Criminal Law

Friday, January 26, 2007

Thursday 26 January 2007

We continued our discussion on appropriation.

Remember that Lawrence had decided that one could appropriate with consent. This was to be (wrongly) blown out of the water by the case of R v Morris [1984]. The hold heard that the defendant had switched price labels on items in a supermarket, and in one case had paid before being arrested, in the other had been stopped before reaching the cashier. Undoubtedly, this was not an authorised act and so was clearly an appropriation (subject to the doubts about assumption of the rights previously dealt with). Consequently, anything said about consent by the House of Lords must be interpreted as obiter. Even so, Lord Roskill had no doubt that “the concept of appropriation … involves not an act expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner but an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those rights”. For now, remember that this is an obiter dicta statement. The court is saying that if you pick up something from a supermarket and go and pay, you are NOT appropriating, but if you run off with it you do appropriate. In other words – you cannot appropriate by consent.

This isn’t correct, but was blindly followed for several years. We had a conflict between Morris and Lawrence (the issue of consent), yet Lord Roskil thought not. He offered no explanation for this, other than to say that it was “beyond question” that there was a dishonest appropriation in Lawrence.
So we now had two House of Lords cases had suggested directly conflicting approaches to the issue of consent but the second had not acknowledged the conflict with the first.

Morris  had asserted that appropriation must be adverse to the wishes of the owner.

Lawrence asserted the complete opposite. Most cases followed Morris.

Finally, the House of Lords was asked to resolve the issue in Gomez [1993]. The defendant had told the manager of the store in which he worked that he had verified that building society cheques being offered by X in payment for expensive electrical goods were valid. In truth, the defendant and X were in collusion and the cheques had been stolen.

His conviction for theft was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that, following Morris, there was no appropriation of the electrical goods because they were obtained with the consent of the manager, albeit induced by fraud. Thus, at last, a case had come before the House of Lords which directly concerned the issue of consent, in which there could be no doubt that it would be a matter of ratio decidendi.

By a majority of 4 to 1, the House of Lords reversed the decision and adopted the approach in Lawrence v MPC. Appropriation is a neutral term. It is the combination with dishonesty (along with other ingredients) which converts it into theft. Thus, V’s consent or authorisation becomes relevant not to the appropriation but to proof of dishonesty in D.

There are some surprising implications of this decision:

(1)      Where persons deal with property that belongs initially to others there is now no way of distinguishing between who may and who may not be a thief by reference to what they do, only by reference to the state of mind in which they do it. All persons who deal with the property of others appropriate that property (including all who take goods down from supermarket shelves, buy goods over the counter, get gifts, hire goods etc.). Thieves do so (additionally) dishonestly and with intent permanently to deprive.
(2)      Because an appropriation is an assumption of any of the rights of the owner, even an authorised preliminary dealing with the property which D intends as a step on the way towards permanent deprivation amounts to theft (repositioning an item at the end of a shelf so as to be able to slip it into a bag more easily later).

Gomez ought to have brought to an end 23 years of uncertainty in the interpretation of appropriation but the Court of Appeal did their best to mess it up. Suggestions form them decided that the goods must be taken away, but it doesn’t say that in the statute. It did in the Larceny Act 1916 (known as ‘asportation’).

The House of Lords was again to confirm that appropriation may take place with or without the consent of the owner in R v Hinks [2000]. A woman H was the carer of an older man of low intelligence, and persuaded him to make gifts to her totalling some £60, 000 and a olour television set. . The jury found as a fact that D had acted dishonestly and convicted her of theft. The House of Lords affirmed the conviction, and said there can be an appropriation even where the victim gives the money voluntarily to the thief.

PROPERTY is defined in s4(1): property includes money and all other property, real or personal,  including things in action and other intangible property.

A thing in action is intangible in that it has no physical existence, but may confer valuable rights on its owner; e.g. a debt, company shares, a copyright or trade mark. But confidential information falls outside s4; in Oxford v Moss [1978] a sneak preview of an examination paper was not theft of property belonging to the university as D did not take the examination paper but merely copied the questions from it.

A credit balance in a bank account and the right to overdraw are examples of things in action; see e.g. Kohn [1979].

Though land is property, under s4(2) it can only be stolen by a person not in possession of it if that person severs it or appropriates it after it has been severed. So, stripping lead or tiles from a roof, taking bricks from the fabric of a building or removing turf or topsoil can all be theft.

