Thursday 19 October 2006
In Re A [2000], the famous case involving the conjoined twins Jodie and Mary, Ward LJ made a speech stating (correctly) that he was bound by the decision in Woollin, so because the outcome was virtually certain to occur the doctors intend to kill or seriously injure even though they do not have any desire to achieve that result.
This can’t be correct, as the judge is saying that foresight of virtual certainty IS intention, rather than EVIDENCE of intention. Fortunately, this is a decision of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division).
The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction of murder in R v Matthews & Alleyne [2003]. The defendants appealed against their conviction for murder following the death of a young man (a non-swimmer) whom they had thrown from a bridge into a river. The Court of Appeal did not consider the conviction unsafe in the light of the evidence, but expressed concern that the Nedrick/Woollin evidential rule should not be treated as if it were a rule of law. A defendant’s foresight of virtually certain death does not automatically require the jury to find that he intended that result: it is merely evidence (albeit often very strong evidence) from which the jury may draw that conclusion.
So, I think it safe to say that foresight of virtual certainty means that a jury may find that the defendant intended the consequence, but that they are not obliged to do so.
Proof of recklessness is generally sufficient to establish the mens rea for a criminal offence. The dictionary definition of ‘reckless’ and its common usage include being aware of (a risk) and not giving any thought to (a risk). A legal rule which requires proof that D was aware of a risk is said to impose a subjective test. One which requires proof merely that D should have been aware of a risk (a reasonable person would have been aware) is said to impose an objective test.
For many years this distinction received little attention. However, in Cunningham [1957], a case involving the administration of a noxious thing requiring proof of recklessness, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant must be aware that he was taking an unjustifiable risk. So ‘recklessness’ took on the role of being ‘subjective recklessness’ when deciding whether or not the defendant was reckless. There was no other type.
Then along came the case of Caldwell [1981], where the House of Lords were to introduce a new type of recklessness, and that was objective recklessness. The idea here is whether the risk was obvious to the reasonable man, not the defendant. Lord Diplock’s ‘model direction’, adapted to be of general application, was that the defendant will be reckless where:
- he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk of a particular consequence, and
- when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it.
It was to be used (for our purposes) for simple and aggravated criminal damage only.
This was bound to lead to unjust decisions as the test is purely objective – as long as the reasonable person would have recognised the risk and would not have taken it, the defendant will be liable even if, because of age, lack of knowledge, or inherent lack of reasoning capacity, the defendant would not have recognised the risk had he applied his mind to it. In Elliott v C [1983], the Divisional Court held that no account should be taken of the fact that the defendant was only 13 years old and was educationally retarded, as well as very tired and hungry, at the time when she burned down a garden shed by dropping lighted matches onto white spirit. A reasonable person would have recognised the risk and it did not matter that, even had she thought about it, she might not have been able to do so. So a mentally retarded child ends up with a conviction for an offence punishable by life imprisonment. This cannot be just.
The situation remained until the case of Gemmill & Richards [2003], a good day, in my opinion. Two eleven-year-old boys set fire to some newspapers and pushed them under a wheelie bin, in turn causing damages of £1 million to a couple of shops. They were charged with aggravated criminal damage, and the Court of Appeal refused to accept the proposition that Caldwell recklessness should not apply to children. They rejected this on the basis of Elliott v C (above). A point of general public importance was certified, so that the House of Lords could look at it. They unanimously decided to use the 1966 Practice Statement, stating that in future a person acted recklessly if
- there was a circumstance where he was aware of a risk that existed or would exist;
- as a result he was aware of a risk that would occur
- and it was unreasonable to take the risk.
So objective recklessness is no more.
I went on to propose a situation where a defendant recognised a risk, took all the steps he believed necessary to eliminate the risk, and then went ahead. It is difficult to say that he is reckless. How can he consciously be taking an unjustifiable risk when he believes that he has eliminated it? See the case of Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police v Shimmen [1986] for a hypothetical example.
Negligence is the failure to achieve the standard of conduct to be expected of the reasonable person. D will be negligent, whether or not he is aware of the risk of his failure to achieve the standard though, of course, if he is aware of it, his culpability will be greater and his state of mind will additionally be recklessness or intention. Since D is being judged against the standard of’ the reasonable person, deficiencies in D’s knowledge and capacity for understanding or for reasoning are irrelevant if they would not be shared by the reasonable person (the reasonable person is not intoxicated, for instance). By contrast, if D has specialist knowledge or expertise, then he will be expected to achieve the standard of the reasonable person possessed of such knowledge or expertise.
