utmost good faith (such as a contract of insurance), from the express or implied terms of a contract, from the custom of a particular trade or market, or from the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties (such as that of agent and principal).

For example, the failure of a solicitor to share vital information with a client within the context of their work relationship, in order to perpetrate a fraud upon that client, would be covered by this section. Similarly, an offence could be committed under this section if a person intentionally failed to disclose information relating to his heart condition when making an application for life insurance.

Section 4 makes it an offence to commit a fraud by dishonestly abusing one's position. It applies in situations where the defendant has been put in a privileged position, and by virtue of this position is expected to safeguard another's financial interests or not act against those interests.

An employee of a software company who uses his position to clone software products with the intention of selling the products on would commit an offence under this section.

Another example covered by this section is where a person who is employed to care for an elderly or disabled person has access to that person's bank account and abuses his position by transferring funds to invest in a high-risk business venture of his own.

Section 6 makes it an offence for a person to possess or have under his control any article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud. This wording draws on that of the existing law in s25 THEFT ACT 1968 (which we discuss later). These provisions make it an offence for a person to "go equipped" to commit a burglary, theft or cheat, although they apply only when the offender is not at his place of abode.

Section 7 makes it an offence to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply any article knowing that it is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud, or intending it to be used to commit or facilitate fraud. For example, a person makes devices which when attached to electricity meters cause the meter to malfunction. The actual amount of electricity used is concealed from the provider, who thus makes a loss.

Section 11: Obtaining services dishonestly. This makes it an offence for any person, by any dishonest act, to obtain services for which payment is required, with intent to avoid payment. The person must know that the services are made available on the basis that they are chargeable, or that they might be. It is not possible to commit the offence by omission alone and it can be committed only where the dishonest act was done with the intent not to pay for the services as expected. This offence replaces the offence of obtaining services by deception in s1 Theft Act 1978, though the new offence contains no deception element.

The section also covers the situation where a person attaches a decoder to her television to enable viewing access to cable / satellite television channels for which she has no intention of paying.

The above should save you many hours of study. The material is within the syllabus rules as it occurs outside of the three month period immediately prior to the examination. It is difficult to envisage a full question on the area, however, as there is no case law as yet.

The one section of the Theft Act 1978 that remains is s3, which creates an offence of MAKING OFF WITHOUT PAYMENT:

“A person who, knowing that payment on the spot is required for any goods or service done is required or expected from him, dishonestly makes off without having paid as required or expected and with intent to avoid payment of the amount due shall be guilty of an offence.”

It is commonly called “Bilking”. Note that there is no deception, & it usually relates to unpaid petrol or restaurant bills, although not exclusively so.

The lawyers have had some great fun with this section:

If there has also been a deception, two offences will apply
It must be a legally enforceable debt (s3(3)) and, therefore walking away from a betting shop or brothel is okay.
The payment need not be money, luncheon vouchers are okay if accepted by the restaurant.
Dishonesty need not be present at the outset, just at the time of making off.
Allen [1985]: the phrase “with intent to avoid payment” is read as meaning “with intent never to pay”. Allen owed a £1,286 hotel bill, and left without paying. He argued that he always intended to pay when he could, & the House of Lords quashed the conviction.
There are differing views over whether payment by a worthless cheque is a “payment”. D must make off without having paid. D has paid if he uses a credit card and the conditions on the card are met, even though he has no authority to use it; the use of the card means that the creditor will be paid. It has been argued that where D pays with a worthless cheque he is not guilty under s3 because the creditor is ‘paid’ in that (s)he takes the cheque as conditional satisfaction of the debt. Conversely, payment with a worthless cheque may not be regarded as payment as “required or expected”; a creditor requires/expects something of value, viz. a cheque that will be honoured. In any event, the point may be largely academic in that where D uses a worthless cheque he almost certainly commits an offence under s2(1)(b) of the Act.
Where is the spot? In Brooks [1982] it was held that it is the place where payment was required. The case of Aziz [1993] held that the spot could differ according to the circumstances, and it is a question for the jury as to whether the defendant has departed from it. Here there was a dispute over a taxi fare when the defendant had reached the end of his journey, the ‘spot’ was the termination of the journey.
How do you make off? Hammond [1983] - you cannot make off where the creditor consents - getting money from the flat to pay the taxi driver, but there may be some argument if the consent is obtained by fraud.
In self-service stores goods aren’t “supplied”. Go into Tesco, fill your trolley, obtains salami from the delicatessen counter, then leave without paying. You will be guilty of two offences, theft of all the goods, plus making off with the salami.

As to the mens rea:

D must make off dishonestly.
He must also know that payment on the spot is required or expected.
There must be an intent to avoid payment. An intent to delay or defer payment is not enough; an intent permanently to avoid payment is necessary - Allen [1985].

We will begin with BLACKMAIL next time.

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