Criminal Law

Friday, December 15, 2006

Thursday 14 December 2006

We have been looking at homicide, and here we are concerned with the defence of provocation, a defence only to murder. The fact that the killing was provoked may be sufficient mitigation to reduce liability from murder to manslaughter.

Provocation was, and remains, a common law defence, though its elements have been modified significantly by s3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. Its essence is that D, though prima facie guilty of murder:

  • killed whilst suffering a sudden and temporary loss of self-control in response to something said and/or done by another person, and (subjective test)

  • D’s response must be such as might have been expected of a reasonable person in the same situation. (objective test)

Cambridge [1994]: if any evidence that D was provoked to lose his self-control appears at the trial, whether the issue is expressly raised by D or not (even if, say, D) asserts an alibi or that he did not kill V – then the judge must put the defence to the jury, which has the task of deciding both whether D did lose his self-control on account of the provocation (the subjective test) and whether a reasonable person would have done as D did (the objective test). As we shall see later, this mythical reasonable person was said to have the same characteristics as the defendant, as long as those characteristics were not ‘fault based’. Fortunately, this nonsense has now been corrected, as we shall see.

The onus is on the Crown to disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt.

Before the 1957 Act was passed, the definition of provocation required an act or series of acts by the defendant towards his victim. No longer the case.

Section 3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957 Act makes it absolutely clear that the provocation can be by words or conduct (“whether by things done or by things said”) but makes reference neither to who must offer the provocation nor at whom it must be directed.

Subsequent interpretation now seems firmly to have established that it need not come from the victim nor need it be directed at the defendant.

Davies [1975]: D immediately sought out and killed his estranged wife, V, upon seeing her lover walking in the direction of the place where she worked. Though his conviction was upheld, the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in telling them that only the conduct of V (as the dead person) was capable of being provocation. The conduct of her lover in walking to meet her was capable of being provocation, too.

Implicit in the decision in DAVIES are two further rules:

(1) the conduct does not have to be directed at D since the lover was totally unaware that he was being observed by D. This was also the effect of the decision in Pearson [1992] where D was able to rely on evidence of the ill-treatment of his brother by his violent father when successfully pleading provocation to the charge of murdering his father. M lived at home with his violent father. Son W was a visitor. On one visit M had violent toothache, and the father threatened to knock all his teeth out. Whilst the father was asleep W got a sledgehammer & got M to switch on the light & struck the father’s head. He stopped & cried. M took over & killed the father.

On appeal W’s conviction for murder was quashed as provocation does not need to be directed towards the defendant, it was sufficient that it was directed at M.

(2) the provocation need not consist of unlawful conduct. In Doughty [1986] the crying of a small baby was held to be capable of being provocation, is a dramatic illustration of both these rules.

Since the 1957 Act and its subsequent interpretation, the scope of the defence of provocation is now much wider. It now appears that the kinds of conduct capable of being provocation are virtually limitless, provided only that they are in some way associated with human agency. Of course, if D did not lose control on account of any such conduct, or if a reasonable man would not have done as he did, then the defence will still fail.

D must lose control on account of the provocation. This means that incidents which have occurred well before the time of the killing are unlikely to be capable of being provocation in themselves. However, evidence of such incidents may be very important in explaining why the most immediate incident, which may in itself have seemed to be very trivial, should be regarded as provocation. This is sometimes called cumulative provocation. In Davies (above), for example, the lover’s apparently innocent conduct in walking down the street took on a totally different meaning when viewed in the light of a number of incidents arising out of D’s separation from V and which had taken place over the previous nine months.


Self induced provocation is also possible where the accused has acted or spoken in such a way that the predictable outcome of his behaviour is that his deeds or words will provoke the victim into attacking him physically or verbally, & the accused kills him.

R v Edwards [1973] (Privy Council):

  • E visits the victim for the purpose of blackmailing him

  • The victim attacks E with a knife

  • A struggle ensues & E kills the victim

The Privy Council said: “On principle it seems reasonable to say –

(1) A blackmailer cannot rely on the predictable results of his own blackmailing conduct as constituting provocation ... & the predictable result may include a considerable degree of hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed ...
(2) but if the hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme lengths it might constitute sufficient provocation even for the blackmailer.
(3) There would be in many cases a question of degree to be decided by the jury”



D must have lost self-control on account of the provocation. This is the sudden, temporary loss of self-control. Evidence that some time elapsed between the last provocative act and D’s response (“cooling-off” time) will cast doubt on D’s assertion that he killed whilst suffering a loss of self-control.

Thornton [1992]: the Court of Appeal considered that, when directing the jury on provocation, the trial judge had been correct to emphasise the requirement for a sudden and temporary loss of self-control and that her behaviour indicated that though she had suffered threats of violence a relatively short time before she had cooled down by the time she killed her husband.

Thornton #2 [1995]: the court confirms that domestic violence is, in fact, evidence of diminished responsibility, not provocation.