However, it is not possible to steal mushrooms growing wild on any land, or flowers, fruit or foliage picked from a plant growing wild on any land unless this is done for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose (s4(3)).

A tenant in possession of the land can only be guilty of theft if he appropriates the whole or part of any fixture or structure let to be used with the land.

Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, are also property but, again, cannot be stolen unless either already reduced into possession by or on behalf of another person without possession having since been lost or abandoned, or in the course of being reduced into possession by another (s4(4)). Essentially, the poacher does not steal by capturing wild creatures himself but can steal from the landowner, gamekeeper or another poacher, any of whom got to the wild creature before him.

A human corpse cannot be owned by anyone and cannot be stolen. But fluid from a living body can be stolen - Rothery [1976] where a driver who had provided a specimen of blood was convicted of theft of the container. It seems that he would also have been guilty of stealing the sample. Presumably, other parts of a living body can also be stolen.

In R v Kelly [1998] the Court of Appeal confirmed that there is no property n a corpse, but subject to an exception where the corpse had undergone a process of skill with a view to preserving it, e.g. embalming, or for scientific examination. It then becomes property and is capable of being stolen. Here the bodu parts were taken from the Royal College of Surgeons and used for artistic purposes.

Electricity cannot be stolen under s1, but s13  is concerned with the offence of abstracting electricity.

We’ll look at s5 – belonging to another – next week.

Friday, January 19, 2007

Thursday 18 January 2007

We concluded our lecture on non-fatal offences.

The other distinction between Ss 18 and 20 OAP 1861 is that s18 talks about “causing” gbh, whereas s20 involves “inflicting” gbh. Once upon a time judges got quite excited in deciding what the difference was. Read on and you will see that they have decided what most of us knew for years, there is no difference …

Clearly, “inflicts” suggests more limited ways of bringing about the injury than causes and until the decision of the House of Lords in Wilson [1983] the convenient distinction was founded upon presence or absence of the elements of an assault (probably in the sense of battery). To inflict required proof of a battery. To cause did not.

The argument was settled once and for all by the House of Lords in Burstow [1997]. You may remember that he was a stalker, and the victim suffered psychiatric illness (considered to be g.b.h.) their Lordships stated that there was no reason to believe that there was any significance between the two words.

ASSAULT OCCASIONING ACTUAL BODILY HARM is created by s47 OAP 1861. There is no definition of a.b.h. in the Act. All harm must be ‘actual’! The offence carries 5 years imprisonment, so is an either-way offence.

The Court of Appeal in CHAN-FOOK [1994] has analysed the requirements as follows:

“harm” requires hurt or injury;
“actual” requires that it is not so trivial as to be wholly insignificant;
“bodily” is not limited to “skin, flesh, bones” since the body includes organs, the nervous system, and the brain.

From this it is apparent that psychiatric injury is included, for the quote to remember was “bodily means the whole man, not just the physical man.”

In R v Morris [1997] THE TIMES 13 NOVEMBER the victim al­leged that, as a result of being ‘stalked’ by the defendant, she suffered pains in her joints and abdomen, sleeplessness, tension and fear of being alone. No psychiatric evidence was adduced. The Court of Appeal held that psychiatric evidence had to be adduced to show that the symptoms apart from the pain amounted to psychological injury and that the pains experienced by the appellant resulted from the non-physical assault by the defendant.

The mens rea of s47 is identical to that of assault. Once the mens rea and actus reus of an assault or battery is proved, the prosecution only have to show that it (i.e. the assault or battery) caused abh, determined objectively. D is liable for injuries which any reasonable man could be expected to foresee. In Roberts [1971] D assaulted a woman by trying to take off her coat which led her to jump out of a car whilst it was moving, as a result of which she was injured. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal, holding that the only question was whether her actions were the natural consequence of his behaviour, in that it could reasonably have been foreseen that she might react in the way that she did.

If D is charged under s20, he may nevertheless be convicted of offence under s47 since the latter is impliedly included in the former – Wilson (above). By s6(3) CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1967, a person may be convicted of an offence other than that with which he is expressly charged if the allegations against him are capable of including, expressly or by implication, an allegation of the other offence.

