Thursday 14 December 2006
We have been looking at homicide, and here we are concerned with the defence of provocation, a defence only to murder. The fact that the killing was provoked may be sufficient mitigation to reduce liability from murder to manslaughter.
Provocation was, and remains, a common law defence, though its elements have been modified significantly by s3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. Its essence is that D, though prima facie guilty of murder:
Cambridge [1994]: if any evidence that D was provoked to lose his self-control appears at the trial, whether the issue is expressly raised by D or not (even if, say, D) asserts an alibi or that he did not kill V – then the judge must put the defence to the jury, which has the task of deciding both whether D did lose his self-control on account of the provocation (the subjective test) and whether a reasonable person would have done as D did (the objective test). As we shall see later, this mythical reasonable person was said to have the same characteristics as the defendant, as long as those characteristics were not ‘fault based’. Fortunately, this nonsense has now been corrected, as we shall see.
The onus is on the Crown to disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt.
Before the 1957 Act was passed, the definition of provocation required an act or series of acts by the defendant towards his victim. No longer the case.
Section 3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957 Act makes it absolutely clear that the provocation can be by words or conduct (“whether by things done or by things said”) but makes reference neither to who must offer the provocation nor at whom it must be directed.
Subsequent interpretation now seems firmly to have established that it need not come from the victim nor need it be directed at the defendant.
Davies [1975]: D immediately sought out and killed his estranged wife, V, upon seeing her lover walking in the direction of the place where she worked. Though his conviction was upheld, the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in telling them that only the conduct of V (as the dead person) was capable of being provocation. The conduct of her lover in walking to meet her was capable of being provocation, too.
Implicit in the decision in DAVIES are two further rules:
(1) the conduct does not have to be directed at D since the lover was totally unaware that he was being observed by D. This was also the effect of the decision in Pearson [1992] where D was able to rely on evidence of the ill-treatment of his brother by his violent father when successfully pleading provocation to the charge of murdering his father. M lived at home with his violent father. Son W was a visitor. On one visit M had violent toothache, and the father threatened to knock all his teeth out. Whilst the father was asleep W got a sledgehammer & got M to switch on the light & struck the father’s head. He stopped & cried. M took over & killed the father.
On appeal W’s conviction for murder was quashed as provocation does not need to be directed towards the defendant, it was sufficient that it was directed at M.
(2) the provocation need not consist of unlawful conduct. In Doughty [1986] the crying of a small baby was held to be capable of being provocation, is a dramatic illustration of both these rules.
Since the 1957 Act and its subsequent interpretation, the scope of the defence of provocation is now much wider. It now appears that the kinds of conduct capable of being provocation are virtually limitless, provided only that they are in some way associated with human agency. Of course, if D did not lose control on account of any such conduct, or if a reasonable man would not have done as he did, then the defence will still fail.
D must lose control on account of the provocation. This means that incidents which have occurred well before the time of the killing are unlikely to be capable of being provocation in themselves. However, evidence of such incidents may be very important in explaining why the most immediate incident, which may in itself have seemed to be very trivial, should be regarded as provocation. This is sometimes called cumulative provocation. In Davies (above), for example, the lover’s apparently innocent conduct in walking down the street took on a totally different meaning when viewed in the light of a number of incidents arising out of D’s separation from V and which had taken place over the previous nine months.
Self induced provocation is also possible where the accused has acted or spoken in such a way that the predictable outcome of his behaviour is that his deeds or words will provoke the victim into attacking him physically or verbally, & the accused kills him.
R v Edwards [1973] (Privy Council):
The Privy Council said: “On principle it seems reasonable to say –
(1) A blackmailer cannot rely on the predictable results of his own blackmailing conduct as constituting provocation ... & the predictable result may include a considerable degree of hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed ...
(2) but if the hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme lengths it might constitute sufficient provocation even for the blackmailer.
(3) There would be in many cases a question of degree to be decided by the jury”
D must have lost self-control on account of the provocation. This is the sudden, temporary loss of self-control. Evidence that some time elapsed between the last provocative act and D’s response (“cooling-off” time) will cast doubt on D’s assertion that he killed whilst suffering a loss of self-control.
Thornton [1992]: the Court of Appeal considered that, when directing the jury on provocation, the trial judge had been correct to emphasise the requirement for a sudden and temporary loss of self-control and that her behaviour indicated that though she had suffered threats of violence a relatively short time before she had cooled down by the time she killed her husband.