There is no rule that the response must be immediate:

Baillie [1995]: it was accepted that D may not only have lost self-control immediately on being provoked but may also have remained out of control for some considerable time, during which the killing was committed. D had been drinking heavily when he was informed by his youngest son that the drug dealer who supplied all his sons was intending to punish them for switching to a different dealer. He immediately went into a rage, armed himself with a shotgun and razor, and drove to V’s house accompanied by his two older sons. He fired the shotgun when walking from the car to the house, seriously injured V with the razor and then, as V tried to escape, fired in his direction. Rather bizarrely, fragments of a wire mesh fence were blown out by the shotgun blast and killed V!

The 1957 Act places the responsibility for deciding whether a reasonable man would have done as D did entirely in the hands of the jury, repealing the previous common law rules, that the response be proportionate to the provocation. Of course, any jury can take these matters into account in deciding the issue, but the judge cannot direct them that the reasonable person would not have responded with the degree of violence  in question, although the judge can tell the jury that if they think that the reasonable man would not have responded to the provocation with the level of violence used by D, then they should reject the defence.

DPP v Camplin [1978]: the House of Lords had held that the reasonable man must be regarded as having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the age and sex of D, and bearing such other characteristics of D as are relevant to the gravity of the provocation. Here the defendant was a 15 year old boy who had just been raped by his victim. However, the characteristic must not be ‘fault based’, e.g. glue sniffing, but see immediately below.

Morhall [1993]: the D’s characteristic of being addicted to glue-sniffing should have been attributed to the reasonable man since it was the specific target of the provocation from V. The House of Lords made it clear that the reasonable man test should be compared with the response of an ordinary person placed in the same situation as D. So now we had a “reasonable glue sniffer”!

So far it seems possible to say that the test now permits consideration of:

(1)      sex, age and (im)maturity - the latter two factors may obviously affect capacity for self-control. So, in DPP v Camplin D’s age of 15 was regarded as relevant to his capacity for self-control when taunted by V about the sexual assault which V had just performed on him.;
(2)      characteristics (permanent or otherwise) which are the specific target of the provocation - addiction to glue-sniffing (Morhall), attention-seeking traits (Humphreys), obsessiveness and eccentricity (Dryden [1995]);
(3)      characteristics not the specific target of the provocation but which may have a general effect on powers of self-control - for example, retarded development (Raven [1982]). An important example may be the condition of “battered woman syndrome” which was recognised in Ahluwalia [1992]  but held not to apply because no evidence of it had been introduced at the trial. In Thornton (No. 2) D’s conviction was quashed and a re-trial was ordered on the ground that she suffered from battered woman syndrome and that the resultant personality disorder was a characteristic which should have been explained to the jury as relevant to the response of the reasonable woman;
(4)      the general background of relevant events for instance, the reasonable man, must be assumed to have experienced any earlier instances of provocative conduct which may have produced a cumulative effect.

R Smith (Morgan) [2000]: the House of Lords held that the jury is to take into account not only the characteristics of the defendant which are relevant to the gravity of the provocation, but also those which affected his powers of self-control. In other words, all sorts of behaviour were relevant. Lord Hoffman was a dissenter here, recognising that monsters had been created “reasonable glue sniffer” “ reasonable obsessive” “reasonable clinically depressed” and so on.

A decision that came out of the blue seems to have put an end to this sorry state of affaris and restored some sanity.

R v Holley [2005]. The decision is one of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Attorney-General of Jersey. Such decisions are not binding on English courts, merely persuasive. However, in this particular case the appeal was heard by a Board of nine judges, all members of the House of Lords, and by 6 votes to 3 the Board disapproved the majority judgement of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith [2000], and reaffirmed the decision in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996].Because it was considered that this latter case had been overruled by Morgan Smith, it does not appear in your manual. As it now looks like it is of great importance again, I have outlined the case immediately below this one.
     
In Holley a chronic alcoholic killed his girl-friend with an axe while under the influence of alcohol. He admitted the killing but claimed provocation. The Court of Appeal of Jersey allowed his appeal from his conviction for murder and substituted a verdict of manslaughter. The Attorney-General of Jersey appealed against this decision to the Privy Council (not in fact seeking to restore the original verdict, the defendant having already gone through two trials and two appeals, but to clarify the law). and reaffirmed the decision in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996]. Delivering the majority judgement, Lord Nicholls said the majority view in Morgan Smith was inconsistent with the clear language of the statute, and was therefore erroneous.

The partial defence of provocation involves two elements, one subjective and the other objective. In determining whether in fact the defendant was provoked, the jury should take into account all the relevant evidence, including evidence of any mental or other abnormality making it more or less likely that he lost his self-control. If the defendant was taunted on account of his intoxication, that may be a relevant matter for the jury to take into account when assessing the gravity of the taunt to the defendant. But in determining (in the language of s3 Homicide Act 1957) “whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did” the jury must consider the effect of that provocation on a person of the same age and sex as the defendant, but with ordinary powers of self-control. In some cases (such as Morhall [1995]) that might mean a glue-sniffer with ordinary powers of self-control, but the jury should not at this point take into account any individual peculiarities such as mental abnormality (which can be more appropriately dealt with through a defence of diminished responsibility) or intoxication.

There is a good article concerning this case to be found in the New Law Journal, 17th February 2006. pages 258-259. It’s in the library.

Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996]. This is another decision of the Privy Council, the original offence having been committed in Hong Kong. The defendant was charged with murder and claimed both provocation and diminished responsibility. He said that following a fall that had knocked him out some time before, he had several times lost his self-control in response to only minor provocation. He now appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge had not referred to this injury when directing the jury on provocation, but the Privy Council dismissed his appeal. Any mental infirmity on the defendant’s part, said Lord Goff, that reduced his powers of self-control below those of an ordinary person, could not be ascribed to the ordinary person for the purposes of the objective test.

There have been three cases that have reached the Court of Appeal since the Privy Council decision in Holley (above).

Mohammed [2005]: the Court of Appeal applied the decision in Holley, rather than Smith (Morgan). The defendant had contended that his temperament, influenced as it may have been by his religious and cultural beliefs, as well as possibly by a violent disposition, should be taken into account when considering whether his conduct could be excused within the objectives test. The court rejected this view, applying the “constant, objective standard” approved by the Privy Council in Holley. Thus, in applying the objective test, the defendant’s temperament was relevant to the gravity of the provocation, but not to the issue of his capacity for self control. Neither the prosecution or defence tried to suggest that the law was other than that stated by the Privy Council.

The law on this tangle of provocation now seems to have been settled by the cases of

R v James and R v Karimi [2006]. These two appeals were heard together because each turns on the true interpretation of s3 Homicide Act 1957. The court has sat five strong because they raise a novel and important question of the law relating to precedent. Should this court accept that the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] has effectively overruled the decision of the House of Lords in R v Smith (Morgan) [2001]? The Court of Appeal decided that the decision in Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 has overruled R v Smith. However, this was not to be taken as a licence to decline to follow decisions of the House of Lords in any other circumstances.

Neither case has been appealed to the House of Lords, s it seems that the status quo has been restored. A reasonable man is you and I, not somefool with his head stuck in a bag of glue.

We then turned to the defence of diminished responsibility. This was introduced by s2 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. It is quite separate from insanity, and was introduced to compensate for the difficulties in the M’Naghten rules on insanity. Like provocation, it applies only to persons charged with murder and it provides only a partial defence.

The basic definition is in s2(1) which states that D may be guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter;

“if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions.”

An abnormality is simply a state of mind which the reasonable man would consider abnormal, therefore it is very wide & covers many conditions not covered by the insanity defence.

R v Byrne [1960]: Byrne strangled his victim & mutilated her body. He claimed that he was subject to an irresistible or almost irresistible impulse because of perverted sexual desires which overcame him & had done so since he was a boy. At Birmingham Assizes a defence of diminished responsibility was raised, but it failed. He appealed on the grounds of a misdirection in the Judge’s summing up. The conviction was quashed. The Trial Judge had said that s2 Homicide Act 1957 was not relevant. The defence covers the mind’s activities in all its aspects & the ability to control one’s physical acts, including an irresistible impulse situation.

Abnormality of Mind has been held to cover:

  • Severe Shock

  • Depression (common in mercy killing & battered wife syndrome)

The disease element excludes drink & drugs, but does cover disease caused by long term alcohol or drug abuse.

We will continue this after the holidays.

Have a great Christmas and New Year, and I will see you on 4 January.

Monday, December 11, 2006

Thursday 7 December 2006

We continued with our look at criminal attempts.

In Jones [1990] - D was distraught when his girlfriend ended their relationship and began associating with P. He armed himself with a sawn-off shotgun a hatchet and a length of cord and got into P’s car as the latter dropped his daughter off at school. Whilst P’s attention was diverted, D took the shotgun from a holdall and pointed it at P at a range of about 12 inches and said, “You are not going to like this”. In the ensuing struggle, P managed to grab the gun and to escape despite having the cord thrown around his neck. The safety catch was found still to be on and P could not remember whether D’s finger was ever on the trigger. D claimed that he had only wanted to kill himself. D’s conviction was upheld. After strongly supporting the view of Lord Lane CJ in Gullefer that the Act must be construed without reference to the pre-existing common law, the court argued that, though the acts of:

  • obtaining and shortening the gun

  • loading it

  • going to the school

could only be regarded as preparatory, whilst:

  • getting into the car

  • taking out the gun

  • pointing it with the intention of killing P

constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to be allowed to determine whether D had done ‘an act more than merely preparatory’.

Campbell [1991] - the police had evidence that an attempt might be made to carry out a robbery at a sub-post office. D was seen in the vicinity. He rode a motor cycle along the road and walked around, approaching to within about 30 yards of the post office. He looked around before turning away. He returned half an hour later and walked back towards the post office. The police arrested him outside and, on searching him, found an imitation gun and a threatening note. He admitted that his intention had been to carry out a robbery but that he had changed his mind and was arrested before he could leave. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal against conviction for attempted robbery and held that there were numerous things still to be done before he could carry out the robbery.

So far as attempting the impossible is conbcerned, before the 1981 Act, the leading authority was Haughton v Smith where the House of Lords held that if what D had tried to do was absolutely impossible, regardless of how he set about it, he would have a good defence. If, on the other hand, D had simply used an inappropriate means of achieving his objective, he could still be convicted. In Haughton v Smith the accused received what he believed to be stolen corned beef. In fact, the corned beef had ceased to be stolen in law because it had been restored to lawful possession after the police had taken control of it. The House of Lords held that he could not be guilty of attempted handling.

