Criminal Law

Friday, March 16, 2007

Thursday 15 March 2007

Tonight we continued with our look at CRIMINAL DAMAGE.

DESTROY OR DAMAGE.

The question is one of fact and degree. The destruction/damage need not be permanent, so that graffiti on a wall is capable of amounting to damage - ROE v KINGERLEE [1986]. Similarly, in HARDMAN AND ANOTHER v CHIEF CONSTABLE OF AVON & SOMERSET CONSTABULARY [1986], the Crown Court held that painting silhouettes on the pavement using water-soluble paint amounted to damage, for the local authority would have to pay to have them removed.

The successful cases all involve an expense in putting the damage right.

PROPERTY is defined in s10(1) and it refers only to tangible property. But the property may be real or personal and it includes money.

Also included are wild creatures that have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity, and any other wild creatures or their carcasses provided they have been reduced into possession which have not been lost or abandoned, or they are in the course of being reduced into possession. This is the same as for theft.

Excluded are wild mushrooms and wild flowers and foliage.

BELONGING TO ANOTHER. According to s10(2), this means that the property belongs to the person who has custody or control of it, or who has a proprietary right or interest in it.

“Custody” means physical custody; ‘control’ means the right to determine what will be done with the property.

THE AGGRAVATED OFFENCE. Some strange decisions here.

STEER [1987]. The House of Lords held that, in relation to s1(2)(b), it must be shown that the danger to life resulted from the destruction to the property, so that D must have intended to endanger life, or been reckless as to whether life would be endangered by the destruction/damage which he caused. S fired an automatic rifle at the door and bedroom window of the bungalow of his former business partner who was in the bedroom at the time. There could be no conviction under s1(2)(b) because the danger to life was caused by the shot from the rifle and not by the damage to the window.

Two later cases from the Court of Appeal both distinguished STEER.

In WARWICK [1995] D pushed a heavy coping-stone onto a train passing beneath a bridge. The stone partly broke through the roof showering passengers with material. D was guilty because he was reckless as to the danger to life from the roof material (not from the stone itself).

In WEBSTER [1995] D was guilty because he was reckless as to the danger to life where he threw a brick from a car at the windscreen of a pursuing police car. Though the damage to the windscreen did not directly threaten the life of the driver, the driver might lose control of the police car on account of the damage to the windscreen and thus life would have been endangered.

This is satisfactory where the envisaged destruction coincides with that which was actually caused. But where what is envisaged was much greater than what was actually caused, we must consider the envisaged destruction and not that which was brought about - DUDLEY [1989] D threw a fire-bomb at a house which resulted in a high sheet of flame. But the occupants of the house quickly put out the fire and only a small amount of damage was done. D could not avoid conviction under s1 (2) by arguing that the damage that actually resulted was insufficient to endanger life.

THREATENING TO DESTROY OR DAMAGE PROPERTY. By s2, a person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that the other would fear it would be carried out;

(a) to destroy or damage property belonging to that other or a third person; or
(b) to destroy or damage his own property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of that other or a third person;

shall be guilty of an offence.

POSSESSION OFFENCES. By s3 CDA 1971 it is an offence where a person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it:

(a) to destroy or damage any property belonging some other person; or
(b) to destroy or damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of some other person.

And with that note the teaching is over. We have arrived at the end of the course, and from now on we shall be concerning ourselves with examination techniques and revision. I handed out a previous examination paper for use next week, and will then be using paper handouts each week for our revision. Consequently this will be the last post on this blog.

Friday, March 09, 2007

Thursday 8 March 2007

We continued with the peripheral crimes contained in the syllabus, all contained in the Theft Act 1968 (TA).

s21(1) TA 1968 states:

A person is guilty of blackmail if with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief:

that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; AND
that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.

The main limit on the demand is that it must be made with a view to gain or with intent to cause loss.

“MENACES” was described by the House of Lords in Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] as not limited to threats of violence but … including threats of any action detrimental to or unpleasant to the person addressed. It may also include a warning that in certain events such action is intended.

Trivial threats are excluded: Harry [1974] where a student “rag” committee offered to exclude shopkeepers from “inconvenience” that might be caused by their activities.

As to the mens rea, it must be shown that D:

intended to make a demand with menaces,
with a view to gain for himself or another, or with intent to cause loss to another,
either not believing that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand or not believing that the use of menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.

“WITH A VIEW TO GAIN …” etc. is interpreted in accordance with s34(2)(a) TA 1968 so that “gain” and “loss” are to be seen in terms of money or other property, either permanent or temporary. “Gain” includes keeping what one has as well as getting what one has not. “Loss” includes not getting what one might get, as well as parting with what one has.

When we discussed robbery I did mention a tie in with blackmail. There may well be circumstances where offences of both robbery and blackmail exist in the same circumstances - “Your money or your life”. There may also be occasions where the circumstances appear to be robbery but, in fact, the charge should be blackmail. Can you recall my example of a woman with a baby in a pram?.

By s22(1) TA 1968:

otherwise than in the course of stealing
knowing or believing them to be stolen goods
dishonestly receives
or
dishonestly
undertakes or assists in the
retention - removal - realisation - disposal
of those goods
by or for the benefit of another person
or
if he arranges to do so

Prior to 1968 only “receiving” was a crime. Now there are 18 ways of committing 1 crime - Nicklin [1977].

