Criminal Law

Friday, February 23, 2007

Thursday 22 February 2007

We began with looking at the final section concerning theft before moving on to some of the more peripheral offences under the Act.

Section 6 Theft Act 1968 is concerned with an INTENTION PERMANENTLY TO DEPRIVE. He phrase is potentially misleading, as we shall see. An intent to return the properly sooner or later means that the intention is not satisfied, and so most (but not all) unauthorised borrowings cannot be theft.

By s6(1) “A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal”. Very much a mouthful, so what does it mean? What matters is that the defendant intends to regard the property as his own, rather than literally to permanently deprive the other of it.

In Cahill [1993] the defendant took an early morning delivery of newspapers from outside a newsagents when walking home after a late drinking session. He may have intended to deposit them at a friend’s house as a joke but was stopped by a police officer. His conviction for theft was quashed because the judge directed the jury that the defendant must have “treated the property as his own” and failed to mention “to dispose of”.

Where D takes something for his own consumption, he is guilty of theft even though he intends to pay for it or to replace it with something else which is just as valuable - Velumyl [1989] where V took £1,050 from his employer’s safe, intending to replace it a few days later with an equivalent sum. His conviction was upheld on appeal. Clearly he didn’t intend to replace exactly the same notes, just their equivalent value. The issue is whether or not he is dishonest.

Borrowing can amount to theft. In Lloyd [1985] the Court of Appeal held that there is sufficient intent to deprive of the accused, in the course of borrowing, removes the ‘goodness & virtue’. L had removed films from the cinema where he worked & took them to B and A for copying. The film was then returned. The Court of Appeal held that the practical value of the films had not been lessened, & there could be no intent to permanently deprive. How much ‘goodness & virtue’ must be removed is not stated.

s6(2) was designed to cover the unauthorised pawning or pledging of another person’s property. If D pawns V’s goods with no intention of ever redeeming them he is guilty of theft. If D does intend to redeem them, he is still guilty if he knows that he may not be able to do so. There is no case law on the subject.

We then turned to the offence of ROBBERY. Section s8(1) TA 1968 states:

“a person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he use force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force”.

It is really nothing more than an aggravated form of theft, with the use or threat of force, therefore if there is no theft there can be no robbery.

The subsection creates two offences, namely robbery and assault with intent to rob. There is no definition of the latter, it is mentioned only in ss 2 - a person guilty of robbery, or of an assault with intent to rob, shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for life.

The prosecution must show that there has been an appropriation of property by force or threat of force. Any use of or threat to use force against the person will suffice. The wording of s8(1) shows that the victim of the force/threat of force need not also be the victim of the theft.

Only a minimal degree of force need be used. In Dawson [1976] it was held that nudging a person so as to make him lose his balance and thereby facilitate the theft might have amounted to robbery. It was a question of fact for the jury as to whether the nudge was a sufficient use of force.

Clouden [1987]: the Court of Appeal held that snatching a shopping bag out of a woman’s grasp and running off with it could also be robbery.

The force/threat of force must be used in order to steal and before or at the time of stealing. But if the defendant is still removing the goods when he uses/threatens force, he can be guilty of robbery - Hale [1978]. There two defendants went into their victim’s house and while one was upstairs stealing a jewellery box, the other was downstairs tying up the victim. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for robbery even though the jewellery box may have been appropriated before any force was used against the victim. The theft was a continuing event and the jury could conclude that it was still in progress when the victim was being tied up.

Although it may not seem so at the moment, robbery and blackmail have some things in common. I shall mention it when we deal with blackmail later.

Section 9 TA 1968 defines BURGLARY. There are a number of different ways of committing burglary. s9(1) TA 1968:

A person is guilty of burglary if:

  1. he enters a building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to steal, inflict/attempt to inflict on any person gbh, do unlawful damage to the building.

  2. having entered a building/part of a building as a trespasser he steals/attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts/attempts to inflict gbh on any person therein.

The original offence also mentioned the intention of raping a woman, but this has been repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 200, which is not a part of the syllabus.

For the purpose of the examinations, a person who commits a 9(1)(b) also commits a 9(1)(a).