Remember my earlier comment regarding whether it is possible to assault (Batter) someone by an omission?:

Director of Public Prosecutions v Santana-Bermudez [2003] Crim LR 471. A police officer approached the respondent as she suspected that he was acting as a ticket tout. She informed him that she intended to carry out a full body search pursuant to s1 PACE 1984. She asked him to turn out all his pockets and place the contents on the table. Those items included one or more syringes without needles. The respondent was asked if he was sure that he had no needles or sharps on him and replied “No”. The police officer then commenced the search. She put two fingers into one of the small pockets in his jacket. Her finger was pierced by a hypodermic needle. She noticed that the respondent had a smirk on his face. He also immediately took another needle from another pocket. When the officer said “I thought you didn’t have any sharps on you”, the respondent merely shrugged his shoulders and again smirked. He was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was convicted in the magistrates’ court and appealed. At the end of the prosecution case before the Crown Court, a submission was made that there was no case to answer because an omission to act could not amount to an assault or battery. The court concluded the submission was well founded and correct in law. It was of the opinion that the evidence did not disclose any positive act committed by him and that his untruthful answers to questions did not convert a negative omission to act into a positive act. The prosecution appealed by way of case stated.

Held, allowing the appeal, where someone by act or word or a combination of the two created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury which materialised, there was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. However, it remained necessary for the prosecution to prove an intention to assault or appropriate recklessness. In the present case, the respondent by giving the police officer a dishonest assurance about the contents of his pockets, thereby exposed her to a reasonably foreseeable risk of an injury which materialised. It was therefore erroneous of the court to conclude that there was no evidential basis for the actus reus of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

That’s it for offences against the person, leaving only property offences under the Theft Acts and Criminal Damage Act 1971 to cover. We began with the building block for all offences of dishonesty, namely theft.

Theft is defined in s1(1) THEFT ACT 1968; the dishonest (mens rea) appropriation (actus reus)of property (actus reus) belonging to another (actus reus) with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it (mens rea).

All elements must be proved, otherwise the offence is not made out.

Section 3(1) defines APPROPRIATION as any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping it or dealing with it as an owner.

So there are two separate times where it is possible to appropriate:

(1) when one assumes the rights of the owner, usually at the same time as the other elements, or
(2) where one later assumes those rights, being unaware of the existence of the property until that moment.

There seems to be a contradiction in s3(1), i.e. it begins by requiring an assumption of the rights (plural) of an owner, but later talks of assuming a right (singular). The major authority on this element is the decision of the House of Lords in the consolidated appeals of R v Morris [1983]. The House of Lords indicated that only one of the rights need be assumed. In the case, D had gone through the checkout before being arrested. We shall be looking at this case closely next week.

The House of Lords decision in Lawrence v MPC [1971] suggested that the consent given by the person deceived does not prevent there being an appropriation, so that almost all cases of obtaining by deception would also be cases of theft. The defendant was a taxi-driver who took advantage of the fact that his customer was unfamiliar with English money. V indicated the address to which he wished to be taken and D said it was a long way and very expensive. V proffered £1 for what should have been a fare of half that value, and D reached over and took a further £6 from the wallet which V was still holding open. He then drove V to the address. This looks like a fairly straightforward case of deception but it was prosecuted as theft. D was convicted and his conviction was upheld both by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

D’s belief that the owner, with full knowledge of the circumstances, did or would consent did not prevent the appropriation taking place but, instead, prevented the defendant from being dishonest. What is true is that the ‘consent’ took place only because of the deception, and this will probably be true of all deceptions.

We’ll continue from here next week.

I hope everyone got home safely, given the appalling weather.

Monday, January 15, 2007

Thursday 15 January 2007

Following on from fatal offences, we turned our attention to non-fatal offences.

The offences of assault and battery were always thought to be common law offences (common assault) but are now considered to be statutory (s39 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988 ).

‘ASSAULT’ is often used to mean ‘BATTERY’, but the two offences are distinct and it is important to be clear about the sense in which the terms are being used. Parliament added to the confusion by using “assault” when either assault or battery might suffice, as in the offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and indecent assault. The simple distinction between them is that:

ASSAULT involves causing a person to fear immediate unlawful violence;
BATTERY is the actual infliction of the violence.

The actus reus of assault is that D causes V to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence, e.g. by raising a fist or a weapon, aiming a kick, throwing a stone or making some other menacing gesture. V must be aware of it, so that, for example striking from behind is not an assault nor is throwing a brick which is badly aimed and of which the intended victim is unaware.

