Criminal Law

Friday, November 24, 2006

Thursday 23 November 2006

After watching a short DVD concerning the famous case of R v Dudley & Stephens we turned to the actus reus of secondary participation.

AID means to give some assistance either before or at the time of the commission of the offence (for instance, by supplying weapons or a car, or by driving the perpetrators to the scene, stopping help getting to the victim of an attack and so on). It does not require the perpetrator to be aware of the assistance and, therefore, need not cause him to commit the crime. A good example can be found in Bainbridge [1959] (below) where D supplied cutting equipment to be used in a theft from a bank.

To ABET and to COUNSEL involve giving advice and encouragement and, obviously, require some communication between perpetrator and secondary party, even if the perpetrator would have committed the offence anyway. They seem to be distinguished only by the time at which they occur - counselling is advice and encouragement away from the scene of the crime, abetting is at the scene of the crime. In Calhaem [1985] D was convicted of counselling a murder by hiring a private detective to carry out the killing under her instructions. The private detective alleged that he had never intended to kill V but had done so in a panic when confronting V for the purposes of making a pretence of carrying out the plan. D’s conviction was upheld because the killing was within the scope of the authority which she had given by her encouragement of it, even if not directly caused by that encouragement.

To PROCURE involves striving to bring about the commission of the offence by the perpetrator, whether or not the perpetrator is aware of what the secondary party is doing. The usual explanation offered is “to prduce by endeavour”, but that seems a bit woolly to me. To procure means wanting something to occur and taking all the steps necessary to bring it about. In A-G’s Reference No. 1 of 1975f, it was held that D could have been guilty as a procurer of the offence of driving with excess alcohol when he “spiked” his friend’s drink with alcohol, knowing that his friend would subsequently drive his car.

A person does not generally become a secondary party to an offence merely by witnessing its commission and doing nothing to prevent it: Clarkson [1971]. Here the D was not guilty of aiding or abetting a rape when he stumbled across the offence and stayed to witness it. See also Coney [1882] where D’s conviction for aiding and abetting an illegal prize fight merely by being a spectator was quashed because his simple presence was not enough.

We then turned to the mens rea of secondary participation. This is not easy to define with absolute confidence. What I can say is that the mens rea is distinct from that of the perpetrator. For instance, though a perpetrator must intend death or serious injury to be guilty of murder, D may be a secondary party to murder if he knows that he is assisting or encouraging a person who possesses, or may possess, that intention, whether or not he himself wants death or serious injury to occur: Ward [1987].

It need not be the purpose of the secondary party that the offence be committed. It is sufficient that he knows that what he is doing will assist or encourage the perpetrator: DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975].

When giving assistance, encouragement and so on to the perpetrator, D must know either the facts which would make the perpetrator guilty of a particular offence or the facts which would make him guilty of one or more of a limited range of offences. Though D may well have some particular offence in mind, so that he could specify precise details of the date, time, location and victim, such detailed knowledge is not required (for instance, the particular bank which is to be robbed: Bainbridge [1959].

Once a secondary party has given the assistance or encouragement, he is “in the hands” of the perpetrator. He cannot be absolutely certain what the outcome will be. This is especially evident in the case of the aider, counsellor or procurer who is not present at the scene of the crime. An important issue arises. For what exactly is the secondary party liable? In particular, what if results occur which D not only did not intend but which he did not even foresee?

In a nutshell, the answer is that the secondary participant will be liable for all the things that occur by accident, but not for those things that happen intentionally, unless those things were within the scope of the joint enterprise or contemplated as such.

It was held by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu [1984] that where D engages in a joint enterprise, he will be liable not only for anything to which he expressly or impliedly assents but also for that which he contemplates.

In Hyde and Others [1990], H, S and C took part in an attack on D, in the course of which one of them delivered what was described as, in effect, a “place kick” to D’s head. This crushed the front of his skull and led to his death some months later. It was not possible to identify with certainty which of the three had delivered the fatal kick but the prosecution argued that all were equally responsible for murder, either because all intended serious injury or because each knew that that was the intention of the others when he took part. Upholding their convictions for murder, the Court of Appeal said:

“If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may kill or intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to participate with A in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient mental element for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the requisite intent, kills in the course of the venture … B has in those circumstances lent himself to the enterprise and by so doing he has given assistance and encouragement to A in carrying out an enterprise which B realises may involve murder”.

In R v Greatrex and Bates [1999] the Court of Appeal decided that a secondary party is not liable for acts of the principal offender which are fundamentally different from those he foresaw. In the two defendants were involved, with other youths, in an attack on the victim, whom they kicked violently. B also used an iron bar and it was from a blow by B with the iron bar that the victim died. The judge directed that in the case of each defendant the jury could convict only if they were sure that there was a shared intention to cause really serious bodily harm. G appealed on the basis that he neither intended nor foresaw the act (the blow with an iron bar) which caused the. death and that he did not know of the existence of the weapon by which it was caused. The court held:

(1) The question of whether the acts of one participant in a concerted attack were outside the common purpose was one of degree.
(2) If the acts of one party are so fundamentally different from those of the others as to be regarded as outside the common purpose, each of the others can he regarded as parties to those acts only if he foresaw such acts.

Note that the doctrine of transferred malice applies in secondary liability so that D is liable on the same basis as X. However, the doctrine was held not to apply in the celebrated case of Saunders and Archer [1573]. There D1, acting on the advice of D2, gave his wife a poisoned apple with the intention of killing her. She ate a small portion of it, and gave the rest to their child, and the child died. D1 was guilty of murder, but D2 was not an accomplice on the facts of the particular case. The court accepted that, by failing to intervene when the apple was passed to the child in the presence of D1, D1 had acted outside the scope of the agreement.

If a statute is created with the purpose of protecting a defined class, e.g. a girl under 16, a member of that class, a victim, cannot be guilty of accomplice liability in that instance. In Tyrrell [1894], a girl under the age of 16 was found not guilty of aiding and abetting a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her.

It is possible for a potential secondary party to withdraw from the enterprise and so avoid liability if this is done in a sufficiently unequivocal manner (though there would still remain the possibility of liability for inchoate offences such as incitement and attempt). Inevitably, the further advanced the execution of the crime, the more extreme the action required to withdraw.