Thornton #2 [1995]: the court confirms that domestic violence is, in fact, evidence of diminished responsibility, not provocation.
There is no rule that the response must be immediate:
Baillie [1995]: it was accepted that D may not only have lost self-control immediately on being provoked but may also have remained out of control for some considerable time, during which the killing was committed. D had been drinking heavily when he was informed by his youngest son that the drug dealer who supplied all his sons was intending to punish them for switching to a different dealer. He immediately went into a rage, armed himself with a shotgun and razor, and drove to V’s house accompanied by his two older sons. He fired the shotgun when walking from the car to the house, seriously injured V with the razor and then, as V tried to escape, fired in his direction. Rather bizarrely, fragments of a wire mesh fence were blown out by the shotgun blast and killed V!
The 1957 Act places the responsibility for deciding whether a reasonable man would have done as D did entirely in the hands of the jury, repealing the previous common law rules, that the response be proportionate to the provocation. Of course, any jury can take these matters into account in deciding the issue, but the judge cannot direct them that the reasonable person would not have responded with the degree of violence in question, although the judge can tell the jury that if they think that the reasonable man would not have responded to the provocation with the level of violence used by D, then they should reject the defence.
DPP v Camplin [1978]: the House of Lords had held that the reasonable man must be regarded as having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the age and sex of D, and bearing such other characteristics of D as are relevant to the gravity of the provocation. Here the defendant was a 15 year old boy who had just been raped by his victim. However, the characteristic must not be ‘fault based’, e.g. glue sniffing, but see immediately below.
Morhall [1993]: the D’s characteristic of being addicted to glue-sniffing should have been attributed to the reasonable man since it was the specific target of the provocation from V. The House of Lords made it clear that the reasonable man test should be compared with the response of an ordinary person placed in the same situation as D. So now we had a “reasonable glue sniffer”!
So far it seems possible to say that the test now permits consideration of:
(1) sex, age and (im)maturity - the latter two factors may obviously affect capacity for self-control. So, in DPP v Camplin D’s age of 15 was regarded as relevant to his capacity for self-control when taunted by V about the sexual assault which V had just performed on him.;
(2) characteristics (permanent or otherwise) which are the specific target of the provocation - addiction to glue-sniffing (Morhall), attention-seeking traits (Humphreys), obsessiveness and eccentricity (Dryden [1995]);
(3) characteristics not the specific target of the provocation but which may have a general effect on powers of self-control - for example, retarded development (Raven [1982]). An important example may be the condition of “battered woman syndrome” which was recognised in Ahluwalia [1992] but held not to apply because no evidence of it had been introduced at the trial. In Thornton (No. 2) D’s conviction was quashed and a re-trial was ordered on the ground that she suffered from battered woman syndrome and that the resultant personality disorder was a characteristic which should have been explained to the jury as relevant to the response of the reasonable woman;
(4) the general background of relevant events for instance, the reasonable man, must be assumed to have experienced any earlier instances of provocative conduct which may have produced a cumulative effect.
R Smith (Morgan) [2000]: the House of Lords held that the jury is to take into account not only the characteristics of the defendant which are relevant to the gravity of the provocation, but also those which affected his powers of self-control. In other words, all sorts of behaviour were relevant. Lord Hoffman was a dissenter here, recognising that monsters had been created “reasonable glue sniffer” “ reasonable obsessive” “reasonable clinically depressed” and so on.
A decision that came out of the blue seems to have put an end to this sorry state of affaris and restored some sanity.
R v Holley [2005]. The decision is one of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Attorney-General of Jersey. Such decisions are not binding on English courts, merely persuasive. However, in this particular case the appeal was heard by a Board of nine judges, all members of the House of Lords, and by 6 votes to 3 the Board disapproved the majority judgement of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith [2000], and reaffirmed the decision in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996].Because it was considered that this latter case had been overruled by Morgan Smith, it does not appear in your manual. As it now looks like it is of great importance again, I have outlined the case immediately below this one.
In Holley a chronic alcoholic killed his girl-friend with an axe while under the influence of alcohol. He admitted the killing but claimed provocation. The Court of Appeal of Jersey allowed his appeal from his conviction for murder and substituted a verdict of manslaughter. The Attorney-General of Jersey appealed against this decision to the Privy Council (not in fact seeking to restore the original verdict, the defendant having already gone through two trials and two appeals, but to clarify the law). and reaffirmed the decision in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996]. Delivering the majority judgement, Lord Nicholls said the majority view in Morgan Smith was inconsistent with the clear language of the statute, and was therefore erroneous.