There is some doubt as to whether menacing words alone are sufficient. In Wilson [1955] stated obiter that the words “get out the knives” would amount to an assault. Conversely, words can help to make it clear that an otherwise threatening gesture is not intended to lead to the immediate infliction of violence, as in Tuberville v Savage [1669] where D put his hand on his sword and said, “If it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you”.

The requirement that V must apprehend immediate violence is interpreted generously, so that D was convicted of assault when he looked through the window of a house and frightened a woman in her dressing gown, even though it was unclear how quickly he would have been able to gain entry to the house: Smith v Superintendent of Woking Police Station [1983].

The actus reus of battery requires infliction of unlawful personal violence. “Violence” means nothing more than some touching, including of the clothes where the blow is felt and possibly even where it is not, as where D slashes V’s leather coat without the victim being aware of it. So, in Thomas [1985] there were obiter suggestions that D would have been guilty of an assault in touching a girl’s skirt and rubbing it. The touching can be by direct contact between D and V, or through the medium of a weapon (held or thrown) and even, perhaps, in less direct ways. So, in Martin [1881] D was guilty of unlawful and malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm (an offence at that time believed to require proof of an assault/battery) when he barred the exits to a theatre, turned out the lights and caused members of the audience to panic and injure themselves.

The touching need not be ‘hostile’, but it be unlawful and more than merely trivial. So there is no battery where V expressly or impliedly consents to it, as in the contact which commonly occurs when people find themselves in crowds (where, in addition, the touching may be merely trivial). In Donnelly v Jackman [1970] it was held that D, a police officer, did not commit battery when he tapped V on the shoulder to attract his attention.

In view of the direct and immediate nature of the injury threatened or inflicted in assault or battery, it has been argued that an act (rather than an omission) is required.

Compare Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] where D had accidentally driven his car onto a police officer’s foot whilst parking it under his direction and had then knowingly delayed removing it. His conviction for assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty was upheld on the grounds that the whole conduct constituted a continuing act. A mere failure to act would not have been enough.

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DPP v K [1990] the court appears to have upheld a conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm on the basis of D’s failure to clear acid from a drying machine in a toilet, in consequence of which V suffered facial injuries when operating the machine.

The mens rea of assault and battery is intention or subjective recklessness in relation to causing apprehension of, or the actual infliction of, unlawful personal violence.

Since the assault or battery must be unlawful, D must intend it to be so, in the sense at least that D knows the facts which make it so. In Blackburn v Bowering [1994] D’s conviction for assaulting an officer of the court (an offence equivalent to assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty) was quashed when it appeared that he may not known that V was a court bailiff trying to execute a judgment debt. It was not necessary to prove that D knew that V was a bailiff and was acting in the execution of his duty. So, if the infliction of violence was unlawful, this offence could have been committed even if D had no idea of the identity and status of V. However, D’s intention to defend himself could not be an intention to inflict unlawful violence if he did not know that V was a court officer acting in the execution of his duty.

In R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1997] the House of Lords was required to interpret “bodily harm” to a person in ss 18, 20 or 47 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861, so as to include recog­nisable psychiatric injury. Moreover, an of­fence of inflicting grievous bodily harm within s20 can, in law, be committed where no physical violence was applied directly or indirectly to the body of the victim, and a silent telephone caller may be guilty of an as­sault within s47 depending on the circum­stances of the cases, in particular the impact of the calls on the victim.

I appealed from the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his appeal against con­viction on 6 February 1995 at Newport (Gwent) Crown Court, having pleaded guilty to three counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s47 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861. The Court of Appeal certified as being of general public importance the question “as to whether the making of a series of silent telephone calls can amount in law to an assault”. B appealed from the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his appeal against conviction on 4 March 1996 in Reading Crown Court, having pleaded guilty to unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 of the 1861 Act. B had changed his plea following a ruling by the judge that an offence of unlawfully and maliciously inflict­ing grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 might be committed where no physical vio­lence had been applied directly or indirectly.