In Becerra [1975] however, D’s shout of “Let’s go”, followed by his actual flight, was not enough when X stabbed and killed a person who had disturbed them in the midst of a violent burglary. Here, withdrawal would have needed, at the least, some warning to the victim or, even, some attempt by D physically to protect the victim.

Police officers and others who involve themselves in plans to commit crime as a way of gaining evidence about those crimes and the participants must be careful that they do not leave themselves open to conviction as perpetrators or secondary parties. A distinction is sometimes drawn between merely joining in an enterprise which has already been designed or is in progress (no liability for secondary participation) and actually setting up some criminal enterprise (as where policemen, convinced that X is a distributor of drugs, go to him with a plan to import drugs) - in this case, there may be liability.

The next topic was vicarious liability, far less important than when studying the law of tort.

Vicarious liability means that one person may be legally responsible for the actions of another. Historically, in civil law, it was applied to the relationship between master and servant, and has more recently been used in the context of the employer/employee relationship. In criminal law, it applies to a wider variety of relationships. Today, vicarious liability for criminal offences can arise in one of two ways:

(a) In what is sometimes known as cases of EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION the law may simply deem the actions of an employee to be those of the employer. This is the result of an extended construction of certain verbs that appear in criminal statutes. It commonly occurs where something is being sold; see, for example Coppen v Moore (No. 2) [1898]. The accused, who owned a number of shops (and therefore could not be present in all of them for all of the time), was convicted of selling goods bearing a false trade description. Contrary to his instructions, one of the assistants had sold an American ham as a “Scotch” ham. It is probably correct that, under this principle, only the employee’s act can be imputed to the employer. Thus the employer can only be criminally liable if he has mens rea; otherwise, it is confined to strict liability offences.

(b) The principle of DELEGATION fixes the delegator with liability for the delegatee’s acts and mental element and is especially useful to the prosecution in connection with crimes which can only be committed by those persons who come within a particular class. See e.g. the LICENSING ACTS. Thus, if a licensee delegates his responsibilities as licensee to another, and the delegatee acts in breach of one of those delegated responsibilities, the delegatee’s acts and state of mind are imputed to the delegator.

Vicarious liability only arises where there has been complete delegation of responsibilities. Thus, the licensee must have delegated all his managerial duties to another; see Vane v Yiannopoullos [1964]. The House of Lords there held that a restaurateur was not guilty of what would now be knowingly selling intoxicants to unpermitted persons. One of the waitresses, contrary to the restaurateur’s instructions, sold an intoxicant to a customer who was not having a meal. The restaurateur had gone to the basement at the time, but he had not delegated control of the restaurant to the waitress. By a three to two majority in the House of Lords it was held that there was only a partial delegation, which was not sufficient for a conviction.

Next week we begin with a look at the criminal liability of corporations.

Saturday, November 18, 2006

Thursday 16 November 2006

We began by looking at duress. In Ortiz [1986] the Court of Appeal said: “the essence of [this] defence is that the will of the subject of the threats is no longer entirely under his own control because of the fear engendered by those threats.”

In duress, the harmful consequence which D seeks to avoid must be death or serious injury to himself or others. The threat to inflict such injury must be made with the specific aim of compelling D to commit an offence - Cole [1994] (below) - and must be “immediate” or “imminent” in the sense that it could be carried out immediately, so that D has no opportunity to avoid it in any other way than by committing the offence.

His response must have been such as might be expected of an ordinary person of reasonable courage and firmness but otherwise sharing D’s characteristics (an objective test).

In Valderrama-Vega [1987] D may have been impelled to bring drugs into the UK for X because of threats of death and serious injury to himself and his mother, threats to disclose his homosexuality and because of general financial difficulties he was experiencing. It was held that only the first threats were sufficient for duress but that they would remain so even if D acted for a mixture of reasons, as long as he would not have done so without the first threats.

The threats may be made against D or anyone else. The questions are whether D’s will was overborne and whether that of a reasonable man would have been.

The requirement that there be no other course of action open to D has not always been interpreted by the courts quite as might have been expected. In R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] the defendants were two young women who lied in giving evidence in a criminal trial because of threats made to them by friends of the person on trial. At first instance the trial judge said that the defence of duress was not available to them because they could have sought the protection of the court and, thus, the threats could not have been carried out immediately. However, on appeal, their convictions were quashed because they genuinely felt under compulsion at the time. Account was taken of the fact that they were young and that any protection would have been of limited duration so that they would have been vulnerable in the days ahead.

In Hasan [2005] Lord Bingham doubted the correctness of the above decision because of the lack of immediacy.

In Cole, D’s defence failed where it appeared that threats by moneylenders to cause serious injury to D and D’s girlfriend and baby if money was not repaid were not accompanied by an insistence that he commit the building society robberies with which he was charged. There was an insufficient link between the duress and the offences and the “imminence” requirement was not satisfied.

Although duress may be a complete defence to most crimes, it will not be a defence to either murder or attempt murder - Howe [1987] and Gotts [1992] respectively. Their Lordships based the decision on the need to protect the lives of ordinary and innocent people, the D should have to sacrifice his own life rather than knowingly cause the loss of life of another.

Before HOWE, it had been held by the House of Lords in DPP for NI v Lynch [1975] that duress could be pleaded by a D charged with aiding and abetting murder (although, on the facts, the defence failed).

D may be denied the defence where he has been in some way at fault in associating himself with those whom he knows might bring pressure on him to commit an offence. This situation developed in the context of terrorist organisations (for example, Fitzpatrlck [1977] in which duress was not available as a defence to robbery committed under IRA threats because D had voluntarily joined the IRA) but was then applied to membership of any kind of criminal gang in Sharp [1987] where D had tried to withdraw from a conspiracy to rob after he discovered that guns were to be used. Under threat of being shot, he participated in the robbery in which V was killed. His defence of duress was rejected and his conviction for manslaughter was upheld.

More recently, the principle has been extended to voluntary association with an individual. So, in Ali [1995] D was unable to use duress as a defence to a robbery at a building society. D was a drug user who had agreed to sell drugs on for his dealer, X, and was in no doubt that X would behave violently if D did not hand over the proceeds of sale. When D failed to do so, X gave him a gun and told him to get the money by robbing a bank or building society.