Goods must be stolen at the time of handling as per Haughton v Smith [1975], otherwise it is an attempt. T

Goods representing stolen goods in the hands of a thief or a handler are also stolen goods:

(i) A steals £2,000 & buys a fur coat
(ii) A gives the coat to B
(iii) B doesn’t like the coat, & swaps it for pearls
B later sells the pearls for £600

Only the £2,000 & coat are stolen goods, unless B knows of the original theft, the proceeds of which bought the coat, & she becomes a handler. Then the £600 & pearls will also be stolen goods. A further example follows below.

Goods cease to be stolen when they have been restored:

to the person from whom they were stolen, or
to lawful possession or custody, or (usually the police)
after that person and any other person claiming through him have otherwise ceased as regards those goods to have any right in respect of the theft (an insurance company who had paid out on the theft).

If the goods are merely marked to facilitate the observation of their whereabouts they do not cease to be stolen. The fact that, for example, a police officer has traced the goods does not per se mean that they have been restored to lawful possession. Much will depend on the intention of the officer: A-G’s Reference (No. 1 of 1974) [1974], where a police officer had removed the rotor arm of a car thereby immobilising it so that he could question the driver. The officer suspected that there were stolen goods in the car. It was held that the jury must distinguish between two possible interpretations. If the officer had decided to take possession of the goods when he removed the rotor arm, they had thereby been restored to lawful possession. But if he kept an open mind when removing the rotor arm and would only decide what to do after he had questioned the defendant. they had not been so restored, and could still be stolen.

“Goods” includes money and every other description of property except land, and includes things severed from the land by stealing.

The meaning of “stolen” is set out in s24(1) and (4), so that goods will be “stolen” if:

they have been stolen contrary to s1 TA 1968; or
they have been acquired by blackmail contrary to s21 TA 1968; or
if they had been the subject of a crime committed abroad which would have been regarded as theft, blackmail or obtaining by deception had it been committed in England or Wales.

The full meaning of s24(2) may best be illustrated as follows:

A steals a vase, and sells it to B for £500.
The vase and the cash which A has received are stolen goods.
If A then uses £250 of that £500 to repay a debt which he owes to C, and C knows that it represents part of the stolen goods, C is also guilty of handling.
Suppose C then uses the £250 to buy a ring for his fiancée, D, the ring is thus stolen goods, and D may be guilty of handling if she is aware of the origin of the money used to pay for it.
If D subsequently sells the ring to E who was unaware that it represents stolen property, and E sells it to F, the cash which E receives will not be stolen goods because E lacks mens rea and is not a handler.

There are many different forms of handling, i.e. ways of committing the offence. According to the House of Lords in Bloxham [1982], they are:

receiving;
undertaking the retention, removal, disposal or realisation for the benefit of another;
assisting in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation by another: and
arranging to do (1), (2), or (3).

“Receiving” means that D took exclusive possession or control of the goods, either by himself or jointly with another. D need not have immediate physical possession of them; it suffices if he receives through his servant or agent. His receipt may be only temporary.

“Arranging to receive” indicates that D may be guilty when he simply prepares to receive, even though his preparations may not amount to an attempt to receive.

As long as he knows or believes the goods are stolen, he may be convicted. If he is mistaken in this belief, he may be guilty of an attempt. An agreement to handle goods which will be stolen in the future may constitute a conspiracy to handle, but will not amount to the full offence - PARK [1987].

“Undertaking or assisting in …” shows there are two ways of retaining, removing, disposing or realising stolen goods
“Retention” means keeping possession of what one already has, continuing to have it, not losing it.

An omission to act can only constitute handling if there is a legal duty to act, so that merely failing to tell the police of the presence of the goods is not enough: Brown [1970].

“Removal” comprises moving goods from one place to another.

“Disposal” covers a variety of cases, e.g. giving away the goods, dumping them, or destroying them.

“Realisation” means exchanging the goods for money or other property - Bloxham.

Handling may consist of “arranging” to undertake or assist in; for example, D agrees to help another person to transport stolen goods.

The act of handling must take place “otherwise than in the course of the stealing”. Thus, if D took part in the theft, his participation therein cannot amount to an act of handling.

In Bloxham [1982] B sold a stolen car. The House of Lords, quashing his conviction, held that where D sells stolen goods he does not realise them for the benefit of another, because the purchaser is not “another”. The purchaser benefits from the purchase, not from the realisation; the realisation benefits only the vendor.

The mens rea consists firstly of “knowing or believing” that the goods are stolen. This is a purely subjective test, although the reasonableness of the belief will almost certainly be relevant evidence of D’s state of mind.

D must also act “dishonestly”: Ghosh [1982].

In cases where D is found in possession of recently-stolen property, it may he said that the “doctrine of recent possession” applies. This is really a matter of common sense, rather than legal “doctrine”. It means simply that a jury may infer that D had the necessary knowledge or belief if he offers no (credible) explanation as to why he came to possess recently-stolen property. In view of the potential difficulty of proving the necessary knowledge or belief, s27(3) TA 1968 provides that the court may admit:

evidence that he has had in his possession, or has undertaken or assisted in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation of, stolen good from any theft taking place not earlier than 12 months before the offence charged; and
(provided that 7 days notice in writing has been given to him of the intention to prove the conviction) evidence that he has within the 5 years preceding the date of the offence charged been convicted of theft or of handling stolen goods.