Their Lordships held that the word “inflict” can embrace the idea of inflicting psychiatric injury. As a matter of law the caller may be guilty of an assault: whether he is or not will de­pend on the circumstance and in particular on the impact of the caller’s potentially men­acing call or calls on the victim. Such a prosecution case under s47 may be fit to leave to the jury. And a trial judge may, depending on the circumstances, put a common-sense consideration before jury, namely what, if not the possibility of imminent personal violence, was the victim terrified about?

DEFENCES TO ASSAULT & BATTERY

Consent: must be genuine. But fraud only invalidates consent where it relates to D’s identity or the nature of his act - Clarence [1888]. C was suffering from a form of gonorrhoea. He had sex with his wife and thereby infected her with venereal disease. Prima facie she consented to the intercourse, but under the mistaken assumption that C was not suffering from any such disease. But since she knew who he was, and she was not mistaken about what he was doing, the deception that he practised (in not telling her about his VD) did not invalidate her apparent consent.

This explains the decision in Richardson [1998] where a dentist, unknown to her patients, had been suspended form her work but continued to treat them. The court held that the patients knew what was being administered and by whom, the fraud was not relevant.

This decision in Clarence is no longer good law, see R v Dica [2003] where a man knew he was infected with the HIV virus; he persuaded two women to consent to unprotected sex (each on more than one occasion) without telling them of his condition. They were subsequently diagnosed HIV positive and the defendant was convicted of causing them grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.

In physical sports etc., consent traditionally has been a defence provided the harm was ordinarily incidental to the game: Billinghurst [1978] where D who deliberately hit an opponent in a rugby match, thereby breaking his jaw, when the ball was some distance away from them, was guilty of aggravated assault. However, the main criterion now seems to be that of public policy the victim can only consent to those assaults and batteries insofar as they are consistent with what is in the public interest.

In Jones and Another [1987] rough horseplay was regarded as a defence to quite serious physical assaults. This was a case involving injuries to schoolboys who had been tossed in the air. It seems to have been decided on the basis that boys do sometimes behave in a rather rough and undisciplined manner, and that since the boys were consenting, or may have been thought by D to be consenting, there should be no liability. However, it must not be D’s intention to cause injury in such circumstances.

This rule is not confined to the activities of children and youths. In Aitken [1992] newly qualified RAF flying officers engaged in celebratory drunken horseplay setting fire to each others’ fire-resistant flying suits. D’s conviction for inflicting g.b.h. on V when he set him on fire was quashed. He had not intended the injury and either V was consenting or D believed him to be consenting.

In Brown and Others [1993] the House of Lords faced a claim for an extension to the categories of exception. The defendants were a group of homosexual men who found great pleasure in sado-madochistic practices. All willingly participated in the activities. None had suffered any permanent injury or sought medical treatment and no complaint had been made by any of them. The police had discovered the practices when they found a videotape recording of some of the sessions which had been made by the group for distribution purely amongst members of the group. The practices included “branding” with metal wire heated by blow-lamp, beating with a cat-o’-nine-tails and various acts of genital torture involving the use of wires, fish hooks, thistles and safety pins.

During their trial for offences under ss 47 and 20 of the OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861, the trial judge ruled that the prosecution were not required to prove lack of consent to injuries of this nature. They then changed their pleas to guilty and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 2 to 4½ years. They appealed against the judge’s ruling on consent.

In a very narrowly based judgment, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeals and asserted that, as the injuries were not merely transient or trifling, the victims could only consent if the circumstances of their infliction fell within the exceptional ‘good reason’ recognised for surgical operations, manly sports and so on. However, the “satisfying of sado-masochistic libido” did not fall within any category of good reason.

The House of Lords upheld that decision by a three to two majority. Lord Templeman, for instance, accepted that violence could be intentionally inflicted and result even in wounding or serious bodily harm without an offence being committed, if the injury was a foreseeable incident of a lawful activity in which the victim was participating (surgery, violent sports. etc.). This decision has since been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. It held that society is bound to protect itself against a cult of violence which is injurious to the participants and unpredictably dangerous (the level of violence could rise if excitement rose; there were dangers in transmission of infections through blood and through instruments). The argument that the law would be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 (the right to private and family life) was summarily dismissed. Article 8 could not invalidate a law which forbade violence intentionally harmful to mind and body.

