Friday, February 02, 2007

Thursday 1 February 2007

s5(1) indicates that property belongs, for the purpose of theft, to the person having:

  • possession

  • control

  • proprietary right or interest in it.

Note that it has nothing to do with ownership, so it is perfectly possible to steal from a thief.

A lien is defined as: “the right to take and hold or sell the property of a debtor as security or payment for a debt or duty”, ad this is the proprietary right that the statute means. So a defendant may steal his own property: Turner (No.2) [1971] where T was convicted of theft of his car in that he had taken it to be repaired and collected it intending not to pay the bill.

The person who controls land prima facie controls property on it, even though he may be unaware of its existence - WOODMAN [1974]. There a quantity of scrap metal on a disused site was sold and the buyer had removed all but a very small amount of it. W went on to the site and took some of the remaining scrap and was convicted of theft from the site-owner. The site-owner continued to have control of it and the erection of fences and notices showed that he intended to exclude others from it.

The same argument will apply to lost golf balls. It appears that rubbish left in a skip belongs to the skip owner, and rubbish in bins will belong to the local authority.

Items abandoned and not owned by anyone cannot be stolen, e.g. leaving a newspaper on a park bench.

Since a company has a separate personality from its members, a shareholder or director may steal company property. But problems exist when the persons who steal property are the sole directors and shareholders. The English approach has been that it is possible for a director to steal from his company, but Australia take a different view. In Roffel [1985] the High Court of Victoria said that as the act was not unauthorised there was no appropriation.

Since the property must, by definition, belong to another, there can be no theft when title in the property has already passed to D at the time he appropriates it - Edwards v Ddin [1976] where D drove off from a garage without paying for the petrol which had just been put into the tank. There could be no conviction for theft because the ownership of the petrol passed to D as soon as it went into the tank. This assumes that D intended to pay when the petrol was put into his tank and only later changed his mind. This has since been corrected by s3 Theft Act 1978 (later).

Property which is subject to a trust belongs to the beneficiaries (who have an equitable title) as well as to the trustees (who have the legal title). However, in the case of charitable trusts there may be no identifiable beneficiaries. Thus, any appropriation by a trustee may not be theft, because the property may not belong to another. Therefore s5(2) states that the persons to whom the trust property belongs includes those who have a right to enforce the trust.

Property received under an obligation is worth remembering. Section 5(3) states that where the property is received by D from V or on account of V and d is under an obligation to V to retain and deal with the property in a particular way, then as against D, the property or its proceeds are to be regarded as belonging to V. A bit of gobbledegook, admittedly, but it is quite straightforward when the English language is used!

A travel agent who receives money from clients in (part) payment for their travel arrangements is not necessarily bound to deal with the money in a particular way: Hall [1973]. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of a travel agent who had failed to use a client’s deposit to book his holiday, as there was no obligation to deal with the cash in a particular way.

I will finish with a straightforward example:

Fancy a block paved drive? I know a man who will do it as a foreigner

(a)     “It’ll cost you £2,000 & I’ll want a 50% deposit”
(b)     “It’ll cost you £2,000 & I’ll need half of it to buy the bricks”

Either way he keeps the cash. What is the outcome? Look at s5(3). In (a) the money becomes the property of the block paver, whilst in (b) it is still owned by the original owner, as the money is to be used only for the bricks.

Section 5(4) states that where D gets property by another’s mistake and “is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof” then, as against D, the property belongs to the person entitled to restoration. It is also provides that “an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded … as an intention to deprive that person of the property or the proceeds”.

What it means is that where there is a legal obligation to return the property, it still belongs to the person that made the mistake and is, therefore, capable of forming a charge for theft, if the other elements are present.

A somewhat extreme example can be found in Shadrokh-Cigari [1988], where an American bank mistakenly credited a child’s account at an English bank with £286,000 instead of £286. S-C, the child’s guardian, got the child to authorise banker’s drafts which S-C paid into his own accounts. The intangible property represented by the drafts, i.e. the right to sue the bank, could not belong to the bank, but the actual document itself did. The bank transferred legal ownership of the draft to S-C or the child on delivery, but it retained an equitable interest. Thus, it was unnecessary to refer to s5(4), but the Court of Appeal said that s5(4) provided an alternative route that would have led to the same result.

The obligation to restore the property in s5(4) must be a legal one as opposed to a moral one - Gilks [1972]. G was paid £106 by a betting-shop clerk, and he took the money knowing that he had been overpaid. G was convicted of theft of the money that he had been overpaid on the basis that the title to it never passed to him. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, as gambling debts are not enforceable at law. There was a moral obligation to repay, but not a legal one.
We then turned to the mens rea elements, beginning with dishonesty.

s2(1) contains three situations in which D will not be said to have been dishonest. Tey are commonly referred to as the “statutory beliefs”:

(a)      where D believes he has a legal right to the property;
(b)      where D believes he has the consent of the person to whom the property belongs; and
(c)      where D believes the person to whom the property belongs cannot be traced by taking reasonable steps.

These beliefs are not required to be reasonable; it is sufficient that any one of them is genuinely held.

Under s2(1)(a), D has a good defence as long as he believes he has a legal, not moral, right to the property. It is irrelevant that he may know that he is not entitled to appropriate it in the way that he does, e.g. by threatening to use physical violence.

In Robinson [1977] D was guilty neither of robbery nor of theft where he seized a £5 note which fell from V’s pocket during a struggle in which D was brandishing a knife. V’s wife owed D £7, and D successfully claimed that he was not dishonest since he believed he had a legal right to the money.

In relation to s2(1)(c), it is worth distinguishing between belief that the property has been abandoned and belief that it has merely been lost but that its owner cannot be found by taking reasonable steps.

Even where D is unable to claim that he held one of the above beliefs, he may still avoid being regarded as dishonest since there is a more general test for dishonesty which must be applied. In Ghosh [1982], it was held that 2 questions must be asked:

(1)      Was D’s conduct dishonest according to the standards of ordinary reasonable people? If not, D must be acquitted. If it was, then
(2)      Was D aware that his conduct would be regarded as dishonest by ordinary reasonable people? Only if the answer to this second question is affirmative may he be treated as having acted dishonestly.

The Ghosh test seeks to apply a comprehensive means of determining dishonesty which encompasses the three situations in s2(1), but is not confined to them. The test is also used in deceptions, and conspiracy to defraud. However, it is probably correct for judges to refer to s2(1), as well as to Ghosh, whenever there is evidence that falls within one of the three paragraphs in the subsection.

In Wootton [1990] W was charged with theft of pottery from their employers, and their defence was that they had taken it in lieu of wages, (i.e. impliedly raising s2(1)(a)). Quashing their convictions, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge ought to have specifically addressed the jury with reference to s2(1)(a).

By s2(2), “A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he is willing to pay for the property”. So, for example, D may be dishonest where he takes V’s property knowing that V does not want to part with it, even though he (D) leaves the price of it behind.

We will look at an intention permanently to deprive next week.

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