There is a statutory preventative measure known as GOING EQUIPPED TO STEAL. According to s25(1) TA 1968:

A person shall be guilty if when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary (s9) or theft (s1 & s12). Cheat was also included, but this now falls under the Fraud Act 2006, which repealed this part of s25.

The crime is aimed at preventing the accused from committing offences even before he has attempted to steal.

The “article” need not be made or adapted for use in the commission of one of the specified offences. What is important is that D must intend to use it in the course of or in connection with one of them. Potentially, therefore, the offence is very wide. Thus, it is probably true that the article must be one which D would not have with him but for the fact that he has one of the specified purposes in mind.

It must be shown that D “has with him” the article, and this bears the same meaning as in s10 (aggravated burglary). Thus, D has the article with him if he has immediate possession or control of it, or if it is only a short distance away so that he can pick it up when he needs it.

D must not be at his place of abode. This is obviously in recognition of the general right of privacy. Where D has no place he regards as his home, but lives in his car, it has been held that his car was his “place of abode” only when it was on a site where he intended to abide: Bundy [1977], where, although D lived in his car, he was not at his place of abode while he was driving his car when arrested by the police.

The two elements of mens rea are:

knowledge of possession of the article; and
an intention that the article should be used in the course of or in connection with any of the specified crimes.

s25(3) was enacted to assist in the proof of the necessary intent. It provides:

Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use.

Thus, the evidential burden is placed on the accused, so that if (s)he does not give a satisfactory explanation (s)he runs the risk of being found to have had the appropriate intent. The burden is on the balance of probabilities.

We then began our last crime, that of CRIMINAL DAMAGE. The basic offence is contained in s1(1) CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971 which provides that it is an offence for a person:

without lawful excuse,
to destroy or damage any property
belonging to another,
intending to do so or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged.

A separate crime, often referred to as an aggravated form of the offence is contained in s1(2), which says that it is an offence for a person, without lawful excuse, to destroy or damage any property:

intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damage; and
intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered.

By s1(3), if the destruction or damage is caused by fire, the offence is arson.

WITHOUT LAWFUL EXCUSE. By s5(2), a person has a lawful excuse:

If at the time of the alleged offence he believed that the persons(s) whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction /damage had so consented, or would have so consented if he/she/they had known of the destruction/ damage and its circumstances; or
If he destroyed/damaged the property in order to protect property belonging to himself or another or a right or interest in property which was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the alleged offence he believed

(i) that the property right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and
(ii) that the means of protection adopted were reasonable in the circumstances.

Thus in Denton [1982] D set fire to his employer’s mill damaging the premises and machinery. D said he had been encouraged by his employer to do this so that the latter could make a fraudulent insurance claim. D was held not guilty of arson.

D must intend or be reckless as to the destruction/damage of property. Intention comes from Woollin [1997], discussed much earlier, and recklessness is subjective (Cunningham [1957]) since the House of Lords decision in R v Gemmill & Richards [2003].

We will continue this next week. I shall also hand out a previous examination paper so that you can prepare for the following week, when I will go through the whole thing with you.

Sunday, March 04, 2007

We began this week with the offence of TWOC – taking a motor vehicle without consent. Section 12(1) TA 1968 states:

“ … a person shall be guilty of an offence if, without having the consent of the owner or other lawful authority, he takes any conveyance for his own or another’s use or, knowing that any conveyance has been taken without such authority, drives it or allows himself to be carried in or on it”.

There are two offences:

taking and driving
allowing oneself to be driven after it was taken

By virtue of s37 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988 the offence is triable summarily only. Therefore, it is not possible to charge an attempt. There is an offence under s9 CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS ACT 1981 of vehicle interference which covers the gap in the main, except it refers only to motor vehicles.

“Taking” requires two elements; i.e. assumption of possession or control of the conveyance, and a minimal degree of movement of it: Bogacki [1973], where the defendant started the engine of a bus but made no attempt to move it. Thus, there could be no taking.

An unlawful taking may occur even though D is originally in lawful possession of the conveyance: McKnight v Davies [1974], where the accused used his employer’s lorry for his own private purposes, instead of returning it to the depot at the end of the day.

Where X has “taken” a conveyance but has then subsequently abandoned possession of it, D (who is totally unconnected with X) can be guilty of a subsequent “taking” of the conveyance - DPP v Spriggs [1993]. Thus you can “TWOC” from a “TWOC’er”.

“For his own or another’s use”: in Bow [1976] it was held that “use” meant use as a conveyance. B released the handbrake so that the vehicle coasted downhill, and this was sufficient for a taking since he rode in it. The fact that B’s motive was to remove the vehicle as an obstruction was irrelevant.

“Conveyance” is defined in s12(7)(a) as “ … any conveyance constructed or adapted for the carriage of a person by land, water or air, except that it does not include a conveyance constructed or adapted for use only under the control of a person not carried in or on it”.

The exception refers mostly commonly to a pram or pushchair.