In the minority, Lord Mustill distinguished between the criminal law of violence and the criminal law of private sexual relations. His view was that the case had been treated as being about violence when it should have been treated as being about sexual relations. The issue should not be looked at as one where all infliction of bodily harm beyond a certain level was unlawful unless falling within an exception justified on policy grounds. The courts were poorly equipped to determine issues of policy of that kind. Instead, the issue was whether the 1861 Act, clearly intended to penalise conduct of a different nature, should be interpreted so as to make this conduct criminal. His view was that it should not he so interpreted.

The judgment puts injuries inflicted during consensual sexual activity on a par with those inflicted in street fights between participants who have consented in the sense of agreeing to fight. It does not even equate such activity with ‘rough horseplay’ let alone recognise that sexual activity is an area of private life in which the application of the full rigour of the law may be entirely inappropriate.

See the file on my website for a good explanation of the case.

In Wilson [1996] the Court of Appeal refused to accept that it was bound by the decision in Brown to uphold a conviction for deliberately inflicted actual bodily harm where the victim had genuinely consented. In the course of a medical examination, Mrs Wilson’s doctor discovered that she had scars on her buttocks which appeared to be the letters, A and W. He reported this to the police, who interviewed the husband, the accused and discovered that he had burnt his initials onto her with a hot knife. It was not disputed that he had done so with her consent as an alternative to the tattooing (which he did not believe he could do) which she had requested. The wife never made any complaint, considering it to be an adornment. On the accused’s trial for assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the judge held that he was bound by Brown and directed the jury to convict. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and expressed its disquiet that the prosecuting authority should have thought it necessary to bring the proceedings, which served no useful purpose and yet involved considerable public expense. The court held:

Brown does not lay down a proposition that consent is never a defence to deliberately inflicted actual bodily harm. All their Lordships had recognised that there are exceptions;
the law should develop upon a case by case basis rather than by the application of general propositions;
the speeches in BROWN recognised that consensual adult tattooing is not an offence, despite deliberate infliction of actual bodily harm. She had clearly indicated that she regarded the carving of the initials (which was not significantly different from a tattoo) as a desirable piece of physical adornment. This was analogous with piercing of nostrils and tongues for decorative jewellery;
the case was markedly different from Brown, which was at the very extreme and involved physical torture which carried risks of serious physical injury and blood infection;
public policy and public interest (considerations regarded as relevant by the House of Lords in Brown) certainly did not demand that the accused’s activities should be visited by the sanctions of the criminal law.

LAWFUL CHASTISEMENT/CORRECTION: may be used to justify assaults and batteries by parents and persons in loco parentis.

SELF-DEFENCE AND PREVENTION OF CRIME: as discussed.

WOUNDING AND G.B.H.

Sections 18 and 20 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861 each contain 2 quite separate crimes involving wounding or grievous bodily grievous bodily harm (gbh).

s18, with a maximum of life imprisonment, contains the more serious offences, primarily because of the need to show D acted with an ulterior intent, viz. to do gbh, or to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of a person. Such ulterior intent need not be shown for s20, which carries a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.

Wound requires all the layers of the skin to be broken - JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1983]. D fired an air pistol and a pellet hit a young man in the area of his left eye. The Divisional Court held that even though internal blood vessels may have been ruptured by the blow, there had been no wound, because there had been no breaking of the continuity of the whole skin.

Gbh means really serious injury. The point to note here is that gbh may occur even though there has been no wounding. Conversely, there may be a technical wounding, although there has been no gbh.

For s18 only an intent will suffice; mere recklessness is not enough: Belfon [1976]. D seriously injured another man by attacking him with a razor. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction under s18 (and substituted a conviction under s20), because the trial judge had wrongly directed the jury that it would suffice if D had thought it likely that his actions would cause gbh, i.e. he had been reckless as to whether such injury might occur.

Subjective recklessness will suffice for s20.

We will continue this next week.

Friday, January 05, 2007

Thursday 4 January 2007

Welcome back after the holidays.

We continued with our look at diminished responsibility. The high profile case of Martin [2001] is a further example. Following an appeal to the Court of Appeal it was accepted that evidence should have been heard of Tony Martin’s paranoid personality disorder and depression. The murder verdict was overturned, and he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.

Can diminished responsibility and intoxication sit together? If the abnormality was due to such acute intoxication that D’s brain was damaged so that his judgment and emotional responses were grossly impaired, or where D had such a craving for drink that his intoxication was involuntary (he could not resist the impulse to drink), D may rely on the defence – Tandy [1988]. T, having drunk most of a bottle of vodka, strangled her 11-year old daughter after she said she had been sexually interfered with and wanted to go to live with her grandmother. Since T could have refrained from taking the first drink she was not suffering from a disease within the meaning of s2(1), and her conviction for murder was upheld.