Since the 1981 Act, the law has changed and was clarified by the House of Lords in Shivpuri [1986] which overruled the majority view in Anderton v Ryan [1985]. Haughton v Smith would almost certainly now result in a conviction.

Regard must be had to s1(2) and (3) which require the court to consider the facts as D, albeit mistakenly, believed them to be. If the facts as D perceived them would have necessitated a breach of the criminal law, D may be convicted of an attempt.

As long as D’s acts would have been more than merely preparatory, and he intended to commit the crime attempted, the prosecution will succeed. In Shivpuri [1986] S was guilty of attempting to knowingly be concerned in dealing with a prohibited drug even though the substance in the suitcase was actually a vegetable material, so that he was incorrect in his belief that he was dealing in heroin.

According to s1(4), there can be no liability for an attempt:

  • to commit a summary offence

  • engage in a statutory/common law conspiracy

  • be a secondary party to an offence

  • to impede apprehension or prosecution of an offender

  • to conceal an offence.

In conclusion, there are many cases where there will be little or no problem in deciding whether or not there is an attempt. Consider:

  • D fires a gun at a pillow intending to kill someone. Guilty of attempted murder.

  • D puts poison in a drink intending to kill V, the dose being too weak. Guilty of attempted murder.

  • D tries to break into a safe with the wrong tools, intending to steal. Guilty of attempt theft.

  • D takes an umbrella from a stand in a pub, believing he has stolen it from another customer. In fact it belongs to him. Cannot be guilty of theft as the property does not belong to another, but is guilty of attempt theft. Obviously there will be problems for the prosecution proving the mens rea, and it could be argued that such an offence is ludicrous, but it is the current state of the law.

We are now turning to offences against the person, beginning with fatal offences.

Unlawful homicide usually encompasses:

  • murder

  • manslaughter

  • infanticide

  • causing death by dangerous driving

  • child destruction

  • abortion

It is the first two that you can expect in the exam!

Murder and manslaughter share the same actus reus, i.e. one person unlawfully kills another. The difference lies in the intent.

Murder consists of unlawful killing with malice aforethought. That simply means intention.

Manslaughter is initially classified as:

voluntary or
involuntary

In voluntary manslaughter all the elements of murder are usually present, but there is also an additional extraneous or mitigating factor which reduces liability. This will be provocation, diminished responsibility or being a participant in a suicide pact.

In involuntary manslaughter D acts with mens rea but not with the necessary intention, i.e. malice aforethought.

I drew a flow chart on the board that I cannot recreate here. Ask a fellow student for a copy.

Looking first at the actus reus of both murder and manslaughter, the principal requirement is that D’s act should have caused the victim’s death, and this is a question of fact for the jury. Since death is a natural process, it is more accurate to say that D must accelerate that process. Thus, it matters not that the victim may be suffering from a terminal illness.

The rules on causation have already been extensively discussed. The cases frequently concerned homicide, and it will be sufficient to emphasise again that the prosecution must prove:

  • causation in fact and in law

  • D’s conduct does not have to be the sole cause but must make a significant contribution

  • intervening events which may be alleged to have broken the chain of causation. Such events include:

(i)      a refusal of treatment by V
(ii)      V’s especial susceptibility
(iii)      an attempt by V to escape
(iv)      negligent medical treatment

The Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 has abolished the old common law rule that no one could be convicted of homicide unless the victim’s death followed within a year and a day after the accused’s act which was said to have caused the death.

This no longer applies, but if either the injury which is alleged to have caused the death occurred more than three years before the death or the accused has previously been convicted of an offence in circumstances alleged to be connected with the death the consent of the Attorney General is required.

The death must be of a human being. This will rarely cause any difficulty for the prosecution but it means, for instance, that to be a potential victim of homicide a child must be born alive, whether injured before or after birth (preventing a child being born alive is not homicide). In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] the House of Lords were faced with a decision as to whether a charge of homicide was appropriate where the child was injured whilst being carried by the mother, but died after being born.

On 26 April 1990 B stabbed his girlfriend M who was to his knowledge between 22 and 24 weeks pregnant with his child. M made a good recovery from the wound but on 11 June 1990, without further trauma, she gave birth to a grossly premature child and it was found that the stab wound had penetrated the foetus. Despite receiving exemplary medical care, the child only survived 121 days. Before the child died B was charged with wounding M with intent to do her grievous bodily harm to which he pleaded guilty. On the death of the child B was charged with the child’s murder. At the end of the prosecution case, on a submission that B had no case to answer, the judge ruled that the facts did not give rise to a verdict of murder or manslaughter; thus, he directed the jury to acquit B.

On a reference by the Attorney-General to the Court of Appeal under s36 Criminal Justice Act 1972 for the Court’s opinion :

  1. whether the crimes of murder or manslaughter could be committed where the unlawful injury was deliberately inflicted on a child in utero, or a mother of a child in utero where the child was subsequently born alive but thereafter died and the injuries while in utero caused or made a substantial contribution to the death; and

  2. whether the fact that the death of the child was caused solely as a consequence of injury to the mother rather than as direct injury to the foetus could negative any liability for murder or manslaughter in those circumstances.