There must always be an “entry”, the question rests on whether it is effective. The latest case is Ryan [1996] where the victim, an elderly householder, found the accused stuck in a downstairs window of the victim’s house at about 2.30 am, the accused’s head and right arm were inside the window which had fallen on his neck and trapped him. The rest of his body was outside the window. He was convicted of burglary and appealed on the grounds that there was no entry because he could not have stolen anything from within the building on account of being stuck. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. A partial entry was sufficient.

The entry must be “as a trespasser”. The civil/tortious definition of trespass means that D must not have express or implied permission to be in the building. Thus, entry with the occupier’s consent will preclude trespass, but trespass alone is not sufficient for an offence of burglary, it must be intentionally or recklessly. In Collins [1972] he was wearing only his socks & climbed a ladder and was perched on a bedroom window sill. The 18-year old girl inside assumed her boyfriend had returned for a nocturnal visit, and she invited him in, and they had sexual intercourse. C was convicted of burglary under s9(1)(a), entry with intent to rape, although the Court of Appeal quashed this because the trial judge had not properly directed the jury on the need for mens rea as to presence as a trespasser.

D will be trespassing if he enters in excess of any permission he might otherwise have - Jones and Smith [1976] where J and S entered the house belonging to S’s father with the intention of stealing, and their convictions for burglary were upheld.

“Building or part of a building” is an element which is difficult to define precisely. s9(3) say’s that it includes an inhabited vehicle or vessel. It is generally accepted that, for example, a caravan or houseboat probably constitutes a “building” when it is inhabited, say during the holiday season, but arguably not at other times of the year. A caravan or houseboat which is someone’s permanent home is a “building” even though (s)he is not there at the time.

A “building” must have some degree of permanence. In B and S v Leathley [1979] a freezer container which had been in the same place for three years and was likely to stay there for the foreseeable future, was a “building”.

A “part of a building” may or may not mean a separate room, it includes an area in a room marked out, as in the case of the area behind the counter in a shop - Walkington [1979] where D went behind a counter marked “Staff Only” in order to take money from a till. Even though the till was empty D was convicted of burglary, because it is the intent to steal which creates the offence.

“Stealing” in s9(1) means theft as in s1. Thus, there is no burglary where D enters with intention of dishonestly using electricity contrary to s13 - Low v Blease [1975] where it was held that, as electricity was not property capable of appropriation, D could not be guilty of burglary in entering premises as a trespasser and making a telephone call from them. Oddly enough. if D had used a gas appliance this would have been property and he would have been convicted of burglary.

“Intent to inflict gbh” in s9(1)(a) means intent to commit offence under s20 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861.

“Unlawful damage” in s9(1)(a) means an offence under s1 CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971.

Section 10 TA 2968 creates and offence of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY:

A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits a burglary & at the time has with him his

  • Weapon of offence

  • Imitation firearm

  • Firearm

  • Explosive

  • A weapon of offence weapon of offence means an article made or adapted for causing injury/incapacitating a person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use. It may mean anything, e.g. coshes, rope etc.

  • imitation firearms are anything that has the appearance of a firearm, whether capable of being fired or not.

  • firearm includes airguns/pistols, but must have a barrel.

  • explosive means any article manufactured for the purpose of producing a practical effect by explosion, or intended by the person having it with him for that purpose.

Kelly [1993], it was held that the focus of the THEFT ACT 1968 s10 is use during burglary, so that a screwdriver taken into a house by D became a weapon of offence on proof that he intended to use it for causing injury to, or incapacitating the householder at the time of the theft. Since it appears that there was sufficient evidence to show that D had the screwdriver with him for some time for the purposes of causing injury if necessary, the case was not one of spontaneous use.

D must have the firearm etc. with him at the time he commits the burglary, i.e. burglary under s9(l)(a) or s9(1)(b). Thus, if the burglary is of the s9(1)(a) type, D must have the firearm etc. with him when he enters the building or part thereof (i.e. when he carries out the actus reus). If it is of the s9(1)(b) type, he must have the firearm etc. with him when he commits the further offence. In Francis [1982] F had a stick with him when he demanded entry into V’s house but had discarded it before stealing from one of the rooms. Thus, there could be no aggravated burglary.