Even though D may not have been aware of the risk of failure to meet the standard, the degree of culpability demonstrated in such failure may vary. There are levels or, degrees of negligence. For instance, overtaking on a blind bend is more culpable than reversing into a car when trying to park, even though neither driver adverts to any risk. A broad division may be between negligence and gross negligence.
However, negligence is not generally a basis for criminal liability in English law. The common law view of mens rea is that either intention or recklessness must be proved or the offence is one of strict liability.
We will look at the issue of gross negligence manslaughter when we discuss homicide.
There are occasions where negligence does suffice, but none are in the syllabus.
THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSFERRED MALICE occurs where D intends a consequence, say serious injury, in relation to victim X but, when trying to achieve it, causes that consequence to victim Y, the prosecution is not required to prove that D had a separate intention against Y. Provided that the actus reus is that of the same offence intended, his mens rea in relation to X can be transferred to that actus reus against Y. Thus, in Latimer [1886] D aimed a blow with his belt at N, but in fact actually struck and severely wounded V. D was taken to have the necessary mens rea for the wounding of V.
Note that the doctrine operates whether or not D succeeds in committing the actus reus against the intended target. In MITCHELL [1983] D pushed or punched X, a 72 year old man who was trying to stop him pushing to the front of a post office queue. X fell back onto V, a frail 89 year old woman, and broke her femur. A few days later, a hip-replacement operation had to be carried out on V but she died 2 days later from pulmonary embolism caused by a blood clot resulting from the break. D’s conviction for unlawful act manslaughter was upheld, partly on the grounds of transferred malice. D did succeed in causing injury to his intended target, X, but his intention to cause injury to X could also be transferred to the injury caused to V.
At some stage the actus reus and mens rea of a crime must coincide. This is known as the CONTEMPORANEITY OF ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA.
Where the actus reus of a crime is instantaneous and complete, D must possess the mens rea at that instant. For instance, the actus reus of burglary under the Theft Act 1968 s9(1)(a) is entry as a trespasser of any building or part of a building. The mens rea includes both knowledge of or recklessness as to the entry of the building as a trespasser and an intention to commit any one or more of three specified offences. If D does not posses that mens rea at the moment of entry, then he cannot be guilty of this form of burglary.
Suppose I wanted to get rid of student B. Before I could kill him intentionally, I accidentally run him over and kill him. The mens rea and actus reus are not simultaneous, and a conviction for murder would be unjust. That said, the rule is somewhat flexible and open to a number of exceptions.
See the cases of Fagan v MPC [1968], Thabo Meli [1954] and Church [1965] for examples of this flexibility(!).
Finally, there is something called the DUTCH COURAGE RULE. A D who decides to commit a crime & gets into a drunken state to do so is guilty even though at the time of committing it he is so drunk that he was mindless, i.e. he lacked mens rea: A.G. for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963].
As mentioned earlier, there are thousands of offences where proof of mens rea is not required. They are known as offences of STRICT LIABILITY.
There is a common law presumption in favour of a requirement to prove mens rea, so most strict liability offences are created by statute. No common law strict liability crimes are a part of the syllabus.
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain [1986]. The defendant was a pharmacist who supplied prescription only drugs, and was presented with a prescription which he did not realise was a forgery. Though he was blameless he was convicted because the court held that it was unnecessary to prove any knowledge and there was no valid prescription.
It is not always so easy to preserve a clear distinction between actus reus and mens rea elements. In Warner v MPC [1969] the House of Lords held that “possession” (actus reus) required proof that D “knew” (mens rea) that he had something but it did not require proof that he knew the something to be a drug.
The common law presumption comes from the case of Sweet v Parsley [1969]. Here there was no indication in the definition of the crime of a requirement of mens rea, but the House of Lords held that Parliament must have meant there to be one. D, a school mistress, was the subtenant of a country farmhouse and she let all but one of the rooms. She visited the farm only very occasionally to collect the rent and to see if there were any problems. Cannabis was smoked at the farm, but D was unaware of this. The House of Lords quashed her conviction for being concerned in the management of premises used for the purposes of smoking cannabis, because the purpose must be that of the person concerned in the management and thus there could be no liability in the absence of mens rea. What they did was simply insert a word into the statute that wasn’t there – ‘knowingly. Certain clear guidelines were laid down by the House of Lords in the case. Lord Reid stated:
- When a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that mens rea is required.
- If a penal provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations that interpretation which is most favourable to the accused must be adopted.
- The fact that other sections of the Act expressly require mens rea, is not in itself sufficient to justify a decision that a section which is silent creates an absolute offence … it is necessary to go outside the Act … to establish the intention of Parliament.
Don’t forget – half term next week. See you in two weeks’ time.