Bicycles are excluded by s12(5) which creates a separate offence.

A conveyance need not have wheels or an engine, but it has been held that a horse is not a conveyance for the purposes of s12: Neal v Gribble [1978].

‘Without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority’ means that liability will only be avoided if the owner has actually consented. Even if the owner would have consented to the taking had he been asked, an offence will still be committed: Ambler [1979].

s12(6) provides a possible defence based on believed authority. Thus, a person does not commit an offence by anything done in the belief that he had the lawful authority to do it or that he would have had the owner’s consent of the owner knew of his doing it and the circumstances of it. Provided D discharges the evidential burden of raising the issue, it will be for the prosecution to show that D did not think he had lawful authority/the owner’s consent.

As for the mens rea, D must know that the conveyance had been taken without authority or consent at the time he drove it or allowed himself to be carried in it.

Following a number of highly publicised incidents the AGGRAVATED VEHICLE-TAKING ACT 1992 was born. The Act amends the THEFT ACT 1968 to create in s12A a new offence of aggravated vehicle taking, in which the “basic offence” is committed by D and, at any time after the vehicle was unlawfully taken (whether by him or another) and before it was recovered, one or more of the following occurred:

the vehicle was driven dangerously on a road or other public place;
owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which injury was caused to any person;
owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which damage was caused to any property, other than the vehicle;
damage was caused to the vehicle.

“Dangerously” is as in the ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1991 (and a vehicle is “recovered” when it is restored to its owner or to other lawful possession or custody.

D can avoid liability by proving that, as regards any such driving, injury or damage referred to above, it occurred before he committed the basic offence or he was neither in nor on nor in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle when that driving, accident or damage occurred.

In the case of R v Marsh [1996] it was decided that where the prosecution relies on the occurrence of a road accident as an ingredient of aggravated vehicle taking, it is not necessary for the prosecution to also show an element of fault on the part of the driver in relation to the accident.

We then turned to some brand new legislation, the FRAUD ACT 2006. I am very hopeful for this new statute, as it greatly simplifies the law on deceptions, and removes the previous common law exceptions. It is really a quite straightforward statute although, as time will tell, the courts may decide otherwise.

All deceptions under the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978, plus the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996 are repealed. Only s3 Theft Act 1968 (making off without payment) remains.

The Act provides for a general offence of fraud with three ways of committing it, which are:

(i) by false representation
(ii) by failing to disclose information and
(iii) by abuse of position.

It creates new offences of:

(iv) obtaining services dishonestly and
(v) possessing, making and supplying articles for use in frauds.

Offences of fraudulent trading are also created, but not relevant to us.

The effect of the new legislation is to move the law to criminalise the conduct of the fraudster rather than to look at the consequence of the fraudster's activities.

There are two basic requirements applicable to all the offences:

(1) the defendant must act dishonestly: Ghosh [1982].
(2) it must be his intention to make a gain, or cause a loss to another. The definitions can be found in the offence of blackmail, which will be discussed next week. However, there is no need to prove that this gain or loss occurred, or that the victim was deceived by the defendant’s behaviour.

Each offence is punishable by 10 years imprisonment.

Section 2 makes it an offence to commit fraud by false representation in any form. A representation is defined as false if it is untrue or misleading and the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.

A representation may also be implied by conduct. An example of a representation by conduct is where a person dishonestly misuses a credit card to pay for items. By tendering the card, he is falsely representing that he has the authority to use it for that transaction. It is immaterial whether the merchant accepting the card for payment is deceived by the representation.

This offence would also be committed by someone who engages in "phishing": i.e. where a person disseminates an email to large groups of people falsely representing that the email has been sent by a legitimate financial institution. The email prompts the reader to provide information such as credit card and bank account numbers so that the "phisher" can gain access to others' assets.

Subsection (5) provides that a representation may be regarded as being made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention). The main purpose of this provision is to ensure that fraud can be committed where a person makes a representation to a machine and a response can be produced without any need for human involvement. (An example is where a person enters a number into a "CHIP and PIN" machine.)

Section 3 makes it an offence to commit fraud by failing to disclose information to another person where there is a legal duty to disclose the information. A legal duty to disclose information may include duties under oral contracts as well as written contracts. Such a duty may derive from statute (such as the provisions governing company prospectuses), from the fact that the transaction in question is one of the utmost good faith (such as a contract of insurance), from the express or implied terms of a contract, from the custom of a particular trade or market, or from the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties (such as that of agent and principal).

For example, the failure of a solicitor to share vital information with a client within the context of their work relationship, in order to perpetrate a fraud upon that client, would be covered by this section. Similarly, an offence could be committed under this section if a person intentionally failed to disclose information relating to his heart condition when making an application for life insurance.

Section 4 makes it an offence to commit a fraud by dishonestly abusing one's position. It applies in situations where the defendant has been put in a privileged position, and by virtue of this position is expected to safeguard another's financial interests or not act against those interests.

An employee of a software company who uses his position to clone software products with the intention of selling the products on would commit an offence under this section.

Another example covered by this section is where a person who is employed to care for an elderly or disabled person has access to that person's bank account and abuses his position by transferring funds to invest in a high-risk business venture of his own.