A weird and infrequently used defence, but still in the syllabus, is marital coercion: s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925. This provides a defence for a wife charged with offence other than murder or treason if she can show that she carried out the crime in the presence of her husband and under his coercion. This puts the burden of proof on D, whereas previously it had been presumed that the wife was coerced.

It is unknown which fact situations would give rise to the defence. It is said to be wider than duress, & would cover such matters as a threat by the husband not to buy food for the wife & children, a threat of desertion, or a threat to bring a mistress into the marital home. The defence was rejected in Ditta and Others [1988] where the wife was acting out of loyalty. This is the most recent authority, so nothing to get excited about!

On three occasions, in 1978, 1989 & 1993 the Law Commission recommended abolition of the defence, but it still remains.

Duress of circumstances has recently been developed by the courts in a series of cases which, initially, all involved driving offences committed while under some external threat.:

Willer [1986]: D’s conviction for reckless driving (as it then was) was quashed because the judge had refused to leave the defence of necessity to the jury on evidence which showed that D may have driven onto a pavement to escape from a gang of youths threatening violence to himself and his passenger. However, somewhat confusingly, the Court characterised the defence as one of duress.

Conway [1989] established the defence of duress of circumstances. D drove recklessly to escape from two men who had approached his car. He did so because, 2 weeks earlier, his passenger had narrowly escaped serious injury when the target of an attack on another vehicle. His conviction was quashed even though the 2 men proved to be plain-clothed police officers. The Court of Appeal stated that the facts amounted to duress of circumstances; duress was an example of necessity; and that whether duress of circumstances was called duress or necessity did not matter.

Martin [1989]: D’s stepson was late for work. D’s wife, who had suicidal tendencies, threatened suicide if D did not drive his stepson to work. D was currently disqualified from driving. His conviction for driving whilst disqualified was quashed.

DPP v Bell [1992] D’s conviction for driving with excess alcohol was quashed when it was accepted that he had driven away from a public house to escape from a gang of men intent on injuring him and had stopped in a lay-by as soon as he believed himself to be out of danger.

Obviously, duress of circumstances is a defence with many of the characteristics of the defence of necessity. However, it is restricted to threats of death or serious injury whereas a general defence of necessity would simply weigh the harmful consequence sought to be avoided against the harm involved in the commission of the offence. In the USA this is recognised as a ‘choice of evils’.

SELF-DEFENCE & PREVENTION OF CRIME


Section 3 CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1967 provides:

A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.

This might be thought to have superseded any common law defence but the conventional view is that D may not always technically be acting “in the prevention of crime” when seeking to defend himself or others, since the attacker may not have mens rea, may be insane and so on and, thus, not guilty of an offence. However, the courts have gradually modified the common law defence so as to remove any special rules (for instance, those relating to a duty to “retreat” before striking a blow in self-defence) which could have distinguished the common law from the statutory defence - Julien [1969].

Thus, though there may be two defences, their rules are essentially the same and the use of force will be reasonable if two conditions are satisfied:

§ that the use of some force is necessary - this question must be answered in relation to the facts as they actually were or in relation to the facts as D believed them to be, even if he was mistaken. Any mistake as to the facts (which could be about whether any attack was taking place, or about the amount of force being used in the attack, or both) merely has to be genuine. It does not have to be reasonable – look back at the defence of mistake with regard to Beckford, Gladstone Williams.

§ the use of the actual force must be justifiable - this is an objective test, how would it be perceived by a reasonable person?”.

There has been considerable controversy in the past few years, with allegations that the Police and Crown Prosecution Service have been far too willing to prosecute innocent citizens who were merely defending themselves (or, more usually, their property) from attack. Moved by adverse publicity accorded to official response to some of these incidents, in 1995 the Home Secretary went so far as to request that the police and prosecuting authorities should show more sympathy to those acting in self-defence or prevention of crime in such circumstances.

Passions were particularly aroused by the finding in the civil case Revill v Newbery [1996] where the D, a 76 year old man, was liable in negligence to pay compensation to V, whom he had shot and injured when V tried to break into D’s allotment shed. When he fired his shotgun from inside the shed, D could not see V and did not know that he was directly in front of the door. D was convicted of criminal offences in connection with the incident but, though prosecuted for wounding V, D was acquitted. These incidents raise very clearly the difficulties surrounding application of the objective test.

Unlike duress, there is no restriction on the offences to which self-defence can be a defence. In particular, the defence can be, and often is, pleaded to a charge of murder. However, if D kills when using more force than is justifiable, even though some force was necessary, he will lose the defence entirely and will be convicted of murder, not merely of manslaughter. This proposition was starkly illustrated in the case of Clegg [1995], where a British soldier serving in Northern Ireland had shot at a car which had broken through a checkpoint and had killed a passenger. He was adjudged to have used excessive force since the danger to himself and his comrades had passed and he had not sought to suggest that he believed himself to be dealing with terrorists who might be going on to commit serious offences (in fact, they were merely joyriders, but the House of Lords decision provoked some subsequent controversy over D’s actual beliefs on this point). The House of Lords declined to recognise a ‘half-way house’ defence in which D could be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder when using excessive force in circumstances where some force was justified. Accordingly, D’s conviction for murder was upheld. He was released from prison a relatively short time afterwards, remains in the Army, and has been since promoted.

We then changed tack completely, to look at PARTICIPATION IN CRIME.

A person may participate in crime:

as a principal offender - that is, as the person who actually commits the actus reus with the appropriate mens rea (if any is required);
as secondary party (accomplice) - that is, as a person who in some way renders assistance to the perpetrator in the commission of the crime without actually committing the actus reus of the crime itself. There can be no liability as a secondary party unless an offence has actually been committed by a perpetrator (there are three exceptions which follow). However, where no offence has been committed, a person who might otherwise have been guilty as a secondary party may be guilty of either of the inchoate offences of incitement and conspiracy. Additionally, if the perpetrator gets to the stage of committing an attempt, the other person can be guilty as a secondary party to that attempt.

It is necessary to make the distinction between perpetrators and secondary parties because, for example:

secondary participation in an offence requires proof of actus reus and mens rea elements which are different from those required for proof as a perpetrator of the offence;
even in strict liability offences the secondary party must have mens rea;
a person cannot be vicariously liable for secondary participation.