A strange offence can be found in s1 TA 1968: REMOVAL OF ARTICLES FROM A PUBLIC PLACE:

“ … where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it, or a collection or part of a collection housed in it, any person who without lawful authority removes from the building or its grounds the whole or part of any article displayed or kept for display to the public in the building or that part of it or n its grounds shall be guilty of an offence”.

This provision has been created to cover cases of temporary deprivation which fall outside the scope of theft.

The public, as opposed to a small class of persons, must have a right of access.

They must have access in order to view, & the article must be displayed or kept for display; i.e. the article must be exhibited in the same way in which an art gallery exhibits a painting - Barr [1978]. Here the defendant removed a cross from a church, which was not part of an exhibition but used in acts of worship.

If the article is displayed in a building it must be removed from the building, and if displayed in the grounds it must be removed from the grounds.

The offence may be committed when the exhibition is closed to the public - Durkin [1973], where there was a criminal removal of paintings from an art gallery even though each painting was seldom on view to the public.

Articles which are exhibited for a commercial purpose, e.g. to sell them, are not protected by s11.

I left the group with a series of questions requiring short answers. We shall discuss these next week before looking at s12 TA 1968, TAKING A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER.

Friday, February 09, 2007

Thursday 8 February 2007

There was no class this evening. The appalling weather and lack of students forced its postponement.

Remember that there is no class next week, as it is half term. See you again on Thursday 22 February 2007.

Friday, February 02, 2007

Thursday 1 February 2007

s5(1) indicates that property belongs, for the purpose of theft, to the person having:

  • possession

  • control

  • proprietary right or interest in it.

Note that it has nothing to do with ownership, so it is perfectly possible to steal from a thief.

A lien is defined as: “the right to take and hold or sell the property of a debtor as security or payment for a debt or duty”, ad this is the proprietary right that the statute means. So a defendant may steal his own property: Turner (No.2) [1971] where T was convicted of theft of his car in that he had taken it to be repaired and collected it intending not to pay the bill.

The person who controls land prima facie controls property on it, even though he may be unaware of its existence - WOODMAN [1974]. There a quantity of scrap metal on a disused site was sold and the buyer had removed all but a very small amount of it. W went on to the site and took some of the remaining scrap and was convicted of theft from the site-owner. The site-owner continued to have control of it and the erection of fences and notices showed that he intended to exclude others from it.

The same argument will apply to lost golf balls. It appears that rubbish left in a skip belongs to the skip owner, and rubbish in bins will belong to the local authority.

Items abandoned and not owned by anyone cannot be stolen, e.g. leaving a newspaper on a park bench.

Since a company has a separate personality from its members, a shareholder or director may steal company property. But problems exist when the persons who steal property are the sole directors and shareholders. The English approach has been that it is possible for a director to steal from his company, but Australia take a different view. In Roffel [1985] the High Court of Victoria said that as the act was not unauthorised there was no appropriation.

Since the property must, by definition, belong to another, there can be no theft when title in the property has already passed to D at the time he appropriates it - Edwards v Ddin [1976] where D drove off from a garage without paying for the petrol which had just been put into the tank. There could be no conviction for theft because the ownership of the petrol passed to D as soon as it went into the tank. This assumes that D intended to pay when the petrol was put into his tank and only later changed his mind. This has since been corrected by s3 Theft Act 1978 (later).

Property which is subject to a trust belongs to the beneficiaries (who have an equitable title) as well as to the trustees (who have the legal title). However, in the case of charitable trusts there may be no identifiable beneficiaries. Thus, any appropriation by a trustee may not be theft, because the property may not belong to another. Therefore s5(2) states that the persons to whom the trust property belongs includes those who have a right to enforce the trust.

Property received under an obligation is worth remembering. Section 5(3) states that where the property is received by D from V or on account of V and d is under an obligation to V to retain and deal with the property in a particular way, then as against D, the property or its proceeds are to be regarded as belonging to V. A bit of gobbledegook, admittedly, but it is quite straightforward when the English language is used!

A travel agent who receives money from clients in (part) payment for their travel arrangements is not necessarily bound to deal with the money in a particular way: Hall [1973]. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of a travel agent who had failed to use a client’s deposit to book his holiday, as there was no obligation to deal with the cash in a particular way.