The partial defence of provocation involves two elements, one subjective and the other objective. In determining whether in fact the defendant was provoked, the jury should take into account all the relevant evidence, including evidence of any mental or other abnormality making it more or less likely that he lost his self-control. If the defendant was taunted on account of his intoxication, that may be a relevant matter for the jury to take into account when assessing the gravity of the taunt to the defendant. But in determining (in the language of s3 Homicide Act 1957) “whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did” the jury must consider the effect of that provocation on a person of the same age and sex as the defendant, but with ordinary powers of self-control. In some cases (such as Morhall [1995]) that might mean a glue-sniffer with ordinary powers of self-control, but the jury should not at this point take into account any individual peculiarities such as mental abnormality (which can be more appropriately dealt with through a defence of diminished responsibility) or intoxication.
There is a good article concerning this case to be found in the New Law Journal, 17th February 2006. pages 258-259. It’s in the library.
Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996]. This is another decision of the Privy Council, the original offence having been committed in Hong Kong. The defendant was charged with murder and claimed both provocation and diminished responsibility. He said that following a fall that had knocked him out some time before, he had several times lost his self-control in response to only minor provocation. He now appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge had not referred to this injury when directing the jury on provocation, but the Privy Council dismissed his appeal. Any mental infirmity on the defendant’s part, said Lord Goff, that reduced his powers of self-control below those of an ordinary person, could not be ascribed to the ordinary person for the purposes of the objective test.
There have been three cases that have reached the Court of Appeal since the Privy Council decision in Holley (above).
Mohammed [2005]: the Court of Appeal applied the decision in Holley, rather than Smith (Morgan). The defendant had contended that his temperament, influenced as it may have been by his religious and cultural beliefs, as well as possibly by a violent disposition, should be taken into account when considering whether his conduct could be excused within the objectives test. The court rejected this view, applying the “constant, objective standard” approved by the Privy Council in Holley. Thus, in applying the objective test, the defendant’s temperament was relevant to the gravity of the provocation, but not to the issue of his capacity for self control. Neither the prosecution or defence tried to suggest that the law was other than that stated by the Privy Council.
The law on this tangle of provocation now seems to have been settled by the cases of
R v James and R v Karimi [2006]. These two appeals were heard together because each turns on the true interpretation of s3 Homicide Act 1957. The court has sat five strong because they raise a novel and important question of the law relating to precedent. Should this court accept that the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] has effectively overruled the decision of the House of Lords in R v Smith (Morgan) [2001]? The Court of Appeal decided that the decision in Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 has overruled R v Smith. However, this was not to be taken as a licence to decline to follow decisions of the House of Lords in any other circumstances.
Neither case has been appealed to the House of Lords, s it seems that the status quo has been restored. A reasonable man is you and I, not somefool with his head stuck in a bag of glue.
We then turned to the defence of diminished responsibility. This was introduced by s2 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. It is quite separate from insanity, and was introduced to compensate for the difficulties in the M’Naghten rules on insanity. Like provocation, it applies only to persons charged with murder and it provides only a partial defence.
The basic definition is in s2(1) which states that D may be guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter;
“if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions.”
An abnormality is simply a state of mind which the reasonable man would consider abnormal, therefore it is very wide & covers many conditions not covered by the insanity defence.
R v Byrne [1960]: Byrne strangled his victim & mutilated her body. He claimed that he was subject to an irresistible or almost irresistible impulse because of perverted sexual desires which overcame him & had done so since he was a boy. At Birmingham Assizes a defence of diminished responsibility was raised, but it failed. He appealed on the grounds of a misdirection in the Judge’s summing up. The conviction was quashed. The Trial Judge had said that s2 Homicide Act 1957 was not relevant. The defence covers the mind’s activities in all its aspects & the ability to control one’s physical acts, including an irresistible impulse situation.
Abnormality of Mind has been held to cover:
The disease element excludes drink & drugs, but does cover disease caused by long term alcohol or drug abuse.
We will continue this after the holidays.
Have a great Christmas and New Year, and I will see you on 4 January.