A principal is one who commit the crime by virtue of engaging in the commission of the actus reus with the appropriate mens rea. In the crime of murder, the perpetrator is the one who shoots or stabs or batters the victim. In the crime of theft, the perpetrator is the one who takes the money or drives away the car or takes the food out of the supermarket without paying for it.

However, it is quite possible for there to be more than one perpetrator arising out of the same incident. If two or more beat a victim to death, they are all guilty of murder as perpetrators. If they do so independently and no joint enterprise can be established by proof of prior agreement or deduced from their actions, then the Crown will have to make out the case separately against each - Petters and Parfitt [1995].

It is also possible for a person to be a perpetrator through the innocent agency of another. So, an adult who exploits a child under ten years old by getting the child to ‘steal’, himself commits the theft since the child is too young to be guilty of any offence Manley [1844], for example.

The situation does not arise simply because the ‘principal’ has a defence. If a postman delivers a parcel bomb no-one would think of charging him as an offender, but the person who sent the parcel would be a principal offender. In STRINGER [1991] the defendant dishonestly sent bogus invoices through a firm’s accounting system & as a result money was transferred to him. He was held to be guilty of theft as a principal because he was responsible for what the accounts staff had done in appropriating what he intended to steal.

A secondary party is one who gives some advice, encouragement or assistance to the perpetrator before or at the time of the commission of the offence or who acts to bring about the commission of the offence. Section 8 ACCESSORIES AND ABETTORS ACT 1861 provides:

Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence … shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

A similar provision in s44 MAGISTRATES’ COURTS ACT 1980 extends liability for secondary participation to summary offences.

The penalties for a secondary party is identical to that of the principal. No better example of this can be seen from the famous case of Craig & Bentley [1952]. The accused who killed (Craig) could not be hanged because he was under age. The secondary party, by virtue of s8, is liable to be punished as a principal & was hanged.

The original view of this legislation was that it created two broad ways of secondary participation, namely, to counsel or procure and to aid and abet.

Persons who aid, abet, counsel or procure are now described as secondary parties or accomplices, no matter when they do so. In practice, offenders are usually charged as “aid & abet” or “counsel & procure”, but the courts have decided to pursue a more complicated scheme.

In A-G’s REFERENCE (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] the Court of Appeal insisted that since Parliament had used four different terms then it must be possible to attribute distinct meanings to them all. Thus, it should be possible to assert that the party was an aider or abettor or counsellor or procurer.

D’s conviction as a secondary party depends upon an offence having been committed by a perpetrator - Vaux [1951], but not upon the conviction of a perpetrator, who may not have been apprehended or who may have been acquitted because of some failure of evidence.

There are three occasions where a principal is not required, namely:

(1) An innocent agent: Manley (above).
(2) Principal has a defence: Bourne (1952) where the defendant is forced to have sex with the family Alsatian under the threat of death or serious injury from her husband (duress). The defence is not available here to the secondary party.

(3) The defendant lacks mens rea: Millward [1994]. X, under instructions from his employer, D, towed a trailer on a main road with D’s tractor. The tractor’s hitch was poorly maintained, the trailer became detached during the journey and hit a car and killed a passenger. X was charged with causing death by reckless driving (as it then was) and D with procuring the offence. The recklessness alleged was the state of the hitch mechanism. X was acquitted but D was convicted.

We’ll begin next week with looking at the actus reus of secondary participation.

Friday, November 10, 2006

Thursday 9 November 2006

We continued with our look at defences with the defence of automatism. Described by Lawton LJ in R v Quick [1973] as “a quagmire of law seldom entered into nowadays save by those in desperate need of some kind of defence.”

Since the actus reus must be a voluntary act a defendant will have a good defence if he can show that he was not in control of his bodily movements, i.e. his mind was not in control of his bodily movements, e.g. a reflex or spasm. The defence is available to any criminal charge. In Hill v Baxter [1958] the judge asserted that it would be automatism if the defendant were to be attacked by a swarm of bees whilst driving and unable to control his limbs because of bee stings (obiter).

Remember, a simple distinction between automatism and insanity can be explained as:

AUTOMATISM – the defence is available if the offence is committed because of an external factor.

INSANITY – the defence is available if the offence is caused by an internal factor.

To raise this defence D must present evidence of a fundamental loss of control not merely a partial loss as might occur when a person’s movements are poorly co-ordinated through tiredness, illness or drink. Consequently. it was held in A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] that D’s claim to ‘have been driving without awareness’ (an allegedly trance-like state caused by prolonged driving on featureless motorway’s) and during which he had collided with two vehicles on the hard shoulder and killed two people could not amount to automatism. There was no evidence of total destruction of control, merely impaired, reduced or partial control.

In R v T [1990] a Crown Court judge allowed D’s plea of automatism to charges of robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm to go before the jury on evidence that she had been raped three days before the offences were committed and that this had resulted in post traumatic stress disorder during which she had acted without conscious mind or will. The rape was presumably regarded as a precipitating external factor.

It must not be supposed that D will inevitably be acquitted if the evidence shows that he was acting involuntarily at the time of the offence. If D was in some way at fault in becoming an a automaton then he may still be liable. Thus, a person who is an automaton through drink or drugs voluntarily taken will be subject to the rules on intoxication. In Lipman [1969] where D killed his girlfriend while suffering hallucinations caused by taking LSD, the fact that he was an automaton merely helped to establish that he did not have the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm required for murder (an offence of specific intent). It did not enable him to escape conviction for manslaughter (an offence of basic intent).

A person who is at fault in some way not involving involuntary intoxication will not be restricted to pleading automatism to specific intent offences but may still be liable it the prosecution can prove that, at the time when he could have prevented himself becoming an automaton, he had an appropriate mental state in relation to the offence which he later allegedly committed.

In Hardie [1984] the Court of Appeal heard that the defendant was distressed by the breakdown of his relationship with V, D had taken about five valium (tranquilliser) tablets prescribed for V some eight years before. He had then set fire to a wardrobe in their bedroom. His defence of automatism on account of the effects of the valium was rejected by the judge on the grounds that his voluntary intoxication could provide no defence to the basic intent criminal damage offence with which he was charged. Allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal considered that voluntary consumption of valium, a sedative or soporific drug not known by D or by the public in general to promote aggressive behaviour or incapacity to appreciate risks, did not fall within the rules on voluntary intoxication. Therefore, the Court considered the jury should have been directed to consider whether D was reckless in taking the valium. Yet it concluded rather lamely, “we are unable to say what would have been the appropriate direction with regard to the elements of recklessness in this case …”

Note that the prosecution will not be obliged to disprove a plea of automatism unless D introduces some credible evidence to support it. If D does not do so, the jury will be told to disregard it. Where, according to the rules discussed above the prosecution fails to show beyond reasonable doubt that D was acting voluntarily (that is, where the plea of automatism succeeds), D is entitled to a complete acquittal.