The Court of Appeal held (1) that murder or manslaughter could be committed where unlawful injury was deliberately inflicted to a child in utero or to a mother carrying a child in utero in such circumstances; and (2) that the requisite intent to be proved in the case of murder was an intention to kill or cause really serious bodily harm to the mother.

On a further reference to the House of Lords at B’s request it was held that the mother and foetus were separate organisms, and rejected that the doctrine of transferred malice could be extended to cover such a situation. The defendant could not be guilty of murder. However, for the purposes of manslaughter in such circumstances, it does not matter that at the time of the unlawful act the foetus was not a living person. The defendant could therefore be convicted of manslaughter.

The D’s conduct must be unlawful. This will absolve from blame an executioner who was carrying out his duties.

More commonly, a doctor performing an abortion within the terms of the ABORTION ACT 1967 would not be guilty if the child initially survived but then died because he would have been acting lawfully. A comatose person who has already suffered brain death cannot subsequently be a victim of homicide.  Similarly, the successful use of the defence of self-defence negates an unlawful killing.

In Malcherek, Steel [1981] D’s claim not to have caused V’s death because doctors had not carried out the full range of checks to determine brain death was rejected. The doctors had acted properly, V was brain dead (and, therefore, legally dead) when life-support machines were switched off, and so D’s conduct must have caused the death.

In the very important case, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] the House of Lords had to face for the first time the issue of the duty on doctors to continue to treat a patient in a persistent vegetative state and in whom there was no prospect of a recovery of any degree of consciousness. V was severely injured when he was crushed in a crowd of football supporters attending an FA Cup semi-final game in April 1989. By the time that resuscitation treatment was administered to him, his brain had been deprived of oxygen for a significant period and the cerebral cortex (the centre of consciousness and all higher functions in the brain) had effectively been destroyed. However, his brain stem functioned normally and he was not dead in any sense recognised by law or medicine. Since he could not swallow, he was fed by means of a tube threaded into his stomach down which food was mechanically pumped. Drugs were administered to suppress infections, and other surgical intervention had been required.

The judgments make use of the rules and principles enunciated above, though there was a strong plea from Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill that Parliament should intervene to lay down rules to govern the conduct of doctors in such situations. It was held that the doctors were under no duty to continue to “treat” V and so would not be guilty of any offences should they cease to do so (V died a short time after treatment stopped). Their Lordships began by arguing that, though the fundamental principle is the sanctity of life, the principle is not absolute. There is no absolute rule that treatment must be given which will prolong life (for instance, the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his patient must yield to the principle of self-determination - the patient could require life-support to be discontinued). However, it is not lawful to act only for the purpose of bringing about death, even if this is motivated by a desire to end suffering. Importantly, the feeding had to be seen in the context of the whole regime and, especially, the requirement to use an invasive technique (the tube). The feeding could therefore be seen as “treatment”, and its cessation as cessation of treatment and not merely as “starving to death”.

Withdrawal of the treatment was to be viewed as an omission, permitting enquiry into whether the doctors were under any duty to continue to treat. Their duty was to act in accordance with what responsible and competent medical opinion would consider to be the best interests of their patient. If, according to such opinion, it would not be in the best interests of a patient to prolong life by the use of invasive techniques, then no such duty existed. If doctors then withdrew treatment, the death would result from the pre-existing condition and, in law, would be caused by the injury or disease which had brought about that condition. In all the circumstances, and despite the fact that V could experience no discomfort, it was proper to conclude that, according to responsible medical opinion, no benefit was conferred on him by the continuation of the treatment. It was not in his best interest and the doctors were under no duty to persist.

Se also Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2000].

The mens rea of both murder and voluntary manslaughter  is malice aforethought. This is a purely technical term, and is potentially misleading. There need be no malice in the sense of spite or ill-will nor any real forethought: murder is not necessarily concerned with premeditated killings.

The prosecution must prove that, at the time he committed the fatal act, D intended to kill or seriously injure; see, e.g. Moloney [1985]. The meaning of intention was fully considered previously, together with the important cases, most of which concern murder or attempted murder.

The crime is one of specific intent, which can be either oblique or direct in nature.

The rule regarding serious injury extends to all kinds of serious injury, even that which no one would expect to be life-threatening in the ordinary run of things. So, if D intended to break V’s leg and V died on account of some unexpected medical complication, this could be murder.

(Voluntary) Manslaughter by Provocation. The fact that the killing was provoked may be sufficient mitigation to reduce liability from murder to manslaughter.

Provocation was, and remains, a common law defence, though its elements have been modified significantly by s3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. Its essence is that D, though prima facie guilty of murder:

  • killed whilst suffering a sudden and temporary loss of self-control in response to something said and/or done by another person, and

  • D’s response must be such as might have been expected of a reasonable person in the same situation.

If any evidence that D was provoked to lose his self-control appears at the trial, whether the issue is expressly raised by D or not (even if, say, D) asserts an alibi or that he did not kill V - Cambridge [1994] - then the judge must put the defence to the jury, which has the task of deciding both whether D did lose his self-control on account of the provocation (the subjective test) and whether a reasonable person would have done as D did (the objective test). As we shall see later, this mythical reasonable person is said to have the same characteristics as the defendant, as long as those characteristics are not ‘fault based’. The onus is on the Crown to disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt.