Provocation was, and remains, a common law defence, though its elements have been modified significantly by s3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. Its essence is that D, though prima facie guilty of murder:
- killed whilst suffering a sudden and temporary loss of self-control in response to something said and/or done by another person, and (subjective test)
- D’s response must be such as might have been expected of a reasonable person in the same situation. (objective test)
Cambridge [1994]: if any evidence that D was provoked to lose his self-control appears at the trial, whether the issue is expressly raised by D or not (even if, say, D) asserts an alibi or that he did not kill V – then the judge must put the defence to the jury, which has the task of deciding both whether D did lose his self-control on account of the provocation (the subjective test) and whether a reasonable person would have done as D did (the objective test). As we shall see later, this mythical reasonable person was said to have the same characteristics as the defendant, as long as those characteristics were not ‘fault based’. Fortunately, this nonsense has now been corrected, as we shall see.
The onus is on the Crown to disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt.
Before the 1957 Act was passed, the definition of provocation required an act or series of acts by the defendant towards his victim. No longer the case.
Section 3 HOMICIDE ACT 1957 Act makes it absolutely clear that the provocation can be by words or conduct (“whether by things done or by things said”) but makes reference neither to who must offer the provocation nor at whom it must be directed.
Subsequent interpretation now seems firmly to have established that it need not come from the victim nor need it be directed at the defendant.
Davies [1975]: D immediately sought out and killed his estranged wife, V, upon seeing her lover walking in the direction of the place where she worked. Though his conviction was upheld, the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in telling them that only the conduct of V (as the dead person) was capable of being provocation. The conduct of her lover in walking to meet her was capable of being provocation, too.
Implicit in the decision in DAVIES are two further rules:
(1) the conduct does not have to be directed at D since the lover was totally unaware that he was being observed by D. This was also the effect of the decision in Pearson [1992] where D was able to rely on evidence of the ill-treatment of his brother by his violent father when successfully pleading provocation to the charge of murdering his father. M lived at home with his violent father. Son W was a visitor. On one visit M had violent toothache, and the father threatened to knock all his teeth out. Whilst the father was asleep W got a sledgehammer & got M to switch on the light & struck the father’s head. He stopped & cried. M took over & killed the father.
On appeal W’s conviction for murder was quashed as provocation does not need to be directed towards the defendant, it was sufficient that it was directed at M.
(2) the provocation need not consist of unlawful conduct. In Doughty [1986] the crying of a small baby was held to be capable of being provocation, is a dramatic illustration of both these rules.
Since the 1957 Act and its subsequent interpretation, the scope of the defence of provocation is now much wider. It now appears that the kinds of conduct capable of being provocation are virtually limitless, provided only that they are in some way associated with human agency. Of course, if D did not lose control on account of any such conduct, or if a reasonable man would not have done as he did, then the defence will still fail.
D must lose control on account of the provocation. This means that incidents which have occurred well before the time of the killing are unlikely to be capable of being provocation in themselves. However, evidence of such incidents may be very important in explaining why the most immediate incident, which may in itself have seemed to be very trivial, should be regarded as provocation. This is sometimes called cumulative provocation. In Davies (above), for example, the lover’s apparently innocent conduct in walking down the street took on a totally different meaning when viewed in the light of a number of incidents arising out of D’s separation from V and which had taken place over the previous nine months.
Self induced provocation is also possible where the accused has acted or spoken in such a way that the predictable outcome of his behaviour is that his deeds or words will provoke the victim into attacking him physically or verbally, & the accused kills him.
R v Edwards [1973] (Privy Council):
- E visits the victim for the purpose of blackmailing him
- The victim attacks E with a knife
- A struggle ensues & E kills the victim
The Privy Council said: “On principle it seems reasonable to say –
(1) A blackmailer cannot rely on the predictable results of his own blackmailing conduct as constituting provocation ... & the predictable result may include a considerable degree of hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed ...
(2) but if the hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme lengths it might constitute sufficient provocation even for the blackmailer.
(3) There would be in many cases a question of degree to be decided by the jury”
D must have lost self-control on account of the provocation. This is the sudden, temporary loss of self-control. Evidence that some time elapsed between the last provocative act and D’s response (“cooling-off” time) will cast doubt on D’s assertion that he killed whilst suffering a loss of self-control.
Thornton [1992]: the Court of Appeal considered that, when directing the jury on provocation, the trial judge had been correct to emphasise the requirement for a sudden and temporary loss of self-control and that her behaviour indicated that though she had suffered threats of violence a relatively short time before she had cooled down by the time she killed her husband.