From a practical point of view, counsel has to choose between advising a client to:

plead guilty & possibly get a light sentence, or
plead automatism, and risk the route to insanity opening up.

A far more important defence, common to most offences of violence is that of intoxication. I drew a flowchart on the board which I cannot replicate here. You should try to get a copy from a fellow student who was present.

The rules apply to drink, drugs and any other substance commonly perceived as producing the effects associated with drink and drugs, e.g. lighter fluid, white spirit etc.

The law is confused as there are two conflicting principles involved. The first is the need to punish people who have acted wrongly; whilst on the other hand accepting that an accused who is intoxicated may not realise what he is doing and is not, therefore, deserving of punishment. Hmm…

A distinction is drawn between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he knew he was ingesting intoxicants even though he may have been mistaken as to their strength - Allen [1989] - D intentionally drank wine and was held to be voluntarily intoxicated despite his claim not to have been aware of its high alcoholic content. A person is involuntarily intoxicated if he was unaware that he was ingesting intoxicants, as where, for instance, he drinks a “soft” drink “spiked” with alcohol or eats a piece of cake containing a hallucinogenic drug.

Assuming a medicine to be known by D or generally to be known to be capable of producing effects equivalent to intoxication, then D will be involuntarily intoxicated if he takes it in accordance with medical instruction. Though the point is not absolutely clear he will be regarded as voluntarily intoxicated if he takes medicine not prescribed for him or not in accordance with instructions.

As confirmed by the House of Lords in DPP v Majewski [1976], offences are divided into two categories, specific intent on the one hand, basic intent on the other.

Specific intent offences are satisfied by proof of nothing less than an intention. They include murder, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm, theft and robbery.

Basic intent offences are satisfied by proof of recklessness and include manslaughter, inflicting grievous bodily harm and lesser forms of assault/battery, and criminal damage.

Anyone charged with a specific intent offence may introduce evidence of intoxication in asserting that, at the time of the offence, he did not have the required intention. This does not mean that anyone who was drunk inevitably avoids liability for such an offence. The effect of the intoxication must be evaluated by the jury and the accused avoids liability if it tends to show that he did not form the intention. As is well known, intoxication often simply makes people more aggressive or less inhibited and, if this was the case, it would not assist D.

Anyone charged with a basic intent offence is simply not allowed to introduce evidence of intoxication to explain why he was not aware of a risk (was not reckless). Consequently, if he has no other independent argument to advance, it is almost certain that he will be convicted. A person who raises evidence of intoxication to avoid conviction for a specific intent offence will inevitably be convicted of any associated basic intent offence.

The rationale expressed by the House of Lords in Majewski for denying the defence of intoxication in basic intent offences was that the drunkenness itself supplies the evidence of the mens rea since it is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is enough to constitute the mens rea in a basic intent offence.

A person who is involuntarily intoxicated is allowed to introduce evidence of such intoxication as he would be allowed to introduce any other evidence to refute existence of mens rea so this is not restricted to specific intent crimes. However, the effect of the intoxication must be that D did not form the required mens rea, not merely that D would not have formed it but for the intoxication. This was established by the House of Lords in Kingston [1994]. D was in a business dispute with Y, who engaged X to lure D into a trap so that he could be blackmailed into resolving the dispute. D had paedophiliac homosexual tendencies and was invited by X, who also had such tendencies, to participate in the sexual abuse of a boy of 15 whom X had brought to his flat and drugged. D was photographed and taped abusing the unconscious boy. The plan was then for X to supply this evidence to Y. Both D and X were charged with indecent assault. A search of X’s flat revealed the presence of sedative drugs and it was argued that X had added some to a drink given to the boy. D claimed that he, too, had been given such a drink and that he had no recollection of anything after seeing the boy lying on the bed until he woke in his own home the next morning. D sought to claim that, though he knew what he was doing, he would not have done it but for the involuntary intoxication. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal which had held that there was no true mens rea because “a man is not responsible for a condition produced by stratagem of fraud of another”. Their Lordships were disturbed by how this principle would fit into current approaches to “irresistible impulse”, were fearful of the difficulties of evidence and proof which its adoption would create and preferred to allow justice to be served by appropriate adjustments of sentence.

The rule in Majewski does not apply where a statute provides that a particular belief will be a good defence - Jaggard v Dickinson [1980] and s5(2) CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971 which provides a potential defence to a charge of criminal damage to property where D acted with a “lawful excuse”; (later). In this case D acted with a lawful excuse because she believed (in her drunken state) that she had the consent, of the person she thought capable of giving valid consent, to damage the property. This provides an exception to the general rule that “a drunken mistake is still a mistake”. We will look at the statute and the case in further detail much later.

Note that, in the highly unlikely event that D forms the intention to commit and offence, deliberately becomes intoxicated to gain courage to do so, and then commits it whilst so intoxicated as not to have the intention, his original intention will suffice - A-G for N Ireland v Gallagher [1963] - ‘Dutch courage’.

Note also that persistent intoxication may give rise to degenerative changes which can be regarded as a disease of the mind and so give rise to a plea of insanity and that, in some cases, it may be a foundation for the defence to a charge of murder of diminished responsibility - Tandy [1989]. The fact that the disease is caused by drunkenness is irrelevant.

A defendant’s plea of mistake is generally either:

a denial of mens rea or
an assertion that had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would have had a defence to the crime with which he is charged.

Mistake or ignorance of the law will not absolve a defendant: Bailey [1800].