Section 6 makes it an offence for a person to possess or have under his control any article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud. This wording draws on that of the existing law in s25 THEFT ACT 1968 (which we discuss later). These provisions make it an offence for a person to "go equipped" to commit a burglary, theft or cheat, although they apply only when the offender is not at his place of abode.

Section 7 makes it an offence to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply any article knowing that it is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with fraud, or intending it to be used to commit or facilitate fraud. For example, a person makes devices which when attached to electricity meters cause the meter to malfunction. The actual amount of electricity used is concealed from the provider, who thus makes a loss.

Section 11: Obtaining services dishonestly. This makes it an offence for any person, by any dishonest act, to obtain services for which payment is required, with intent to avoid payment. The person must know that the services are made available on the basis that they are chargeable, or that they might be. It is not possible to commit the offence by omission alone and it can be committed only where the dishonest act was done with the intent not to pay for the services as expected. This offence replaces the offence of obtaining services by deception in s1 Theft Act 1978, though the new offence contains no deception element.

The section also covers the situation where a person attaches a decoder to her television to enable viewing access to cable / satellite television channels for which she has no intention of paying.

The above should save you many hours of study. The material is within the syllabus rules as it occurs outside of the three month period immediately prior to the examination. It is difficult to envisage a full question on the area, however, as there is no case law as yet.

The one section of the Theft Act 1978 that remains is s3, which creates an offence of MAKING OFF WITHOUT PAYMENT:

“A person who, knowing that payment on the spot is required for any goods or service done is required or expected from him, dishonestly makes off without having paid as required or expected and with intent to avoid payment of the amount due shall be guilty of an offence.”

It is commonly called “Bilking”. Note that there is no deception, & it usually relates to unpaid petrol or restaurant bills, although not exclusively so.

The lawyers have had some great fun with this section:

If there has also been a deception, two offences will apply
It must be a legally enforceable debt (s3(3)) and, therefore walking away from a betting shop or brothel is okay.
The payment need not be money, luncheon vouchers are okay if accepted by the restaurant.
Dishonesty need not be present at the outset, just at the time of making off.
Allen [1985]: the phrase “with intent to avoid payment” is read as meaning “with intent never to pay”. Allen owed a £1,286 hotel bill, and left without paying. He argued that he always intended to pay when he could, & the House of Lords quashed the conviction.
There are differing views over whether payment by a worthless cheque is a “payment”. D must make off without having paid. D has paid if he uses a credit card and the conditions on the card are met, even though he has no authority to use it; the use of the card means that the creditor will be paid. It has been argued that where D pays with a worthless cheque he is not guilty under s3 because the creditor is ‘paid’ in that (s)he takes the cheque as conditional satisfaction of the debt. Conversely, payment with a worthless cheque may not be regarded as payment as “required or expected”; a creditor requires/expects something of value, viz. a cheque that will be honoured. In any event, the point may be largely academic in that where D uses a worthless cheque he almost certainly commits an offence under s2(1)(b) of the Act.
Where is the spot? In Brooks [1982] it was held that it is the place where payment was required. The case of Aziz [1993] held that the spot could differ according to the circumstances, and it is a question for the jury as to whether the defendant has departed from it. Here there was a dispute over a taxi fare when the defendant had reached the end of his journey, the ‘spot’ was the termination of the journey.
How do you make off? Hammond [1983] - you cannot make off where the creditor consents - getting money from the flat to pay the taxi driver, but there may be some argument if the consent is obtained by fraud.
In self-service stores goods aren’t “supplied”. Go into Tesco, fill your trolley, obtains salami from the delicatessen counter, then leave without paying. You will be guilty of two offences, theft of all the goods, plus making off with the salami.

As to the mens rea:

D must make off dishonestly.
He must also know that payment on the spot is required or expected.
There must be an intent to avoid payment. An intent to delay or defer payment is not enough; an intent permanently to avoid payment is necessary - Allen [1985].

We will begin with BLACKMAIL next time.

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Thursday, March 01, 2007

Just a note to say that the blog for Thursday 1 March 2007 will be delayed, as I have internet problems at home. It will, hopefully, be fixed on Sunday 4 March, and I will endeavour to post then.

Friday, February 23, 2007

Thursday 22 February 2007

We began with looking at the final section concerning theft before moving on to some of the more peripheral offences under the Act.

Section 6 Theft Act 1968 is concerned with an INTENTION PERMANENTLY TO DEPRIVE. He phrase is potentially misleading, as we shall see. An intent to return the properly sooner or later means that the intention is not satisfied, and so most (but not all) unauthorised borrowings cannot be theft.

By s6(1) “A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal”. Very much a mouthful, so what does it mean? What matters is that the defendant intends to regard the property as his own, rather than literally to permanently deprive the other of it.

In Cahill [1993] the defendant took an early morning delivery of newspapers from outside a newsagents when walking home after a late drinking session. He may have intended to deposit them at a friend’s house as a joke but was stopped by a police officer. His conviction for theft was quashed because the judge directed the jury that the defendant must have “treated the property as his own” and failed to mention “to dispose of”.