What conduct can be provocation? This is where we shall begin next week.

Friday, December 01, 2006

Thursday 30 November 2006

We began with a look at the criminal liability of corporations. A corporation (or company) is a separate person in law. It is an individual in its own right, quite distinct from those persons (human beings) who act on its behalf. It can own property, buy and sell property, have its own money and bank account; it can sue and be sued, and it can prosecute and be prosecuted; see Salomon v Salomon & Co. [1897], in which the court held that a company’s debts belonged to and were the responsibility of the company, and not the man who ran it effectively as a one-man business and who owned the vast majority of shares in it.

There are obvious limits on corporate liability under the criminal law; e.g. a company cannot commit crimes such as rape and bigamy because these offences can only be committed by certain human beings. Also a company cannot commit a crime that is punishable only by imprisonment (e.g. murder). But it is worth noting that a company may be guilty of manslaughter: P & O European Ferries Ltd [1990] though the prosecution resulting from the Zeebrugge disaster failed on the evidence. It is in the area of gross negligence manslaughter that interest lies.

In 1994, OLL Ltd and its managing director, Kite, were convicted of manslaughter. Four teenagers pursuing activities organised by OLL Ltd had drowned when crossing Lyme Bay in canoes. There was clear evidence that Kite knew that the safety procedures and the general standards of skill and competence of instructors were seriously defective: R v Kite & OLL Ltd [1994].

In the leading case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] the House of Lords, per Lord Reid said:

“A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these; it must act through living persons. Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company … He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate … If [his mind] is a guilty mind, then that guilt is the guilt of the company.”

Thus, crimes committed by those persons who control the company (the “BRAINS”) could be attributed to the company; whereas the offences committed by mere servants of the company (the “HANDS”) could not (except, of course, by the vicarious liability rules). The case is concerned with a trading standards offence, where the store manager was said to be only the hands of the company.

In the Lyme Bay case (above), OLL Ltd was a very small company and it was easy to identify it with Kite, the managing director, and to attribute to it his knowledge and failures. As the P & O European Ferries Ltd case shows, in larger companies it may not be so easy to establish the appropriate culpability in anyone who can be identified with the company.

It does look like reform is on the way. The Corporate Manslaughter & Homicide Bill 2006 received it second reading on 10th October 2006.

We then turned to the subject of inchoate offences. Inchoate is simply another word for an offence which is incomplete. It is desirable that the Police should have the opportunity to prevent the full offence from being committed whilst at the same time prosecuting those who contemplated it. Unlike secondary offences the full crime need not have taken place before the accused is guilty of an inchoate offence. An inchoate offence is criminal only in relation to the full offence, it is important that one is not guilty of an attempt, but, for example, of attempted murder. There are three inchoate offences:

  • incitement     }     this sequence shows the movement

  • conspiracy     }     towards the commission of the full

  • attempt          }     offence
     
     although some other statutory offences have a similar effect. Here are two:
     
The mens rea for all of the inchoate offences is specific intent, recklessness is not enough.
     
INCITEMENT. It is a common law crime to incite another person to commit any criminal offence, apart from conspiracy (see s5(7) CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1977), whether or not that offence is committed. It does not matter whether or not the solicitation has any effect: Higgins [1801].
     
The offence is punishable with a fine or imprisonment within the discretion of the judge when the case is tried on indictment, even though the principal offence’s maximum is much less. An accused can be more severely punished for incitement the offence than the person who actually commits it!
     
The usual case offered is Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976], which also confirms that the persuasion need not be oral. The company advertised for sale an instrument useful in evading police speed traps, & were found guilty of inciting an offence (the use of the product with a Home Office wireless licence).
     
If the crime incited is committed, the inciter may be guilty of incitement and/or be treated as a secondary party to that crime.
     
What the defendant has incited must amount to a crime: Whitehouse [1977]. There it was held that W could not be guilty of inciting his 15-year old daughter to have incestuous sexual intercourse with him. By s11 SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 1956, it is impossible for a girl under 16 to be guilty of incest; neither could such a girl be guilty of aiding and abetting a man to commit incest with her. Thus, W had effectively been charged with inciting his daughter to commit a crime which she could not commit!

The persuasion/encouragement should come to the attention of the person who is to be influenced, though it need not be effective: Krause [1902]. If it is effective and the person incited agrees to commit a crime, he and the inciter are likely to be guilty of conspiracy.
     
If the inciter suggests an inappropriate means of committing the crime so that it cannot come about, the inciter will still be guilty provided he had the necessary mens rea. Where what was incited could never be achieved regardless of the means adopted, the inciter will also be guilty provided he had mens rea. In McDonough [1962] McD was convicted of inciting another to handle stolen lamb carcasses which did not exist. It is assumed that this decision was reached on the basis that McD mistakenly believed that the carcasses did exist.
     