The leading case is the decision of the House of Lords in DPP v Morgan [1975] that D would not be guilty of rape if he genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believed that V consented to sexual intercourse. The reasonableness of his mistake was relevant only to the credibility of his assertion that he had made the mistake. Before this case, courts were apt to require any mistake to be reasonable no matter what the mental element for the crime. Of course, if the mistake results from intoxication, then D will not be allowed to introduce this explanation if the offence is one of basic intent. So, the jargon to remember is:

The mistake as to a fact does not have to be reasonable, just honestly held. So the more bizarre the story offered, the less likely it is to be believed. Good examples can be found in:

Gladstone Williams [1983], where M witnessed a youth snatching a woman’s handbag, chased after him, caught him and knocked him to the ground. D, who then came on the scene, was told by M that he (M) was arresting the youth and that he was a police officer (which he was not). D asked M to produce his warrant card, but of course he could not do so. A struggle then ensued between them during which D punched M. Quashing his conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the Court of Appeal held that D would lack the necessary mens rea if, on the facts as he mistakenly believed them to be, he was entitled to use reasonable force either in self-defence or in prevention of crime. The reason for this was that the mens rea is the intent to use unlawful force on another person.

Beckford [1987] B, an armed police officer, went to investigate a report of an armed and dangerous man terrorising his family. The Crown alleged that B and another shot and killed the man who was in fact unarmed. B claimed that the man had fired at the police and had been shot by them when they returned fire. The Privy Council quashed B’s conviction for murder, and held that the plea was one of self-defence based on a mistake as to the facts. In such a case, as stated in Williams (above) the accused had to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be. As long as no more than reasonable force was used in those (mistakenly) perceived circumstances, there was no criminal liability.

Tolson [1889] is presents an obstacle to the construction of any coherent theory of the effect of mistake in criminal law. D married again some five years after her husband had deserted her and had been reported to have drowned at sea. In fact, he was still alive and D could not come within the statutory defence to bigamy which required continual absence for seven years. D’s conviction was quashed but only because her mistake was reasonable, the Court asserting that the common law only allowed a defence of mistake if it was honest and reasonable.

Even so, there are situations in which a mistake of law may prevent D from having the mens rea required for the offence. For instance, theft requires a dishonest appropriation of another’s property. According to the THEFT ACT 1968 s2(1)(a), a person is not dishonest if he believes that in law he has the right to the property. So, a misinterpretation of the law by D which leads him to believe that he is the owner of property currently in V’s possession will mean that he is not dishonest when he appropriates it.

A similar proviso appears in the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971. We’ll cover both later.

NECESSITY = no choice
DURESS = forced by other
DURESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES = forced by circumstance
SELF DEFENCE = forced by third party

At first glance they seem to have little to do with one another, but at the end I will provide examples that seem to suggest a less than coherent approach by the judiciary.

In all these defences, D claims that when he committed the alleged offence, he had to make a choice between two courses of action, to commit the offence or to allow some other harmful consequence to occur. He claims that the nature of the harmful consequence was such that, in reality, he was compelled to stop it happening by committing the offence. His will was overborne. The broad concept, of which the other two are more restricted examples, is necessity, but the courts have been reluctant to accept any general defence of necessity and have been more prepared to develop the narrower forms of duress and duress of circumstances.

In a general defence of necessity, D would be entitled to argue that his decision to commit any crime was excused or justified by the need to avert an even more harmful consequence. It would be necessary to show that there was no other way of achieving this and that the other consequence was significantly more harmful than the commission of the offence itself. You could argue that this is a definition of duress of circumstances! Judges have never been able to bring themselves to acknowledge this broad proposition.

They rejected it in the very unusual case of Dudley and Stephens (1884) where D1 and D2 killed and fed on the cabin boy (Parker) when set adrift after a shipwreck. Ten days after killing the boy, they were rescued by a passing ship. They were charged with murder and, even after a special verdict, were found guilty (although the death sentence was commuted). Parker had not volunteered to die, and he might have lived had he been allowed to eat one of the others. It was said that the accused had no defence, but it is not certain as to what they had no defence. There are three views:

there is no general defence of necessity in criminal law.
necessity is no defence to murder.
on the facts given necessity simply did not arise.

There is a god file on my internet site covering this case. Whatever the true view, the development of the law has been impeded. Note:

The facts of the case are peculiar. It was an emergency requiring immediate action on the facts as the defendants believed them to be. Even Parker’s relatives thought that the defendants should not be blamed.
The courts are reluctant to grant a defence where there is some immorality. The weakest had been selected for killing, whereas the issue was that people were under a duty to sacrifice their lives.
Because of the extreme circumstances it was no deterrent to punish the defendants.
To convict in these circumstances was above a standard of reasonable people, it was nearer to saintliness.
In a US decision, US v Holmes [1846], the court held that there should have been a selection by lot. It is interesting to note that the defendants in this case were sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, the same as in Dudley v Stephens.

We also discussed situations occurring in the Zeebrugge disaster and the Andes mountains where, in both cases, the English law would argue against the necessity of saving lives at the risk of losing other lives.

In the conjoined twins case Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2000] the judge in the Court of Appeal quoted the three conditions necessary for a defence of necessity to operate:

(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil, and
(ii) no more should be done than reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved, and
(iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.

This was not the case in Dudley & Stephens (above) as it meant the taking of innocent life.

We will begin with duress next week.

Friday, November 03, 2006

Thursday 2 November 2006

We continued with a talk on offences of strict liability. In Gammon v A-G of Hong Kong [1985], Lord Scarman set out a framework for determining whether the presumption in favour of mens rea is displaced in any particular crime. Some of them seem to make more sense than others, as inconsistency creeps in.

(1) The presumption is particularly strong where the offence is “truly criminal”. What does that mean? Serious, perhaps all, offences against the person would be so regarded. Which others would? No problem with rape, murder and theft. But some violations involving strict liability offences can be very serious, e.g. a victim may be killed as a result of speeding.
(2) It applies to statutory crimes and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute. Clearly, the words of the statute will be very important and the following may be factors:

(a) some words import mens rea, e.g. “knowingly” does, “permits” may do, as may “wilfully”, but “causes” does not. See: Alphacell v Woodward [1972].
(b) comparison of different sections of the same statute; absence of mens rea words in the section in question but their presence in others suggests strict liability, for example MEDICINES ACT 1968 ss58(2) and 63-65: Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Storkwain).