I will finish with a straightforward example:

Fancy a block paved drive? I know a man who will do it as a foreigner

(a)     “It’ll cost you £2,000 & I’ll want a 50% deposit”
(b)     “It’ll cost you £2,000 & I’ll need half of it to buy the bricks”

Either way he keeps the cash. What is the outcome? Look at s5(3). In (a) the money becomes the property of the block paver, whilst in (b) it is still owned by the original owner, as the money is to be used only for the bricks.

Section 5(4) states that where D gets property by another’s mistake and “is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof” then, as against D, the property belongs to the person entitled to restoration. It is also provides that “an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded … as an intention to deprive that person of the property or the proceeds”.

What it means is that where there is a legal obligation to return the property, it still belongs to the person that made the mistake and is, therefore, capable of forming a charge for theft, if the other elements are present.

A somewhat extreme example can be found in Shadrokh-Cigari [1988], where an American bank mistakenly credited a child’s account at an English bank with £286,000 instead of £286. S-C, the child’s guardian, got the child to authorise banker’s drafts which S-C paid into his own accounts. The intangible property represented by the drafts, i.e. the right to sue the bank, could not belong to the bank, but the actual document itself did. The bank transferred legal ownership of the draft to S-C or the child on delivery, but it retained an equitable interest. Thus, it was unnecessary to refer to s5(4), but the Court of Appeal said that s5(4) provided an alternative route that would have led to the same result.

The obligation to restore the property in s5(4) must be a legal one as opposed to a moral one - Gilks [1972]. G was paid £106 by a betting-shop clerk, and he took the money knowing that he had been overpaid. G was convicted of theft of the money that he had been overpaid on the basis that the title to it never passed to him. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, as gambling debts are not enforceable at law. There was a moral obligation to repay, but not a legal one.
We then turned to the mens rea elements, beginning with dishonesty.

s2(1) contains three situations in which D will not be said to have been dishonest. Tey are commonly referred to as the “statutory beliefs”:

(a)      where D believes he has a legal right to the property;
(b)      where D believes he has the consent of the person to whom the property belongs; and
(c)      where D believes the person to whom the property belongs cannot be traced by taking reasonable steps.

These beliefs are not required to be reasonable; it is sufficient that any one of them is genuinely held.

Under s2(1)(a), D has a good defence as long as he believes he has a legal, not moral, right to the property. It is irrelevant that he may know that he is not entitled to appropriate it in the way that he does, e.g. by threatening to use physical violence.

In Robinson [1977] D was guilty neither of robbery nor of theft where he seized a £5 note which fell from V’s pocket during a struggle in which D was brandishing a knife. V’s wife owed D £7, and D successfully claimed that he was not dishonest since he believed he had a legal right to the money.

In relation to s2(1)(c), it is worth distinguishing between belief that the property has been abandoned and belief that it has merely been lost but that its owner cannot be found by taking reasonable steps.

Even where D is unable to claim that he held one of the above beliefs, he may still avoid being regarded as dishonest since there is a more general test for dishonesty which must be applied. In Ghosh [1982], it was held that 2 questions must be asked:

(1)      Was D’s conduct dishonest according to the standards of ordinary reasonable people? If not, D must be acquitted. If it was, then
(2)      Was D aware that his conduct would be regarded as dishonest by ordinary reasonable people? Only if the answer to this second question is affirmative may he be treated as having acted dishonestly.

The Ghosh test seeks to apply a comprehensive means of determining dishonesty which encompasses the three situations in s2(1), but is not confined to them. The test is also used in deceptions, and conspiracy to defraud. However, it is probably correct for judges to refer to s2(1), as well as to Ghosh, whenever there is evidence that falls within one of the three paragraphs in the subsection.

In Wootton [1990] W was charged with theft of pottery from their employers, and their defence was that they had taken it in lieu of wages, (i.e. impliedly raising s2(1)(a)). Quashing their convictions, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge ought to have specifically addressed the jury with reference to s2(1)(a).

By s2(2), “A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he is willing to pay for the property”. So, for example, D may be dishonest where he takes V’s property knowing that V does not want to part with it, even though he (D) leaves the price of it behind.

We will look at an intention permanently to deprive next week.