Where D takes something for his own consumption, he is guilty of theft even though he intends to pay for it or to replace it with something else which is just as valuable - Velumyl [1989] where V took £1,050 from his employer’s safe, intending to replace it a few days later with an equivalent sum. His conviction was upheld on appeal. Clearly he didn’t intend to replace exactly the same notes, just their equivalent value. The issue is whether or not he is dishonest.

Borrowing can amount to theft. In Lloyd [1985] the Court of Appeal held that there is sufficient intent to deprive of the accused, in the course of borrowing, removes the ‘goodness & virtue’. L had removed films from the cinema where he worked & took them to B and A for copying. The film was then returned. The Court of Appeal held that the practical value of the films had not been lessened, & there could be no intent to permanently deprive. How much ‘goodness & virtue’ must be removed is not stated.

s6(2) was designed to cover the unauthorised pawning or pledging of another person’s property. If D pawns V’s goods with no intention of ever redeeming them he is guilty of theft. If D does intend to redeem them, he is still guilty if he knows that he may not be able to do so. There is no case law on the subject.

We then turned to the offence of ROBBERY. Section s8(1) TA 1968 states:

“a person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he use force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force”.

It is really nothing more than an aggravated form of theft, with the use or threat of force, therefore if there is no theft there can be no robbery.

The subsection creates two offences, namely robbery and assault with intent to rob. There is no definition of the latter, it is mentioned only in ss 2 - a person guilty of robbery, or of an assault with intent to rob, shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for life.

The prosecution must show that there has been an appropriation of property by force or threat of force. Any use of or threat to use force against the person will suffice. The wording of s8(1) shows that the victim of the force/threat of force need not also be the victim of the theft.

Only a minimal degree of force need be used. In Dawson [1976] it was held that nudging a person so as to make him lose his balance and thereby facilitate the theft might have amounted to robbery. It was a question of fact for the jury as to whether the nudge was a sufficient use of force.

Clouden [1987]: the Court of Appeal held that snatching a shopping bag out of a woman’s grasp and running off with it could also be robbery.

The force/threat of force must be used in order to steal and before or at the time of stealing. But if the defendant is still removing the goods when he uses/threatens force, he can be guilty of robbery - Hale [1978]. There two defendants went into their victim’s house and while one was upstairs stealing a jewellery box, the other was downstairs tying up the victim. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for robbery even though the jewellery box may have been appropriated before any force was used against the victim. The theft was a continuing event and the jury could conclude that it was still in progress when the victim was being tied up.

Although it may not seem so at the moment, robbery and blackmail have some things in common. I shall mention it when we deal with blackmail later.

Section 9 TA 1968 defines BURGLARY. There are a number of different ways of committing burglary. s9(1) TA 1968:

A person is guilty of burglary if:

  1. he enters a building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to steal, inflict/attempt to inflict on any person gbh, do unlawful damage to the building.

  2. having entered a building/part of a building as a trespasser he steals/attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts/attempts to inflict gbh on any person therein.

The original offence also mentioned the intention of raping a woman, but this has been repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 200, which is not a part of the syllabus.

For the purpose of the examinations, a person who commits a 9(1)(b) also commits a 9(1)(a).

There must always be an “entry”, the question rests on whether it is effective. The latest case is Ryan [1996] where the victim, an elderly householder, found the accused stuck in a downstairs window of the victim’s house at about 2.30 am, the accused’s head and right arm were inside the window which had fallen on his neck and trapped him. The rest of his body was outside the window. He was convicted of burglary and appealed on the grounds that there was no entry because he could not have stolen anything from within the building on account of being stuck. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. A partial entry was sufficient.

The entry must be “as a trespasser”. The civil/tortious definition of trespass means that D must not have express or implied permission to be in the building. Thus, entry with the occupier’s consent will preclude trespass, but trespass alone is not sufficient for an offence of burglary, it must be intentionally or recklessly. In Collins [1972] he was wearing only his socks & climbed a ladder and was perched on a bedroom window sill. The 18-year old girl inside assumed her boyfriend had returned for a nocturnal visit, and she invited him in, and they had sexual intercourse. C was convicted of burglary under s9(1)(a), entry with intent to rape, although the Court of Appeal quashed this because the trial judge had not properly directed the jury on the need for mens rea as to presence as a trespasser.

D will be trespassing if he enters in excess of any permission he might otherwise have - Jones and Smith [1976] where J and S entered the house belonging to S’s father with the intention of stealing, and their convictions for burglary were upheld.

“Building or part of a building” is an element which is difficult to define precisely. s9(3) say’s that it includes an inhabited vehicle or vessel. It is generally accepted that, for example, a caravan or houseboat probably constitutes a “building” when it is inhabited, say during the holiday season, but arguably not at other times of the year. A caravan or houseboat which is someone’s permanent home is a “building” even though (s)he is not there at the time.

A “building” must have some degree of permanence. In B and S v Leathley [1979] a freezer container which had been in the same place for three years and was likely to stay there for the foreseeable future, was a “building”.

A “part of a building” may or may not mean a separate room, it includes an area in a room marked out, as in the case of the area behind the counter in a shop - Walkington [1979] where D went behind a counter marked “Staff Only” in order to take money from a till. Even though the till was empty D was convicted of burglary, because it is the intent to steal which creates the offence.