(3) The statute must deal with an issue of social concern, including:

drugs - Warner v MPC [1969] (discussed previously).
pollution - Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] the House of Lords held that a company was guilty of polluting a river. They had installed a device in an effort to prevent pollution, but the pumps became blocked by vegetation and polluted water overflowed into the river. There was no evidence that the company was negligent or that it knew of the pollution.
public safety - Gammon (above) concerned deviation from approved building plans in consequence of which part of a building collapsed.
owning or being in charge of a dog dangerously out of control in a public place contrary to the DANGEROUS DOGS ACT 1991 s3(1).

To these we can add two much later decisions:

Harrow LBC v Shah [1999]: selling a lottery ticket to a person under 16 years is a strict liability offence, even though the offence carries imprisonment of up to three months.

B v DPP [2000]: the House of Lords held that gross indecency with a child under the age of 14 years is so serious that mens rea as to age is required.

(4) Even so, strict liability must be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance not to commit the prohibited act. The arguments in favour are:

if a person runs a business properly, the law should not be broken. If the actus reus is committed, the business is improperly run.
that it is easier to obtain convictions; guilty people will not escape through lack of evidence, especially companies (Alphacell v Woodward).
strict liability raises standards all round, certain activities must be prohibited for the public good (regulatory offences).
it is easier to enforce the law when mens rea is irrelevant (Storkwain).
strict liability deters others from committing the same offence.
a person who creates a risk & takes a profit from it ought to be liable if the creation of the risk causes problems.
it avoids the increased length of trials. Courts are not overburdened with prosecutions seeking to prove petty violations

Some arguments against:

there is no evidence that standards are raised .
it is wrong to punish people who have not voluntarily broke the law. They are not blameworthy, and the penalties are sometimes very severe, e.g. in Larsonneur she was deported.
it is especially wrong to punish a person who has taken all reasonable care. In Callow v Tillstone [1900] a butcher was convicted of exposing meat for sale which was not fit for human consumption despite the fact that he had a veterinary surgeon’s certificate certifying it as sound. Consider also Storkwain.
strict liability offences are not always rigorously enforced. For example, factory inspectors do not prosecute without warning the offender first. Do such offences fit easily within criminal law?
respect for the law is lessened, a person has a conviction who is not blameworthy.
people, such as butchers, would be put out of work if the rules were strictly enforced, and that is not what the public really wants.
when a judge deals with a strict liability offence the jury is excluded from all arguments regarding intention etc., yet they are relevant to the sentence.

Should the government decide to pass a law that made it a crime to have flu, a condition which you are powerless to prevent, there would be an outcry. Earlier we looked at 2 cases, namely Winzar v C.C. of Kent [1983] & Larsonneur [1933]. In the former the defendant had been removed from a hospital and gently placed on the pavement, & was then arrested for being ‘found drunk’. In the later the defendant was deported from Ireland to England, & was then convicted of being an illegal immigrant. In neither case could the defendant do anything to prevent the situation.

And now for something completely different. We turn our attention to general defences to crime. Whilst defences such as provocation and diminished responsibility are defences that are specific to a particular crime, in this case murder, other defences have a general application towards most, if not all, crimes.

INFANCY - DOLI INCAPAX. A child under 10 years cannot commit a crime. Such a child is irrebuttably presumed to be incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong (i.e. doli incapax) - s50 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1933 as amended by s16 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1963. For implications, see Walters v Lunt [1951] where parents could not handle a “stolen” bike because the bike could not be stolen by their seven-year old son.

Once the person reaches 10 years of age they are deemed to be responsible for their own actions in exactly the same way as adults, although the sentencing framework is different.

Since changes in the law it is highly unlikely that the defence will figure in an examination.

We then looked at INSANITY. The defence is rarely raised today, for a variety of reasons including, the use of diminished responsibility, the punishment of an indeterminate time in a mental hospital may be less attractive than a few years in prison.

REMEMBER, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THAT THE DEFINITION GIVEN IS A LEGAL ONE, NOT A MEDICAL ONE.

the defendant’s sanity may be raised at either of two stages before trial.

(1) unfit for trial – may have nothing to do with the offence
(2) insane at the time of committing the offence

If the defendant has been committed in custody awaiting trial, the Home Secretary may order him to be detained in a hospital because of his mental state – ss 47 & 48 Mental Health Act 1983.

When the defendant is brought up for trial, he may be unfit to plead because of his mental state. The CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 s4 as amended by the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY AND UNFITNESS TO PLEAD) ACT 1991, and further amended by s22 Domestic Violence Crime & Victims Act 2004, provides for a judge to determine whether or not the defendant was insane at the time he committed the act. If this is the case a jury is empanelled to decide whether or not the defendant committed the actus reus of the crime. He can’t have possessed the mens rea remember, because of his mental state. Relying on the evidence adduced to that point, and any further evidence which may be adduced, the jury may acquit the defendant if they find that he did not do the act or make the omission. Otherwise, the jury will determine that the defendant did do the act or omission. Where found unfit to plead, the defendant may be subject to any one of four orders (s5 as amended by the 1991 Act):

admission to a hospital specified by the Secretary of State - this is no longer automatically accompanied by restriction on release though the judge has power to make such a direction;
for guardianship;
for supervision and treatment this will be by a social worker or probation officer and for a specified period of not more than two years;
for an absolute discharge.

However in the case of any offence for which the penalty is specified by law, i.e. murder, the judge must make an admission to hospital order and must direct that release be restricted without limit of time.

Many defendants suffering from some type of mental disorder would not stand trial but would be detained under the Mental Health Act.

When the defendant contends that he was insane at the time of commission of the alleged offence, the defence of insanity is based on the rules developed in M’Naghten [1843]. The defendant, believing that he was being persecuted by the Tories, fired his gun at Prime Minister Peel, but killed his secretary, Edward Drummond. Medical opinion showed that he was suffering from morbid delusions which might have affected his perception of right & wrong. From this developed the test for insanity:

Everyone is rebuttably presumed to be sane.
To rebut this presumption, the defendant must show (on a balance of probabilities) that at the time of committing the actus reus he was labouring from such a defect of reason, caused by a disease of the mind, that either he did not know the nature and quality of his act or he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.

In Bratty v A.G. for Northern Ireland [1963] a disease of the mind was said to be ‘any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur’. This is nonsense, for you do not have to be violent. In Burgess [1991] the Court of Appeal said that the absence of danger of recurrence is not a reason for saying it cannot be a disease of the mind.