We then turned to CONSPIRACY. The main form of conspiracy is statutory conspiracy which consists of an agreement that one or more of the parties to the agreement will commit a criminal offence (s1 CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1977). All common law conspiracies were abolished by s5 of the 1977 Act except for conspiracy to defraud. Conspiracies to corrupt public morals and to outrage public decency were also preserved as common law conspiracies but only if the courts should decide that such activities were not offences in themselves; though doubts remain, it may well be that both are now offences in their own right so that agreeing to do either will be a statutory conspiracy (however, see the comments on such conspiracies below).
     
Conspiracy consists of an agreement between two or more persons; there is no maximum number. Agreement is often difficult to establish and may have to be deduced from all the evidence.
     
Apart from an agreement in which all the conspirators are in contact with each other, agreements may be established by proof that one person acted as the central contact (the “hub” of a “wheel”) or by proof that the conspirators were linked in a ‘chain’. In these forms, a conspirator may know the identity of only one other conspirator but will be held to have agreed with all the others provided that he knows that others are involved and that they are all working towards a common end.
     
The agreement must be between two or more people. The CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1977 s2 provides that there is no statutory conspiracy where, apart from D the only other party to the conspiracy is :
     
  • D’s spouse

  • A person under the age of criminal responsibility

  • An intended victim of the offence, e.g. Tyrrell [1894] where D, who was under 16, could not be guilty of aiding and abetting X to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her.

Section 1(1) of the 1977 Act requires proof that D made an agreement:

with any other person(s) that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either

  1. will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence(s) by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or

  2. would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence(s) impossible.

This appears to mean that D must intend that the agreement be carried out by himself and/or at least one other party to the agreement. Not so.

In Anderson [1985] the House of Lords considered that the making of the agreement was enough, even if D, as happened in the case, never intended that it should be carried out and believed that it could not be carried out without his participation (he intended to take the money but not do the job). The only exception recognised was where D was a “respectable citizen” such as a police officer, whose purpose was to expose and frustrate the criminal purpose of the others. Even here, the police officers must not intend, as part of their plan to gain information, that the object of the agreement be pursued.

The Court of Appeal in Siracusa [1989] held that the defendant’s agreement is all that is necessary.

Criminal liability is generally territorial; that is, English courts have jurisdiction only in relation to offences committed within England and Wales. Thus, courts only have jurisdiction over conspiracies when they consist of agreements to commit offences in England and Wales.

However, a British citizen may be indicted for murder in England no matter where in the world the murder occurred. Consequently, an agreement in England to commit murder abroad is indictable as a conspiracy in this country. More generally, by virtue of s1(4) of the 1977 Act, any agreement by anyone in England, whether British subject or not, to commit murder abroad is indictable in this country. An agreement abroad to commit any offence in England is indictable as a conspiracy in England, whether or not any acts have been done in England in pursuit of the conspiracy. The simple way to understand this:

Conspire to murder someone abroad? Yes
Conspire to steal the Mona Lisa from the Louvre? No - because the theft could not be tried in England and Wales

For CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD, Lord Diplock said that common law conspiracy was “the least systematic, the most irrational branch of English penal law.”

There is no clear definition of “fraud” for these purposes. According to the House of Lords in Scott v MPC [1974] it includes dishonestly causing economic loss:

“by dishonestly to deprive a person of something which is his or to which he is or would be or might be entitled … and by dishonesty to injure some proprietary right of his …”

Deception is not a requirement so that in Scott the defendant was guilty of conspiring with cinema employees to borrow films for copying and distribution for profit in breach of copyright.

Later cases suggest that it is probably sufficient that they agree to do things which they know will defraud, whether or not they have that purpose. In Cooke [1986] British Rail stewards were guilty of conspiracy to defraud British Rail by selling their own sandwiches and making profits for themselves whilst at work, even though their main aim was probably simply to make the money for themselves. They must have known that the effect would be to damage British Rail’s economic interests.

Dishonesty must also be shown, and here it seems that the tests in Ghosh [1982] apply; i.e.

  1. was D’s conduct dishonest according to the standards of ordinary decent people? If it was,

  2. was D aware of this? Both questions must be answered in the affirmative for a finding of dishonesty.

We will look at this case more closely when we deal with theft.
So far as CONSPIRACY TO CORRUPT PUBLIC MORALS OR OUTRAGE PUBLIC DECENCY is concerned, it is true to say that the law is confused. Prior to Shaw it had been unheard of. However, the House of Lords in Shaw v DPP [1961] and in Knuller v DPP [1972] held that such agreements do constitute criminal offences.

In Shaw, S published a “Ladies Directory” containing the names and addresses of prostitutes and the sort of sexual activities they performed, and was convicted of conspiracy to corrupt public morals.

In Knuller, it was held that an agreement to publish advertisements which would assist in the commission of homosexual acts between consenting adult males in private was also a conspiracy to corrupt public morals. Although there is no residual power for the House of Lords to create offences (the Declaratory Theory), Lord Simmonds stated in Shaw;

“There remains in the Courts of Law a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the state”.

In Gibson [1990] the defendant was an artist who included in a public display of his work a pair of earrings made from freeze dried foetuses. The Court of Appeal held that, since the object of the common law offence was to protect the public from feelings of outrage, there was no requirement for the prosecution to prove that D had an intention to outrage or appreciated the risk of such outrage and determined nevertheless to run that risk.