Thornton #2 [1995]: the court confirms that domestic violence is, in fact, evidence of diminished responsibility, not provocation.
There is no rule that the response must be immediate:
Baillie [1995]: it was accepted that D may not only have lost self-control immediately on being provoked but may also have remained out of control for some considerable time, during which the killing was committed. D had been drinking heavily when he was informed by his youngest son that the drug dealer who supplied all his sons was intending to punish them for switching to a different dealer. He immediately went into a rage, armed himself with a shotgun and razor, and drove to V’s house accompanied by his two older sons. He fired the shotgun when walking from the car to the house, seriously injured V with the razor and then, as V tried to escape, fired in his direction. Rather bizarrely, fragments of a wire mesh fence were blown out by the shotgun blast and killed V!
The 1957 Act places the responsibility for deciding whether a reasonable man would have done as D did entirely in the hands of the jury, repealing the previous common law rules, that the response be proportionate to the provocation. Of course, any jury can take these matters into account in deciding the issue, but the judge cannot direct them that the reasonable person would not have responded with the degree of violence in question, although the judge can tell the jury that if they think that the reasonable man would not have responded to the provocation with the level of violence used by D, then they should reject the defence.
DPP v Camplin [1978]: the House of Lords had held that the reasonable man must be regarded as having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the age and sex of D, and bearing such other characteristics of D as are relevant to the gravity of the provocation. Here the defendant was a 15 year old boy who had just been raped by his victim. However, the characteristic must not be ‘fault based’, e.g. glue sniffing, but see immediately below.
Morhall [1993]: the D’s characteristic of being addicted to glue-sniffing should have been attributed to the reasonable man since it was the specific target of the provocation from V. The House of Lords made it clear that the reasonable man test should be compared with the response of an ordinary person placed in the same situation as D. So now we had a “reasonable glue sniffer”!
So far it seems possible to say that the test now permits consideration of:
(1) sex, age and (im)maturity - the latter two factors may obviously affect capacity for self-control. So, in DPP v Camplin D’s age of 15 was regarded as relevant to his capacity for self-control when taunted by V about the sexual assault which V had just performed on him.;
(2) characteristics (permanent or otherwise) which are the specific target of the provocation - addiction to glue-sniffing (Morhall), attention-seeking traits (Humphreys), obsessiveness and eccentricity (Dryden [1995]);
(3) characteristics not the specific target of the provocation but which may have a general effect on powers of self-control - for example, retarded development (Raven [1982]). An important example may be the condition of “battered woman syndrome” which was recognised in Ahluwalia [1992] but held not to apply because no evidence of it had been introduced at the trial. In Thornton (No. 2) D’s conviction was quashed and a re-trial was ordered on the ground that she suffered from battered woman syndrome and that the resultant personality disorder was a characteristic which should have been explained to the jury as relevant to the response of the reasonable woman;
(4) the general background of relevant events for instance, the reasonable man, must be assumed to have experienced any earlier instances of provocative conduct which may have produced a cumulative effect.
R Smith (Morgan) [2000]: the House of Lords held that the jury is to take into account not only the characteristics of the defendant which are relevant to the gravity of the provocation, but also those which affected his powers of self-control. In other words, all sorts of behaviour were relevant. Lord Hoffman was a dissenter here, recognising that monsters had been created “reasonable glue sniffer” “ reasonable obsessive” “reasonable clinically depressed” and so on.
A decision that came out of the blue seems to have put an end to this sorry state of affaris and restored some sanity.
R v Holley [2005]. The decision is one of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Attorney-General of Jersey. Such decisions are not binding on English courts, merely persuasive. However, in this particular case the appeal was heard by a Board of nine judges, all members of the House of Lords, and by 6 votes to 3 the Board disapproved the majority judgement of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith [2000], and reaffirmed the decision in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996].Because it was considered that this latter case had been overruled by Morgan Smith, it does not appear in your manual. As it now looks like it is of great importance again, I have outlined the case immediately below this one.
In Holley a chronic alcoholic killed his girl-friend with an axe while under the influence of alcohol. He admitted the killing but claimed provocation. The Court of Appeal of Jersey allowed his appeal from his conviction for murder and substituted a verdict of manslaughter. The Attorney-General of Jersey appealed against this decision to the Privy Council (not in fact seeking to restore the original verdict, the defendant having already gone through two trials and two appeals, but to clarify the law). and reaffirmed the decision in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996]. Delivering the majority judgement, Lord Nicholls said the majority view in Morgan Smith was inconsistent with the clear language of the statute, and was therefore erroneous.