“Stealing” in s9(1) means theft as in s1. Thus, there is no burglary where D enters with intention of dishonestly using electricity contrary to s13 - Low v Blease [1975] where it was held that, as electricity was not property capable of appropriation, D could not be guilty of burglary in entering premises as a trespasser and making a telephone call from them. Oddly enough. if D had used a gas appliance this would have been property and he would have been convicted of burglary.

“Intent to inflict gbh” in s9(1)(a) means intent to commit offence under s20 OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861.

“Unlawful damage” in s9(1)(a) means an offence under s1 CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971.

Section 10 TA 2968 creates and offence of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY:

A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits a burglary & at the time has with him his

  • Weapon of offence

  • Imitation firearm

  • Firearm

  • Explosive

  • A weapon of offence weapon of offence means an article made or adapted for causing injury/incapacitating a person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use. It may mean anything, e.g. coshes, rope etc.

  • imitation firearms are anything that has the appearance of a firearm, whether capable of being fired or not.

  • firearm includes airguns/pistols, but must have a barrel.

  • explosive means any article manufactured for the purpose of producing a practical effect by explosion, or intended by the person having it with him for that purpose.

Kelly [1993], it was held that the focus of the THEFT ACT 1968 s10 is use during burglary, so that a screwdriver taken into a house by D became a weapon of offence on proof that he intended to use it for causing injury to, or incapacitating the householder at the time of the theft. Since it appears that there was sufficient evidence to show that D had the screwdriver with him for some time for the purposes of causing injury if necessary, the case was not one of spontaneous use.

D must have the firearm etc. with him at the time he commits the burglary, i.e. burglary under s9(l)(a) or s9(1)(b). Thus, if the burglary is of the s9(1)(a) type, D must have the firearm etc. with him when he enters the building or part thereof (i.e. when he carries out the actus reus). If it is of the s9(1)(b) type, he must have the firearm etc. with him when he commits the further offence. In Francis [1982] F had a stick with him when he demanded entry into V’s house but had discarded it before stealing from one of the rooms. Thus, there could be no aggravated burglary.

A strange offence can be found in s1 TA 1968: REMOVAL OF ARTICLES FROM A PUBLIC PLACE:

“ … where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it, or a collection or part of a collection housed in it, any person who without lawful authority removes from the building or its grounds the whole or part of any article displayed or kept for display to the public in the building or that part of it or n its grounds shall be guilty of an offence”.

This provision has been created to cover cases of temporary deprivation which fall outside the scope of theft.

The public, as opposed to a small class of persons, must have a right of access.

They must have access in order to view, & the article must be displayed or kept for display; i.e. the article must be exhibited in the same way in which an art gallery exhibits a painting - Barr [1978]. Here the defendant removed a cross from a church, which was not part of an exhibition but used in acts of worship.

If the article is displayed in a building it must be removed from the building, and if displayed in the grounds it must be removed from the grounds.

The offence may be committed when the exhibition is closed to the public - Durkin [1973], where there was a criminal removal of paintings from an art gallery even though each painting was seldom on view to the public.

Articles which are exhibited for a commercial purpose, e.g. to sell them, are not protected by s11.

I left the group with a series of questions requiring short answers. We shall discuss these next week before looking at s12 TA 1968, TAKING A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER.

Friday, February 09, 2007

Thursday 8 February 2007

There was no class this evening. The appalling weather and lack of students forced its postponement.

Remember that there is no class next week, as it is half term. See you again on Thursday 22 February 2007.

Friday, February 02, 2007

Thursday 1 February 2007

s5(1) indicates that property belongs, for the purpose of theft, to the person having:

  • possession

  • control

  • proprietary right or interest in it.

Note that it has nothing to do with ownership, so it is perfectly possible to steal from a thief.

A lien is defined as: “the right to take and hold or sell the property of a debtor as security or payment for a debt or duty”, ad this is the proprietary right that the statute means. So a defendant may steal his own property: Turner (No.2) [1971] where T was convicted of theft of his car in that he had taken it to be repaired and collected it intending not to pay the bill.

The person who controls land prima facie controls property on it, even though he may be unaware of its existence - WOODMAN [1974]. There a quantity of scrap metal on a disused site was sold and the buyer had removed all but a very small amount of it. W went on to the site and took some of the remaining scrap and was convicted of theft from the site-owner. The site-owner continued to have control of it and the erection of fences and notices showed that he intended to exclude others from it.

The same argument will apply to lost golf balls. It appears that rubbish left in a skip belongs to the skip owner, and rubbish in bins will belong to the local authority.

Items abandoned and not owned by anyone cannot be stolen, e.g. leaving a newspaper on a park bench.

Since a company has a separate personality from its members, a shareholder or director may steal company property. But problems exist when the persons who steal property are the sole directors and shareholders. The English approach has been that it is possible for a director to steal from his company, but Australia take a different view. In Roffel [1985] the High Court of Victoria said that as the act was not unauthorised there was no appropriation.

Since the property must, by definition, belong to another, there can be no theft when title in the property has already passed to D at the time he appropriates it - Edwards v Ddin [1976] where D drove off from a garage without paying for the petrol which had just been put into the tank. There could be no conviction for theft because the ownership of the petrol passed to D as soon as it went into the tank. This assumes that D intended to pay when the petrol was put into his tank and only later changed his mind. This has since been corrected by s3 Theft Act 1978 (later).