It may turn out that, completely unknown to the parties, it is impossible for them to achieve their objective. For example, they plan to burgle a house to steal a particular painting, not knowing that the painting was sold and removed a short time before they made their agreement.  This is usually described as impossibility. The law used to be that the nature of the conspiracy determined whether or not impossibility could provide a good defence. If the conspiracy was very narrow and precise so that the agreed course of conduct could never produce the result/circumstances prohibited by law, then D was not liable: DPP v Nock and Others [1978]. There D and others could not be guilty of conspiring to produce cocaine by extracting it from a particular powder, because their agreement was limited to the use of the specific powder and cocaine could not be obtained from it. However, this distinction has now been abolished, at least in relation to statutory conspiracies.

Even though what the parties to such a conspiracy have agreed to cannot be materialised, they may still be convicted. This is implicit in s1(1)(a) CLA 1977 (as amended), and is put beyond doubt by s1(1)(b).

Notwithstanding the need for at least two parties to a conspiracy, A may be convicted of conspiring with B (and with no-one else), whereas B may be acquitted of conspiring with A (and with no-one else). This is true where A and B are tried separately (DPP v Shannon [1974]), or where they are tried together by the same jury (Longman and Cribben [1980]).

In the first case, different juries may come to different conclusions about the evidence against the parties, in the latter there may be strong evidence against one party but only weak evidence against the other. This rule is firmly supported by s5(8). Naturally, if the evidence against each party is of equal weight and cogency, a jury should return the same verdict against each of them.

ATTEMPTS were formerly common law, but now governed by the CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS ACT 1981. The rationale behind the law can be explained as:

  • People who are dangerous should be prosecuted. A person who shoots and misses is just as blameworthy as one who shoots and hits.

  • People should not be penalised for simply thinking about committing a crime, therefore the police have to hold back until the point is reached where the defendant commits the “act that is more than merely preparatory”, even though they may be certain that the defendant intends to commit the full offence.

  • Each time a new indictable offence is created, an offence of attempting to commit the offence is automatically created.

  • The mens rea of an attempt is nothing less than intent to commit the full offence, even though the mens rea for the full offence is satisfied by recklessness. Section 1(1) provides:

If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies…

It would appear, therefore, that the mens rea of an attempt is intention to commit the full offence. However, it should be noted that where an offence can be committed with an intention to cause lesser injury than actually must occur (in murder, for instance, death must occur but D will be guilty if he intends death or serious injury), the attempt will require an intention to cause nothing less than the full injury. Thus, the mens rea of attempted murder is an intention to kill, an intention to cause serious injury is not enough.

A doubt is sometimes raised about so-called conditional intent. The term is often used to describe D’s state of mind when engaged in acts with the aim of seeing whether it is worth his while to continue and might be found especially in theft, where D may want to see whether anything is worth taking.

In Easom [1971] D was caught when he rifled through V’s handbag in a cinema. V was a policewoman specially planted for the purpose and it was clear that D had not actually taken anything because there was nothing that interested him. His conviction for theft was quashed but, at that time, he could have been convicted of attempted theft and it would appear that that would also now be true under the 1981 Act.

Actus reus:

D must do something which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence attempted. Whether or not D has acted in this way is a question of fact.

The idea of this phrase, was to try to solve the problems associated with the previous law, where there were several attempts to decide on just when an attempt had been committed. Anything that takes place too early cannot be an attempt, conversely if it is too late it means that the full offence has been committed. Trying to take one step back from when the full offence was committed is what caused all of the problems.

Prior to the 1981 Act many different formulations had been tried to solve the problem, including:

a proximity test, which was the most used. In Eagleton [1855] it was said that “Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the full offence are not to be considered as attempts, but acts immediately connected with it are.” The Law Commission suggested as late as 1980 that in a report on which the 1981 Act was based that the proximity test should be consigned to the dustbin of history.

an equivocality test, which asked whether the accused’s conduct had any purpose other than the commission of the full offence, as in Davey v Lee [1968].

a last act test, asked whether the defendant did the last act dependent on him. In DPP v Stonehouse [1978] Lord Diplock  described the last act as “crossing the Rubicon and burning his boats.”

None of these tests are satisfactory, and it has been argued that none should apply to the Criminal Attempts Act. The Courts have recently asserted that the common law cases should no longer be cited in explanation of the statute since they represent conflicting and unsatisfactory lines of authority. The following points may be made:

  1. all acts are in some sense “preparatory” so if any distinctions are to be made between acts which are sufficient to amount to an attempt and those which are not, then the word “merely” must be significant;

  2. whether an act is “more than merely” preparatory must be a question of degree in all the circumstances, including the definition of the completed offence itself;

  3. though D need not have reached the stage of the “last act” which it is necessary and possible for him to do, it is clear that if he has reached this stage then he must be guilty of an attempt;

  4. the respective functions of judge and jury are laid down by the 1981 Act s4(3) as follows:


  • the judge must decide whether there is some evidence of an act more than merely preparatory. If there is none then he must withdraw the issue from the jury;

  • if the judge decides that there is such evidence, he must leave the issue to the jury to decide as a question of fact. This is so even if he considers that D must be guilty because he has reached the stage of the last act.

We will continue with this next week.