A “defect of reason” means the defendant was incapable of exercising a power of reasoning. Mere failure to exercise power of reason, e.g. through temporary absent-mindedness, is not enough: Clarke [1972].

To compare a “disease of the mind” by the cases of:

Kemp [1957]: arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries within the brain came within the phrase.

Charlson [1955]: a cerebral tumour did not.

The meaning of a disease of the mind was expressed by Lord Diplock in Sullivan [1984]:

“It did not matter whether the impairment itself was organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself was permanent or transient or intermittent, provided it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act, since the purpose of the legislation relating to insanity was to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous state no matter how temporary the duration of the suspension of facilities might be. It followed therefore that if the occurrence of an epileptic fit brought about a temporary suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding during the course of which the offence was committed, the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was appropriate.”

Thus, various forms of epilepsy may constitute disease of the mind: Sullivan. S was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and his defence was that he did not know what he was doing because he was recovering from a minor epileptic fit at the time. When the trial judge ruled that the defence raised was one of insanity, S changed his plea to guilty. The House of Lords upheld the trial judge’s ruling. The main limit seems to be that the disease must be caused by some internal, not external, factor.

Clearly, however, not all epileptics ought to be detained. In Sullivan he suffered from a rare form of the disease which manifested itself in violence.

Diabetes is a disease in which the body does not produce enough insulin to break down blood sugar. If not reduced, increasing levels of blood sugar (hyperglycaemia) will result progressively in confusion, disorientation, possible drunken-like behaviour and aggression, lack of consciousness, coma and death. Excessively low levels of blood sugar (hypoglycaemia) produce almost identical effects. The former condition results from lack of insulin, the latter from too much (usually in combination with a failure to maintain a correct diet). The courts have categorised lack of voluntariness due to hyperglycaemia as insanity (an internal factor, the disease itself) but involuntariness due to hypoglycaemia as automatism (an external factor, the taking of the insulin).

In Hennessy [1989] the defendant claimed that he had taken a conveyance without consent and had driven whilst disqualified when suffering from hyperglycaemia brought about by his failure to take insulin, in part because of stress, anxiety and depression caused by marital problems. The Court of Appeal characterised the latter as internal factors and held that the defence was insanity because the hyperglycaemic state resulted from the disease of diabetes itself.

Compare with Quick [1973] where the defendant’s conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm was quashed when it was accepted by the Court of Appeal that, at the time of the attack, he was in a state of hypoglycaemia produced by a combination of an insulin injection and lack of food.

Sleepwalking used to be regarded as an example of automatism not arising from a disease of the mind and therefore not an example of insanity. However, it was almost inevitable that that view would be revised in the light of the definition of “disease of the mind” adopted in Sullivan and this did indeed occur in Burgess [1991] (above). THE defendant admitted that he must have hit the defendant on the head with a bottle and a video recorder and grasped her throat. However, he claimed that they had both fallen asleep whilst watching a video tape and that the incidents occurred whilst he was still asleep. The judge ruled that the defendant’s explanation amounted to a plea of insanity and the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. On appeal, he contended that his plea was one of non-insane automatism. Sleepwalking was held by the Court of Appeal to arise from an internal and not external cause and, despite its transitory nature, to be an abnormality, whether functional or organic, which had manifested itself in violence. It was a disorder or abnormality which might recur, though the possibility of it recurring in the form of serious violence was unlikely. Thus, the condition fell squarely within the description of insanity proposed in Sullivan and, however incongruous the result, only Parliament could alter it.

Another problem with “disease of the mind” is its uncertainty. In Charlson [1955] (above) a father asked his son to look out of the window to see a rat swimming in the river. When he did so he hit the boy over the head with a hammer and threw him from the window. He said that he knew he was killing him, but had no idea why. As the defendant was suffering from a brain tumour, the trial judge directed that this was a physical disease, outside of M’Naghten. This was disapproved of by Lord Denning in Bratty, and is at odds with Kemp [1957].

The “nature and quality of the “act refers to the physical nature of the act, not its moral or legal nature. See Codere [1916] where the defendant thinks he is chopping wood when he is in fact chopping someone’s head off!

“Knowing the act is wrong” was interpreted by Windle [1952] as meaning legally wrong. W, whose wife had often talked about committing suicide, persuaded her to take 100 aspirins because he thought she would be better off dead. On appeal. it was held that the trial judge had correctly ruled out insanity because W had admitted that he knew he would be hanged for what he had done. He knew it was illegal. He was hung.

If the defendant pleads insanity successfully, the verdict is “not guilty by reason of insanity”; s1 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (known as the ‘special verdict’). Following such a verdict, it was very likely that the defendant would be detained in a secure hospital and no doubt this deterred many Ds from pleading the defence (many changed their pleas to guilty on being faced with this prospect during trial). In consequence of the amendments to s5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 made by the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY AND UNFITNESS TO PLEAD) ACT 1991, the judge now has the range of options available (above).

SOME THOUGHTS:

insanity is caused by an internal factor, automatism by an external factor.
Lord Diplock has suggested that the rules are meant to differentiate between dangerous & non-dangerous individuals. Why are epileptics dangerous, but some diabetics not?
If a person is insane he can still plead guilty, but is still dangerous.
Including epileptics as insane has led some Crown Court judges to refuse to follow Sullivan. In McFarlane [1990] the judge directed the jury that the accused was not guilty if she was undergoing a fit when she occasioned a.b.h. on a constable who was searching her home for stolen goods.
In Quick [1973] Lawton LJ said that a ‘disease of the mind’ should not cause incredulity to normal people, and so labelling a sleepwalker as insane seems inappropriate.
The definition dates from 1843 and has not developed to take account of modern-day medicine.
The 1953 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment heard that the rules were “entirely obsolete and misleading”.
A medically insane person may well know the nature and quality of his act, and know it is wrong, but still commit the offence through illness.
A legally insane person may not be medically insane, yet medical treatment is imposed!
Article 5 ECHR protects liberty, and states that a person of unsound mind can only be detained where proper account of medial expertise is taken,.

There is a danger, as we shall see, where a defendant alleges automatism. He runs the risk of being proved insane by the prosecution.

We’ll begin with automatism next week.