A plea of diminished responsibility should not be left to the jury where there is no medical evidence to support it - Dix [1982].

Section 4 HA 1957 creates a defence where the killing is in pursuance of a suicide pact. Although it is murder intentionally to kill someone even though he wishes to die, i.e. he kills with malice aforethought, an exception is made where the killing is in pursuance of a suicide pact. This requires:

  1. An agreement between 2 or more persons

  2. which has as its object the death of all parties to it

  3. a settled intention of dying.

The survivor of such agreement is liable to be convicted of manslaughter.

The SUICIDE ACT 1961 abolished the crime of suicide, though s2(1) preserves the offences of aiding, abetting. counselling or procuring the suicide of another.

There are two main varieties of INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER:

  • Gross negligence manslaughter

  • unlawful and dangerous act (constructive) manslaughter.

Until 1983, it was generally thought that involuntary manslaughter consisted of

  • gross negligence manslaughter;

  • unlawful act manslaughter;

  • possibly subjective recklessness manslaughter. This third group has now gone.

Gross negligence manslaughter extended to any conduct, whether unlawful in itself or not (for example, driving a car).

The Court of Appeal in Stone and Dobinson [1977] obscured matters, first by equating gross negligence as recklessness.

The death of reckless manslaughter finally occurred in Prentice and Others [1993], when the Court of Appeal insisted that the objective recklessness test, requiring that a risk be ‘obvious’ would not necessarily be appropriate to breach of duty cases, perhaps involving expert fields beyond the knowledge of an “ordinary prudent individual” and where risks of injury might already exist independently of D’s conduct (as in medical treatment).

Subsequently, an appeal from Prentice was heard by the House of Lords under the name of Adomako [1994] where the revival of gross negligence was upheld in accordance with the original decision of the Court of Appeal.

Gross negligence manslaughter requires proof of:

  1. any conduct (act or omission). It does not have to be unlawful in itself, so that it may arise out of any activity which poses a risk of injury, for example employment or medical treatment: in Prentice, one case concerned an inexperienced doctor who had administered a fatal spinal injection without having proper information available and under the supervision of another doctor who believed himself merely to be supervising the injection procedure and not the suitability of the drug for such injection: another, an anaesthetist (Adomako) who had failed to notice that a tube had become disconnected; and the third, an electrician who did not discover that he had wired live to earth in a central heating installation; and

  2. AMOUNTING TO BREACH OF A DUTY.

  3. WHICH CREATES A RISK OF DEATH/SERIOUS INJURY.

  4. AND ACTUALLY CAUSES DEATH - causation as previously considered;

  5. SOME FURTHER ELEMENT, whether described as a state of mind or not, which supplies the requisite degree of culpability; which makes it gross negligence. The defendant does something that is so bad that he ought to be punished by the criminal law.

A couple of cases may help to conclude this.

R v Wacker [2003]. You may remember this awful case where the defendant was trying to smuggle into the UK 61 Chinese illegal immigrants. He closed the air vents in the back of the vehicle, causing the death of 60 of the immigrants. He was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. Look at the checklist above and it is easy to see why.

Willoughby [2005]. The defendant owned a disused public house which was destroyed by fire and an explosion. The victim was killed when the building collapsed in the explosion. The defendant was injured and was found outside the building in a state of shock. The Crown alleged that he (the defendant) had recruited the victim to help him to set fire to the building, that they had used petrol as an accelerant, and that the victim had died when the petrol was ignited, whether deliberately or by accident.

The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, reckless arson contrary sl(2) and 1(3) Criminal Damage Act 1971 and with gross negligence manslaughter. On the latter offence, the trial judge directed the jury that, even if the defendant and victim were engaged in a joint enterprise to destroy the public house, nevertheless there was evidence to support the proposition that the defendant owed a duty of care to the victim.

On appeal against conviction for manslaughter, the defendant asserted that the trial judge’s direction was inadequate because it merely suggested that two men had set fire to the public house owned by one of them. Though this was an inherently risky business, there were no grounds for saying that the owner of premises owes a duty of care to a co-actor merely by virtue of being co-actors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating:

  1. a duty cannot arise simply because the defendant was the owner of the premises.