The partial defence of provocation involves two elements, one subjective and the other objective. In determining whether in fact the defendant was provoked, the jury should take into account all the relevant evidence, including evidence of any mental or other abnormality making it more or less likely that he lost his self-control. If the defendant was taunted on account of his intoxication, that may be a relevant matter for the jury to take into account when assessing the gravity of the taunt to the defendant. But in determining (in the language of s3 Homicide Act 1957) “whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did” the jury must consider the effect of that provocation on a person of the same age and sex as the defendant, but with ordinary powers of self-control. In some cases (such as Morhall [1995]) that might mean a glue-sniffer with ordinary powers of self-control, but the jury should not at this point take into account any individual peculiarities such as mental abnormality (which can be more appropriately dealt with through a defence of diminished responsibility) or intoxication.
There is a good article concerning this case to be found in the New Law Journal, 17th February 2006. pages 258-259. It’s in the library.
Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996]. This is another decision of the Privy Council, the original offence having been committed in Hong Kong. The defendant was charged with murder and claimed both provocation and diminished responsibility. He said that following a fall that had knocked him out some time before, he had several times lost his self-control in response to only minor provocation. He now appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge had not referred to this injury when directing the jury on provocation, but the Privy Council dismissed his appeal. Any mental infirmity on the defendant’s part, said Lord Goff, that reduced his powers of self-control below those of an ordinary person, could not be ascribed to the ordinary person for the purposes of the objective test.
There have been three cases that have reached the Court of Appeal since the Privy Council decision in Holley (above).
Mohammed [2005]: the Court of Appeal applied the decision in Holley, rather than Smith (Morgan). The defendant had contended that his temperament, influenced as it may have been by his religious and cultural beliefs, as well as possibly by a violent disposition, should be taken into account when considering whether his conduct could be excused within the objectives test. The court rejected this view, applying the “constant, objective standard” approved by the Privy Council in Holley. Thus, in applying the objective test, the defendant’s temperament was relevant to the gravity of the provocation, but not to the issue of his capacity for self control. Neither the prosecution or defence tried to suggest that the law was other than that stated by the Privy Council.
The law on this tangle of provocation now seems to have been settled by the cases of
R v James and R v Karimi [2006]. These two appeals were heard together because each turns on the true interpretation of s3 Homicide Act 1957. The court has sat five strong because they raise a novel and important question of the law relating to precedent. Should this court accept that the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] has effectively overruled the decision of the House of Lords in R v Smith (Morgan) [2001]? The Court of Appeal decided that the decision in Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 has overruled R v Smith. However, this was not to be taken as a licence to decline to follow decisions of the House of Lords in any other circumstances.
Neither case has been appealed to the House of Lords, s it seems that the status quo has been restored. A reasonable man is you and I, not somefool with his head stuck in a bag of glue.
We then turned to the defence of diminished responsibility. This was introduced by s2 HOMICIDE ACT 1957. It is quite separate from insanity, and was introduced to compensate for the difficulties in the M’Naghten rules on insanity. Like provocation, it applies only to persons charged with murder and it provides only a partial defence.
The basic definition is in s2(1) which states that D may be guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter;
“if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions.”
An abnormality is simply a state of mind which the reasonable man would consider abnormal, therefore it is very wide & covers many conditions not covered by the insanity defence.
R v Byrne [1960]: Byrne strangled his victim & mutilated her body. He claimed that he was subject to an irresistible or almost irresistible impulse because of perverted sexual desires which overcame him & had done so since he was a boy. At Birmingham Assizes a defence of diminished responsibility was raised, but it failed. He appealed on the grounds of a misdirection in the Judge’s summing up. The conviction was quashed. The Trial Judge had said that s2 Homicide Act 1957 was not relevant. The defence covers the mind’s activities in all its aspects & the ability to control one’s physical acts, including an irresistible impulse situation.
Abnormality of Mind has been held to cover:
- Severe Shock
- Depression (common in mercy killing & battered wife syndrome)
The disease element excludes drink & drugs, but does cover disease caused by long term alcohol or drug abuse.
We will continue this after the holidays.
Have a great Christmas and New Year, and I will see you on 4 January.