Property which is subject to a trust belongs to the beneficiaries (who have an equitable title) as well as to the trustees (who have the legal title). However, in the case of charitable trusts there may be no identifiable beneficiaries. Thus, any appropriation by a trustee may not be theft, because the property may not belong to another. Therefore s5(2) states that the persons to whom the trust property belongs includes those who have a right to enforce the trust.

Property received under an obligation is worth remembering. Section 5(3) states that where the property is received by D from V or on account of V and d is under an obligation to V to retain and deal with the property in a particular way, then as against D, the property or its proceeds are to be regarded as belonging to V. A bit of gobbledegook, admittedly, but it is quite straightforward when the English language is used!

A travel agent who receives money from clients in (part) payment for their travel arrangements is not necessarily bound to deal with the money in a particular way: Hall [1973]. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of a travel agent who had failed to use a client’s deposit to book his holiday, as there was no obligation to deal with the cash in a particular way.

I will finish with a straightforward example:

Fancy a block paved drive? I know a man who will do it as a foreigner

(a)     “It’ll cost you £2,000 & I’ll want a 50% deposit”
(b)     “It’ll cost you £2,000 & I’ll need half of it to buy the bricks”

Either way he keeps the cash. What is the outcome? Look at s5(3). In (a) the money becomes the property of the block paver, whilst in (b) it is still owned by the original owner, as the money is to be used only for the bricks.

Section 5(4) states that where D gets property by another’s mistake and “is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof” then, as against D, the property belongs to the person entitled to restoration. It is also provides that “an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded … as an intention to deprive that person of the property or the proceeds”.

What it means is that where there is a legal obligation to return the property, it still belongs to the person that made the mistake and is, therefore, capable of forming a charge for theft, if the other elements are present.

A somewhat extreme example can be found in Shadrokh-Cigari [1988], where an American bank mistakenly credited a child’s account at an English bank with £286,000 instead of £286. S-C, the child’s guardian, got the child to authorise banker’s drafts which S-C paid into his own accounts. The intangible property represented by the drafts, i.e. the right to sue the bank, could not belong to the bank, but the actual document itself did. The bank transferred legal ownership of the draft to S-C or the child on delivery, but it retained an equitable interest. Thus, it was unnecessary to refer to s5(4), but the Court of Appeal said that s5(4) provided an alternative route that would have led to the same result.

The obligation to restore the property in s5(4) must be a legal one as opposed to a moral one - Gilks [1972]. G was paid £106 by a betting-shop clerk, and he took the money knowing that he had been overpaid. G was convicted of theft of the money that he had been overpaid on the basis that the title to it never passed to him. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, as gambling debts are not enforceable at law. There was a moral obligation to repay, but not a legal one.
We then turned to the mens rea elements, beginning with dishonesty.

s2(1) contains three situations in which D will not be said to have been dishonest. Tey are commonly referred to as the “statutory beliefs”:

(a)      where D believes he has a legal right to the property;
(b)      where D believes he has the consent of the person to whom the property belongs; and
(c)      where D believes the person to whom the property belongs cannot be traced by taking reasonable steps.

These beliefs are not required to be reasonable; it is sufficient that any one of them is genuinely held.

Under s2(1)(a), D has a good defence as long as he believes he has a legal, not moral, right to the property. It is irrelevant that he may know that he is not entitled to appropriate it in the way that he does, e.g. by threatening to use physical violence.

In Robinson [1977] D was guilty neither of robbery nor of theft where he seized a £5 note which fell from V’s pocket during a struggle in which D was brandishing a knife. V’s wife owed D £7, and D successfully claimed that he was not dishonest since he believed he had a legal right to the money.

In relation to s2(1)(c), it is worth distinguishing between belief that the property has been abandoned and belief that it has merely been lost but that its owner cannot be found by taking reasonable steps.

Even where D is unable to claim that he held one of the above beliefs, he may still avoid being regarded as dishonest since there is a more general test for dishonesty which must be applied. In Ghosh [1982], it was held that 2 questions must be asked:

(1)      Was D’s conduct dishonest according to the standards of ordinary reasonable people? If not, D must be acquitted. If it was, then
(2)      Was D aware that his conduct would be regarded as dishonest by ordinary reasonable people? Only if the answer to this second question is affirmative may he be treated as having acted dishonestly.

The Ghosh test seeks to apply a comprehensive means of determining dishonesty which encompasses the three situations in s2(1), but is not confined to them. The test is also used in deceptions, and conspiracy to defraud. However, it is probably correct for judges to refer to s2(1), as well as to Ghosh, whenever there is evidence that falls within one of the three paragraphs in the subsection.

In Wootton [1990] W was charged with theft of pottery from their employers, and their defence was that they had taken it in lieu of wages, (i.e. impliedly raising s2(1)(a)). Quashing their convictions, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge ought to have specifically addressed the jury with reference to s2(1)(a).

By s2(2), “A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he is willing to pay for the property”. So, for example, D may be dishonest where he takes V’s property knowing that V does not want to part with it, even though he (D) leaves the price of it behind.

We will look at an intention permanently to deprive next week.