  2. a duty could arise out of the combination of factors (the defendant was the owner, his property was to be destroyed for financial gain, he had enlisted the help of the victim, and victim’s roles was to spread the petrol).

  3. whether a duty arises is a matter for a jury.

  4. it would have been simpler had the case been left to the jury as one of unlawful act manslaughter.

  5. given the circumstances, a charge may be appropriate by reason of an unlawful and dangerous act, and by reason of gross negligence. (This hasn’t happened yet, and it is difficult to envisage how it could)

Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act is also known as constructive manslaughter. The essence of this form of manslaughter is that D caused V’s death whilst engaged in an act (not an omission) which was both a crime and created a risk of some personal injury (was dangerous). Typically, it occurs when D attacks V intending relatively minor injury (an act which is a crime and, self-evidently, creates a risk of some personal injury) and V sustains unexpectedly severe injuries from which death results (say, because he falls backwards and breaks his skull). Rewind the clock five minutes before the killing and it is usually the case that the death would not be foreseen.

The “unlawful act” must be a crime. This means that civil wrongs are not enough. It also means that all the elements of the crime must be proved, both actus reus and mens rea. In Lamb [1967] the D shot and killed his friend whilst having a joke with a revolver which he did not believe to be loaded in such a way that it would fire on the first press of the trigger. His conviction was quashed because, though he had clearly committed the actus reus of an offence such as battery, he neither intended nor was reckless as to (did not foresee) any injury to his friend. So, he had committed the actus reus of a crime, in the course of which he had brought about V’s death, but he would not have been guilty of any crime prior to the death because of lack of mens rea.

In Cato [1976] D’s act of injecting V with heroin at V’s request was a crime (unlawfully and maliciously administering a noxious thing) because, in law, V could not give consent. The Court’s further, alternative, suggestion that D could have been convicted on the basis of the injection of the drug which he had unlawfully taken into his possession is more difficult. The injection was dangerous but (on this assumption) not unlawful, whilst the possession was unlawful but, in itself, hardly dangerous!

The decision of Church [1966] (below) was approved of in the House of Lords in DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976]. The two defendants threw a half paving stone from a bridge into the path of an approaching train. It smashed through the windscreen of the cab and killed the guard. Their convictions for manslaughter were upheld but their Lordships totally failed to identify the relevant “unlawful act”. In truth, the case was mainly concerned with the second element in this form of manslaughter, namely whether the unlawful act was “dangerous” (below) and their comments on the 1st element were brief and superficial. Assuming neither intention nor recklessness in relation to personal injury the most obvious unlawful act for which D1 and D2 would have had mens rea was criminal damage. It has been objected that committing a property offence should not be sufficient for liability for manslaughter unless accompanied, at least, by awareness of the risk of personal injury.

The crime must be “of a dangerous kind”. According to the Court of Appeal in Church [1965] this means that the act must be “such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom”.

In Goodfellow [1986] D was convicted of manslaughter when he set fire to his council house (arson) as a way of trying to persuade the local authority to re-house him and his family. Unfortunately, family members who were in the house at the time and who were supposed to be led to safety were killed in the fire.

Compare the case of Cato (above) with Dias [2002]. The defendant prepared the heroin syringe concoction and handed it to the victim, who injected himself. He was to die as a result. Dias was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter (in line with Cato), but was acquitted on appeal. Here’s why, and it’s important in Cato the defendant had administered a noxious thing to the victim – and that’s a crime. In Dias he had handed the syringe to the victim, who self-injected. It is not a crime to inject oneself, hence no offence of manslaughter. Additionally, he could not be a secondary party to the killing as there was no principal offender.

Section 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIME & VICTIMS ACT 2004 creates a new offence of failing to prevent the death of a child. Where a child is unlawfully killed by a member of her family, any adult member of the family who knew (or should have known) the risk of such an event, and did not do what he reasonably could to prevent it, is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for up to 14 years. The prosecution is not required to prove who actually killed the child - it may even have been the adult himself. (This new offence is intended to meet the situation where a child has been killed by one of its parents, each of whom exercises the right to remain silent as to the circumstances of the death.)

We will continue with other fatal offences next week. They are of secondary importance to what we have discussed thus far.